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This thesis explores the contemporary lived experience of altered moods (i.e. those 
experiences that are commonly diagnosed by Western medicine as affective or mood 
disorders) and Christianity using a distinctive and robust empirical theological methodology to 
develop a grounded practical theology. This methodology integrates constructivist grounded 
theory (Charmaz, 2014) with dialogic mutual critical correlation (Pattison, 2000); grounded 
theory is thus used as a theological methodology and not simply as an empirical tool.  
 
Analysing 21 interviews with participants who have lived experience of both unusually high 
and/or low mood and Christianity, I argue that these mood and faith experiences inform and 
challenge each other in four main areas: identity-talk, interpretations of altered moods, images 
of God, and Christology. Three major overarching themes frame these interactions: altered 
moods as experience not identity, a potential disconnect between experience and theology, and 
suffering. 
 
This analysis of the empirical material is brought firstly into dialogue with disability theology 
and then with wider Christian theological resources - contextual Christologies, trauma 
theology, and theology of the cross. This process of dialogue with experience highlights three 
distinctive aspects of theological reflection on altered moods: 1) Jesus as the site of divine 
understanding and solidarity, with the traditional image of his suffering on the cross adopted 
and transformed to incorporate the distress associated with altered moods, 2) the need to 
attend to the ongoing reality of suffering, and 3) theology of altered moods is a theology of 
experience, not of identity. Potential elements of such a theology – a mad theology – include 
wounds that remain, realism about experience, the solidarity of God encountered through 
Jesus, and the abiding nature of God’s love. Such a mad theology bears witness to the ways in 
which God is glimpsed and encountered even in the distress of altered moods.  
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1.1 Context – Mental health and faith in the UK today 
 
In 2019 the UK’s Guardian newspaper (Sherwood, 2019) reported that:  
 
The Archbishop of Canterbury has revealed he is taking medication for 
depression and has urged others who are “walking in darkness” to reach out 
for help… Speaking on BBC Radio 4’s Thought for the Day slot before a mental 
health conference at Lambeth Palace… Justin Welby said: “Last year I realised 
I was depressed. I have a daughter who has been very open about her 
experiences of depression, and she helped me see that it wasn’t something to 
be ashamed of. It’s just life – and I got help”… Welby said that, along with the 
rest of society, the church had a history of not knowing how to deal with 
mental health issues. Many churches offered safe spaces and care, “but it is 
not universal and we need to work hard on that”. 
 
The Archbishop is not alone in his experience of depression. National survey data suggests that 
around 20% of UK adults meet the medical criteria to be diagnosed with the most common 
mental health problems of depression or anxiety (McManus et al., 2016). Around a quarter of 
UK adults have been diagnosed with a mental health condition at some time in their life 
(Bridges, 2015). UK public awareness campaigns1 aim to normalise help-seeking by 
encouraging us to talk freely about mental health and develop skills to respond appropriately 
to those experiencing mental distress. However, the fact that the Archbishop of Canterbury 
was reported in a national newspaper to have ‘revealed’ his use of antidepressants suggests 
that there is still some distance to go in meeting those goals. These kinds of statistics are 
evidence that mental health challenges and symptoms of ill-health are common in the UK. 
However, not everybody who meets the criteria for a mental health condition understands or 
experiences those challenges and symptoms in the same way. Different cultures and 
communities may understand and experience them in particular ways. Medical 
anthropologists and cross-cultural psychiatrists talk about ‘Western psychologization’,2 for 
 
1 E.g. Time to Talk, Mental Health First Aid, or the #oktosay campaign featuring Princes William 
and Harry speaking about coping with the death of their mother. 
2 The concept of ‘Western psychologisation’ (and the parallel ‘Chinese somatisation’) in 
depression originated with Kleinman (1977), see Ryder and Chentsova-Dutton (2012) or Dere 
et al. (2013) for more recent discussion.  




example, when discussing differences in the dominant ways that people from different 
cultures experience or represent depression.3 There may also be differences between groups 
that exist within the same wider society. In the UK, religious or faith communities may fit into 
this category; these groups may understand mental health problems in spiritual or theological 
terms. Mental health symptoms may be understood as evidence of spiritual weakness (or 
occasionally as evidence of strength), or as the result of external supernatural forces (e.g. 
demons). These religious interpretations may be held in parallel with other, more dominant, 
perspectives, such as the biopsychosocial model. People might, for example, consult both their 
GP and a faith healer for help with their mental health. (See e.g. Stanford, 2007; Khalifa et al., 
2012 for quantitative surveys of beliefs; Dein and Illaiee, 2013; Scrutton, 2020 for an overview 
of Christian perspectives on depression).  
 
There is a significant body of literature that examines the relationship between religion and 
wellbeing or mental health (e.g. Loewenthal, 2009; Cook, 2013b; Rosmarin and Koenig, 2020). 
A 2016 evidence review of 139 such studies, carried out by the think tank Theos, concluded 
that there is good evidence of a positive correlation between religion and wellbeing (with 
mental health being one component of wellbeing). This conclusion should be read alongside 
the acknowledgment that both religion and wellbeing can be defined and measured in 
multiple ways and have multiple aspects, that certain aspects (such as religious practices) are 
much easier to measure in surveys than others, and that even a strong positive association 
does not imply all kinds of religion are always good for wellbeing. Social and individual 
religious participation were found to show the strongest positive correlation with global 
wellbeing and mental health, with the authors concluding that, “At the most generalised level, 
it seems that the more serious, genuinely held and practically-evidenced a religious 
commitment is, then the greater the positive impact it is likely to have on well-being” (Spencer 
et al., 2016, p.7). The same report found, however, that not all aspects of religion are 
associated with positive mental health; some beliefs and practices can be harmful.  
 
We can see some of these complexities reflected in the national news report about the 
Archbishop – a degree of surprise that a spiritual leader might experience depression, and a 
 
3 There is no single settled position (within academia, health care, or wider society) on the 
most appropriate language to describe these kinds of experiences and symptoms. Terms such 
as ‘depression’, ‘mental health conditions/problems’, or ‘mental ill-health’ are used here in 
their colloquial sense. See section 1.3 for a discussion of some of the complexities around 
language and how it will be used in the rest of the thesis.   




deliberate choice on the part of the Archbishop to refute the idea that his depression is 
shameful. That the Archbishop hosted a mental health conference at all is also notable – 
reflecting an awareness that churches may differ in the ways in which they understand and 
respond to mental distress, that some of those ways may not be associated with positive 
mental health, and some of them may be quite distinctive when compared with the wider 
society. Until recently, in-depth and fine-grained exploration of these complexities was notably 
absent from both the theological and social scientific academic literature. In particular, there 
was an absence of theological engagement with the ways in which Christians interpret mental 
health challenges, and with the wider topic of mental health. 
 
These complexities around the ways in which Christians in the UK understand and respond to 
mental health problems, the limited previous literature, and my own Christian and ministerial 
practice  provided the broad context and motivation for this project. The need for this kind of 
research and engagement has since been noted by other authors, for example a 2017 scoping 
report on Christianity and mental health in the UK found need for “building an authentic 
biblical and theological language of mental health” (Ryan, 2017, p.8) that is grounded in lived 
experience. The same unexpected lack of theological engagement with mental health and 
disability observed earlier has also been noted by Swinton (2018a) and Cook (2013b). Started 
in 2015 before Ryan’s identification of that need, this thesis extends the existing theological 
landscape of mental health. It does so by developing the idea of a grounded practical 
theology4 of altered moods based on the narratives of twenty-one people with lived 
experience of high and/or low moods and Christianity. It is an empirical theological exploration 
of the ways in which the lived experience of altered moods is informed by the lived 
experience5 of Christianity; and vice versa. Weaver has described this interplay between faith 
 
4 The term ‘grounded theology’ is used by Barnsley (2016) to refer to a theological method 
that combines grounded theory with the Quaker practice of silent waiting. In this thesis I 
develop the idea of grounded theology in a different direction. 
5 The term ‘lived experience’ has a particular meaning in some mental health settings where 
personal experience of mental distress and/or using mental healthcare is considered a mark of 
expertise which gives access to a particular kind of knowledge. For example, ‘lived experience 
of mental distress’ might be listed as a desirable person specification for some support roles, 
with the person designated as an ‘expert by experience’. ‘Lived experience’ and ‘lived religion’ 
have a less specific meaning in the social sciences, referring to the study of life (or religion 
specifically) as it is experienced and interpreted by a particular individual or group. It is 
associated with an interpretive orientation and thick description of a situation – paying 
attention to the particulars of experience, “to understand, portray and interpret the meanings 
that actions and events have for those involved” (Shaw et al., 2006, p.99). In both cases ‘lived 
 




and experience well:  
 
Sometimes faith deeply connects with experience, which in turn reinforces 
belief; other times faith contrasts with lived experience, resulting in a critical 
dialectic between religious belief and the rest of one's life. This happens at 
the personal as well as at the corporate level (Weaver, 2013, p.70). 
 
It is common in both disability theology and some areas of constructivist social science writing 
for the author to indicate something of their own lived experience of the topic. This is less to 
do with establishing credentials and more to do with an explicit commitment to reflexivity and 
situating the author’s voice. It is for this reason that I have written the thesis in the first 
person, despite recognising that this is not common in all disciplines (Starfield, 2015). Here it 
seems appropriate to say that I recognise many of the complexities around mental health and 
Christianity from my own lived experience. I write as a British Christian woman who is 
currently an ordained member of the Church of England working as a University chaplain. My 
faith tradition is central Anglican,6 but I have previously been part of other traditions and 
denominations. My interest in this particular topic arises from my own experiences around the 
intersections of mental health and faith, my former work in mental health promotion for the 
NHS, and the stories of faith and life that are generously and sometimes courageously shared 
with me in the course of my pastoral ministry.     
 
 
experience’ may be (implicitly or otherwise) contrasted with an alternative such as knowledge 
about mental health gained through other means (like academic study), or the official doctrine 
and teaching of a particular religious tradition (McGuire, 2008). It does not, however, have to 
entail religion that is practiced outside of religious institutions (Ammerman, 2014). Ordinary 
theology (Astley, 2012) or practical theology more broadly is perhaps the theological 
equivalent of ‘lived experience’ or ‘lived religion’. 
6 Anglican tradition is often said to have several significant strands or ‘tribes’ that are held 
together in one communion – evangelical, (Anglo-) catholic and usually a third grouping which 
at different times has been described as liberal, central, middle-of-the-road, traditional, or 
broad church (Atherstone, 2016). This group is more difficult to define than the other two. 
Empirical work by Village (2012) suggests that being ‘broad church’ (his term) is “partly about 
taking a broadly Anglo-Catholic or Evangelical stance on many issues, but without strongly 
owning either identity, and partly about taking a distinctively ‘middle ground’… Broad church 
views were typically more in favour of change and innovation… [and] tended to be associated 
with a liberal or accepting point of view that was more closely aligned with practice or belief in 
society at large (Village, 2012, p.111). This ‘middle ground’ is expressed via a neutral opinion 
on some issues that have historical divided the church (e.g. use of vestments or ritual), greater 
civic involvement and a positive attitude towards wider society society, less frequent church 
attendance, and a more liberal approach to contemporary divisions, such as ordination of 
women, marriage and relationships, and sexuality.  




1.2 Shape of this project 
 
This thesis is a ‘grounded’ practical theology in two senses. Firstly, in a technical sense - 
constructivist grounded theory is the guiding methodology for the data collection and analysis 
which are integrated into the practical theology methodology. Grounded theory is used as a 
theological method and not just as an empirical tool. This movement and the integration of 
two methodologies is discussed further in 1.4 and Chapter 2. Secondly, in a wider sense, 
describing this as a ‘grounded’ theology reflects a commitment to taking seriously the 
experiences and voices of the participants throughout the study. This commitment is reflected 
in both the methods used, and the form of the thesis. This approach is attentive to context and 
dialectical; seeking to keep individual experiences, (as narrated by interview participants), in 
the foreground, to move primarily from data to theory rather than the reverse, and to 
establish dialogue between the theological and the grounded theory aspects of the project. 
The thesis is thoroughly grounded in the experiences, words, and reflections of the 
participants, all of whom have been unusually high and/or low to an extent that disrupted 
their daily life. I describe this as ‘grounding theology in experience’, an approach which 
amplifies the everyday or ordinary theology of participants. Combining methodologies in this 
way is an innovative approach to practical theology; a literature search revealed only two 
previously published examples, by Shooter (2012) and Barnsley (2013; 2016).7 
 
For many participants the disruption has been severe and long-lasting, leading to a 
restructuring and reconstruction of life around that disruption. To reflect this, and to maintain 
a focus on the idea of theology grounded in experience, the structure of the thesis has been 
imagined and described as a building project. The foundations and building materials consist of 
an integrated empirical and theological methodology, drawing together social scientific and 
theological methods into a grounded theological method for exploring the interactions 
between experience and theology. On the ground floor are those elements that form the base 
and give shape to the building; the mood experiences of participants and the interpretations of 
those experiences. On the first floor and second floors are theological motifs that build on 
those interpretations and that emerged as particularly significant from the data analysis. The 
top floor draws together the preceding chapters to explore and highlight some potential 
 
7 Both Shooter and Barnsley locate themselves in feminist theology; Shooter researching 
survivors of abuse, and Barnsley everyday experiences of complex gender. 




contours of a constructive contextual theology of altered moods – a mad theology.8 Consistent 
with the grounded nature of this methodology, the empirical data collected from participants 
is the origin and primary source for each section; analysis of that data provides the overarching 
structure of the construction.  
 
This is a distinctive empirical approach to the subject, combining robust social scientific and 
practical theological methodology and methods.9 There are a large number of quantitative 
surveys that deal with the relationships between religious beliefs/practice and mental health 
(including religious beliefs about mental health). There are far fewer studies that address the 
ways in which Christians interpret mental health conditions - the theology of mental health. 
Most other recent theological work on mental health is autobiographical (e.g. Colwell, 2014; 
Oh, 2018), biblical (e.g. Webb, 2017; Cook and Hamley, 2020), or theoretical (e.g. Cook, 2013b; 
Scrutton, 2020). This wider literature is discussed below in section 1.4, as part of the 
disciplinary context for this project. However, it is important to note here recent work by 
Swinton (Swinton, 2017; Swinton, 2020a), which offers a practical theology of mental health. 
 
Writing initially about dementia, Swinton (2017) develops a theological redescription of the 
condition; describing dementia using alternative scripts drawn from Christian Scripture, 
tradition and theology as a counter to the scripts conventionally accepted by wider Western 
society, especially neurobiology and medicine. Swinton suggests that this process of 
redescription is applicable beyond dementia: 
 
Redescription is an interdisciplinary approach to practical theology that seeks, 
in the light of Scripture and Christian tradition, to redescribe objects, actions, 
situations, and contexts in ways that reveal hidden meanings, modes of 
oppression and misrepresentation, with a view to offering a fuller and more 
accurate description that highlights alternative understandings and previously 
inconceivable options for theory and action (Swinton, 2017, p.21). 
 
 
8 See sections 1.3, 1.4 and Chapter 8 for discussion of use of the word ‘mad’. 
9 The combination of grounded theory and theology is relatively uncommon; searching the 
literature revealed five examples: Pleizier (2010); Joynt (2012); Shooter (2012); Walsh (2012); 
Barnsley (2013). This may be due to disciplinary boundaries and differences in training 
between theological and social scientific disciplines (practical theologians have not necessarily 
received extensive training in empirical research methods), but may also reflect ongoing 
debate as to the role of experience in theology (see section 2.1.1.2). The theoretical rationale 
for empirical theology more broadly, and my use of grounded theory as a way to bridge 
differences and facilitate dialogue between disciplines is discussed throughout Chapter 2. 




In a recent volume, Swinton applies this process of redescription to what might be described 
clinically as severe mental illness (including depression), with the aim of providing “rich, deep, 
and thick descriptions of the spiritual experiences of Christians living with mental health 
challenges” (Swinton, 2020a, p.2). The aim is to understand how Christians experience their 
faith lives and their mental health challenges - Swinton describes this as a phenomenological 
dimension. The primary focus of this work is to explore ways in which Christians with long-
term mental health challenges live well and faithfully with Jesus in the midst of the 
metaphorical storm. Data collection and preliminary analysis for this project was complete 
before Swinton published his call for theological redescription. As a work of grounded practical 
theology it has been carried out in this same spirit of theological redescription, but takes a 
different path. The primary focus, methodology, and outcomes are distinctive to this project.  
 
Firstly, primary focus. Rather than focusing on how Christians with mental health challenges 
live faithful Christian lives, the focus of this project is broader - how participants’ experiences 
of faith and mental health have interacted and informed each other, and how participants 
interpret their mood experiences (rather than the experience of mental health challenges per 
se). The range of participant experiences are therefore also broader. This project centres the 
everyday or ordinary theology of participants reflecting on their mood experiences without 
defining lived theology as necessarily being about participants’ faith lives or relationship with 
God.10 Methodologically, Swinton takes a phenomenological approach both in this most recent 
work and in previously published interview-based work on mental health (Swinton and Mowat, 
2006, chap. 4). As a project guided by grounded theory, the significant aspects of the 
interaction between faith and mood emerged from the data and analysis, and may well have 
included perspectives which did not include wanting to live faithfully with Jesus; participants 
were recruited on the basis that they had at some time identified as Christian and did not 
necessarily need to identify in that way at the time of the interview. With respect to outcomes, 
the grounded nature of the project meant that the outcomes arose through the process of 
data collection and analysis. The major themes outlined in Chapters 3-7, and particularly the 
possible contours of a practical contextual mad theology in Chapter 8 were not anticipated in 
advance and emerged through the rigorous grounded theological methodology. This project 
therefore offers a new contribution in two specific areas: the integration of grounded theory 
 
10 Compared with Swinton’s description of lived theology as “gain[ing] insight into the ways in 
which people’s unconventional mental health experiences affect their faith lives and 
relationships with God” (Swinton, 2020a, p.6). 




and theological methodologies, and contextual theologies of experience. 
 
1.3 Renaming, language & definitions 
 
The kinds of experiences that are commonly diagnosed in the UK as depression or moods 
disorders may be described in different ways, depending on the context and preferences of 
the author. In this section I therefore present an examination of some of the key terms, and a 
renaming. First, a discussion of definitions of depression, mood disorders, and what I have 
referred to as ‘altered moods’. 
 
There are two major systems that Western-style health care uses to diagnose and classify 
illnesses. These are the International Classification of Disease (now in its 11th edition [ICD-11]) 
(World Health Organization, 2019), and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (currently on the 5th edition [DSM-5]) (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). ICD-
11 covers the full range of medical specialties and bodily systems, while DSM-5 focuses only on 
those conditions that would typically fall under psychiatry or mental health services, and so 
offers a more in-depth system of classification. ‘Mental disorders’ is a broad medical term, 
referring, in the DSM classification at least, to problems or patterns of difference associated 
with the functioning of the ‘mind’ (intellect, thoughts, emotions, behaviour) and brain. This 
includes those states that would commonly be described as mental illness, but also a wide 
range of other conditions, including intellectual disability, neurodivergence such as autism, 
addictions, dementia, and sleep disorders.  
 
Despite this apparently clear differentiation between ‘mental disorders’ and other kinds of 
illnesses or diseases, it is not straightforward to specify what exactly constitutes a ‘mental’ 
condition (compared to ‘physical’ or ‘somatic’ conditions). There is an enduring intuition that 
experiences which might be characterised as mental health conditions are in some way a 
distinct category. However, it is not clear whether this intuition simply reflects the historical 
development of Western psychiatry (for an overview of this history see Albee and Joffe, 2003; 
Shorter, 2008), or if there is some kind of common characteristic shared across the diverse 
experiences that might be diagnosed as a mental health condition. It is not just that there are 
obvious links between physical and mental health (such as pain impacting psychological 
wellbeing), but that it is not easy to decide precisely what makes something a mental rather 
than a physical condition, other than medical convention (Kendell, 2001; Pilgrim, 2016). 




Symptoms, aetiology, diagnosis and treatment are all possible ways in which mental and 
physical health conditions might be differentiated, but none of those possibilities offer a 
definitive answer. For example, Western medicine characterises mental health problems as 
predominantly consisting of cognitive and emotional symptoms. However, people 
experiencing altered moods commonly also have physical symptoms such as heaviness in the 
limbs, and depressed mood or anxiety may also accompany physical health conditions. 
Similarly, the aetiological and diagnostic characteristics of mental health conditions may relate 
more to the current state of medical knowledge than to genuine differences.   
 
It is apparent that it is difficult to make a clear-cut distinction. The introduction to the DSM-IV 
similarly reflected these concerns, without offering a solution:  
 
The term mental disorder unfortunately implies a distinction between 
‘mental’ disorders and ‘physical’ disorders that is a reductionistic 
anachronism of mind/body dualism. A compelling literature documents that 
there is much ‘physical’ in ‘mental’ disorders and much ‘mental’ in ‘physical’ 
disorders. The problem raised by the term ‘mental disorders’ has been much 
clearer than its solution, and, unfortunately, the term persists in the title of 
DSM-IV because we have not found an appropriate substitute (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000, xxx). 
 
Looking more specifically at those experiences that fall within the remit of this thesis, the 
earlier DSM-IV contained a section on ‘mood disorders’. In DSM-5 these are separated into 
‘bipolar and related disorders’ and ‘depressive disorders’ (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). There are multiple potential diagnoses under each of those headings, with criteria that 
must be met for the various diagnoses. For major depressive disorder, for example, these are: 
 
At least 5 of the following symptoms are present during the same 2-week period (including at 
least one of the first two symptoms): 
• depressed mood 
• diminished interest or loss of pleasure in almost all activities 
• significant weight or appetite change 
• sleep disturbance 
• psychomotor agitation or retardation 
• fatigue or loss of energy 
• feelings of worthlessness 
• diminished ability to think or concentrate; indecisiveness 




• recurrent thoughts of death, recurrent suicidal ideation, or a suicide attempt or specific 
plan for committing suicide. 
 
The symptoms must cause significant distress or functional impairment and not be attributable 
to drugs or another medical condition, or be better explained by a different diagnosis 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Many of the diagnoses in DSM-V have overlapping 
criteria or symptoms, including the possibility of low or elevated mood. In particular, mood 
and anxiety disorders often co-occur (Kessler et al., 2003). 
 
Throughout this thesis I have chosen to primarily use the term ‘altered moods’11 rather than 
either the technical terms of ‘mood or depressive disorder’ taken from DSM-V or colloquial 
terms such as ‘depression/anxiety’, ‘common mental health problems’, or ‘mental illness’. The 
intention is that ‘altered moods’ encompasses experiences that could be diagnosed as mood 
disorders such as depression, dysthymia, bipolar affective disorder, or mania, but also 
unusually high and/or low moods that do not fit neatly into diagnostic categories or that have 
not been diagnosed as such. Despite the difficulties of reaching a precise definition, there are 
certain types of experiences (persistent low mood, lack of interest in life, suicidal ideation and 
so on), that those living in the UK would be likely to describe in terms of (poor) mental health 
and which would commonly be identified as depression, anxiety, or bipolar disorder.12 It is 
these experiences which are the focus of this thesis.  
 
The initial need was to find a suitable term, covering those kind of experiences, to use in 
participant recruitment. The recruitment process allowed participants to self-define as having 
lived experience of the experiences under discussion, i.e. I did not ask participants or potential 
participants to confirm they had a mental health condition such as depression, disclose any 
diagnosis, nor take any kind of mood screening test. Participants also self-defined as having 
identified as ‘Christian’ at some point. This recruitment strategy is discussed further in section 
 
11 This term is not in common use in the literature, although it can be found in some mental 
health materials aimed at a general audience. In the academic literature it appears to be used 
mainly in relation to mood changes associated with other health conditions or environmental 
stressors. I propose it here as a useful term to encapsulate the varieties of unusually high/low 
moods. 
12 Surveys of population mental health literacy (which includes the recognition and labelling of 
certain experiences as mental health conditions) suggest that upwards of 70% of people in 
Western societies identify the DSM criteria for ‘major depressive disorder’ as indicating 
depression, for example (Link et al., 1999; Furnham and Swami, 2018).   




2.3.3. I therefore wanted to find a term that centred on the various conditions that would 
colloquially be called depression or bipolar, but without tying it too tightly to medical 
terminology or diagnosis. This model of recruitment was intended to include those who reject 
medical labels for their experiences, who might resist the language of ‘disorder’, who have not 
had a diagnosis at all, or who had a different diagnosis (e.g. anxiety) with significant mood 
changes. The term ‘altered moods’, despite being an unfamiliar term, seemed to meet this 
need and worked well in recruitment – participants’ mood experiences did cluster around 
depression/low mood, but also included some who had not sought medical help or diagnosis, 
and at least one person who strongly rejected the medical model. One participant commented 
that when she saw the term ‘altered moods’ she thought ‘that’s exactly it, that’s what it feels 
like – your mood is altered’. The eventual phrasing used in recruitment was a call for 
participants who had, at some time in their life: 
 
a) Considered themselves to be Christian or been part of a Christian community (e.g. a church) 
AND 
b) Experienced at least one episode of altered mood (often called depression, bipolar, or 
manic depression) which was severe enough to disrupt their everyday life.   
 
I continued to mainly, but not exclusively, use altered moods after recruitment and throughout 
the project and thesis. This choice of terminology reflects the fact that the medical 
categorisation of mood disorders is a contested concept; that some people strongly resist 
being given a diagnostic label; and that people may give alternative, non-medical, accounts of 
altered moods such as seeing them as a spiritual crisis. ‘Altered moods’ is an attempt to be 
inclusive of those different perspectives while still being readable. Similarly, I have used the 
terms ‘mental health problems’, ‘poor mental health’, ‘mental distress’ or ‘mental health 
challenges’, in preference to ‘mental illness’, to reflect common usage in the UK. However, 
some people who experience mental distress strongly prefer the term ‘mental illness’, as 
captured in the term ‘severe mental illnesses’ which is used to differentiate severe and 
enduring experiences of distress (especially those which include psychosis) from more 
frequent and less severe experiences of mental distress – ‘common mental health problems’ 
or ‘common mental disorders’. Others reject that kind of language entirely and might, for 
example, describe themselves as survivors (of mental distress or the mental health system), as 




mental health service users, or as mad.13 The language used by participants in this study 
reflects this range of perspectives and I have not taken a hard line on this - in some places I use 
medical language, in others the terms that are in common use, and in others altered moods. 
This is a pragmatic choice rather than reflecting a strong commitment to anything other than 
centring the narratives of participants and respecting their diverse voices. The language 
choices I have made in this thesis should not be read as being either anti-psychiatry/anti-
medicine14 nor endorsing a strongly medicalising15 or realist16 stance towards the states that 
are diagnosed as mood disorders. Rather they are intended as the best choice from a range of 
potential options, none of which are value-neutral or embraced by all of the study participants, 
let alone everyone who experiences mental distress or has a diagnosed mental health 
condition. These language choices are not, however, intended to downplay or romanticise the 
very real and often severe distress and resulting life difficulties (such as relationship stress or 
loss of employment) that may be part of experiencing altered moods. Along with Swinton, “I 
acknowledge without equivocation” that the states which may be diagnosed as depression, 
bipolar disorder, and so on, are:  
 
extremely difficult condition[s] to live with, both for sufferers and for those 
who care for them. I use the term “suffering” quite deliberately…. [S]uffering 
is a key dimension of the experience… [it] is not a romantic disease. 
Nevertheless, it need not be defined only as suffering. There is room for hope 
(Swinton, 2017, p.189). 
 
Similarly, my acknowledgement of difficulties around definitions is not intended to indicate 
that it is impossible to say anything concrete about the experience of altered moods. Wendell 
 
13 See e.g. Mental Health Foundation (2021) for an overview of terminology and Allan (2006) 
for a first-person view on ‘mental illness’. 
14 The term ‘anti-psychiatry’ is particularly associated with work by Laing, Szasz and Goffman in 
the 1960s and 70s which was highly critical of the foundations and practice of psychiatry. The 
current ‘critical psychiatry’ movement is distinct but builds on that foundation (Middleton and 
Moncrieff, 2019). 
15 In particular, my language choices should not be taken as minimising the strong association 
between various forms of deprivation and poor mental health. Broadly speaking, I would 
endorse the biopsychosocial model, which recognises that biology, psychology, and the social 
environment (including structural determinants of health and health inequalities) may all have 
an effect on mental health.  Strongly medicalising stances on the other hand, have been 
characterised as the bio-bio-bio model (Read et al., 2009). 
16 ‘Realist’ in the sense of psychiatric positivism or naïve realism, in which psychiatric 
diagnoses such as ‘mood disorders’ are, relatively uncritically, taken to be “natural givens” 
(Pilgrim and Rogers, 2005, p.2550). In this thesis I take a pragmatic position, drawing on both 
critical realism and interpretivism (see section 2.2). 




(1989, p.108) has commented that, despite the social model perspective that disability is 
created by society and is not a characteristic of a person, the phrase ‘people with disabilities’ is 
meaningful for as long as there is social oppression based on disability. I consider that it is 
equally meaningful to talk about ‘people who experience altered moods’ as a group, for as 
long as people with certain experiences are given that label and are related to as part of that 
group. Those experiences consist of mental distress which takes the form of the kinds of 
emotional, cognitive, and physical symptoms outlined in the DSM-V.  
 
A second term that requires definition and discussion is ‘disability’. The legal definition of 
disability in the UK is that a disability is an impairment which has a substantial and long-term 
adverse effect on the ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities (Equality Act 2010, sec. 
6). Disability studies and the disability rights movement typically define disability in a different 
way to the legal definition. Disability in this case is distinguished from impairment and the 
direct effects of that impairment. It is instead a social context – to be disabled is to be a 
member of a group that shares an experience of marginalisation. Rather than disability being a 
personal tragedy, disability is seen as a social construction. In this social model of disability a 
distinction is often drawn between functional impairment (e.g. a person’s impaired visual, 
mobility, or intellectual abilities) and disability; a person’s blindness or deafness may impair 
some of their abilities but they are disabled by the failure of society to accommodate their 
different needs. Disability is no longer located within the person, and physical differences such 
as blindness or deafness are seen as ‘mere differences’ (Barnes, 2016),17 rather than as 
inherently negative.18 
 
There are a number of different social approaches to disability, arising from different 
 
17 Barnes has suggested that a bad-difference view of disability is often assumed to be self-
evident and intuitive. That is, disability is assumed to be an intrinsic harm to the person. She 
points out, however, that this intuition is not shared by many disabled people, who would 
argue for a mere difference perspective (Barnes, 2014, p.94). A mere-difference view does not 
necessarily imply that there are never any bad effects of impairment or disability, nor that 
these bad effects are solely the result of ableism, only that these harms are not the whole 
story and are no different in principle to other bodily limitations. 
18 This approach has been criticised, notably by Shakespeare (2014), for relying on this 
distinction between disability and impairment, which is easier to sustain theoretically than in 
relation to the real lives of disabled people. Shakespeare summarises this criticism as “people 
are disabled by society and by the their bodies and minds” (Shakespeare, 2014, p.5). 
Proponents of a strong social model (e.g. Barnes (2020)) respond that the social model does 
not necessarily imply a commitment to the idea that individual impairments are irrelevant, nor 
a rejection of medical and rehabilitative support to address those impairments. 




perspectives and different parts of the world. For example, the British ‘social model of 
disability’ differs from the ‘minority group’ approach which has predominated in the United 
States.19 What they, and indeed their critics, have in common is a shared commitment to 
“improving the lives of disabled people, by promoting social inclusion and removing the 
barriers that oppress disabled people” (Shakespeare, 2014, p.2). Differences among these 
social approaches are also reflected in debates about the use of person-first (‘people with 
disabilities’) or identity-first (‘disabled people’) language. This thesis is not primarily concerned 
with definitions of disability, and so it is not appropriate here to fully discuss the nuances of 
these different approaches. Trusting that all the approaches are intended to indicate respect 
and a commitment to inclusion, I have taken the decision to mainly, but not exclusively, used 
the term ‘disabled people’ throughout this thesis, without further discussion.20 
 
A related question is whether mental health challenges, including altered moods, constitute 
disability. At least some kinds of mood experiences certainly meet the legal definition of 
disability,21 and some people who experience altered moods do identify as disabled, but it is 
hard to judge the extent to which people find that identity meaningful. The Mad Pride 
movement, for example, did not find widespread acceptance in the same way that Disability 
Pride gained traction among those with physical impairments. ‘Mad Studies’ is an academic 
discipline, but the language of madness has not (yet) been taken up more widely, either by 
academia, as an identity claimed by individuals, or as a way of signifying a particular position 
that challenges or resists normative and dominant perspectives (compared with use of the 
term ‘queer’).22 In those cases where ‘mad’ is used as a descriptor, it is primarily by those with 
experience of severe mental distress such as psychosis. In some senses that may not be very 
different from physical impairments – these also have a spectrum of severity and not everyone 
with physical impairments would consider ‘disabled’ to be a meaningful identity – and yet 
there does seem to be a continuing sense in which mental ill-health does not quite fit with 
 
19 For an overview of these different social approaches see Shakespeare (2014) and Watson 
and Vehmas (2020, Part 1). 
20 This decision reflects the British context in which I am working, the limited use of person-
first language in relation to other types of difference, and a pragmatic intention to enhance 
the readability of the text. 
21 Long-term ability to carry out day-to-day activities can certainly be significantly impaired by 
altered moods, particularly those that might be diagnosed as ‘severe’; there is therefore 
potential overlap between the concepts of disability and some mental health conditions.  
22 Queen Margaret’s University in Scotland offers an MA in Mad Studies, for example. See 
Whittington (2012) for a discussion of the use of the word queer in academic discourse. 




other types of disability.23 
 
In this thesis I therefore take a different position on the use of language around mental health 
when compared to disability. I use primarily person-first language in relation to mental health 
(‘person who experiences altered moods’ rather than the identity-first ‘disabled person’). This 
reflects use of language by participants. Similarly, I am not using the language of madness, 
other than in the final chapter, where it is introduced to deliberately invite comparisons with 
other kinds of contextual theologies.  I also take the position that some experiences of altered 
moods can be (and are) considered to be a type of disability, but that it is not necessary to 
argue that all such experiences should be classified in that way. I leave it as an open question 
as to whether altered moods (or the medical diagnoses of depression, anxiety and so on) 
constitute a disability; ‘altered moods’, ‘disability’ and ‘mental health’ are all fuzzy categories 
or essentially contested concepts (Gallie, 1964). I make a more limited claim - it is my view that 
the kinds of altered moods experienced by participants (i.e. severe enough to cause noticeable 
disruption to their everyday life) have enough in common with other conditions that are 
considered disabling to mean that disability studies literature (and particularly disability 
theology) offers the most appropriate disciplinary context for this thesis. It is to this context 
that I now turn. 
 
1.4 Context – disability, mental health, and theology 
 
Disability theology is a relatively recent disciplinary development, in which the experience of 
human impairment and disability is used as the basis for diverse kinds of theological reflection. 
In a review of Christian disability theology, for example, Swinton (2012) identified work 
emerging from a variety of theological fields, including liberation, feminist, systematic, 
practical, and process theology from a range of denominational perspectives. This section 
provides a brief overview of relevant literature in the field of disability theology. As an 
interdisciplinary field, there is a considerable wider literature of relevance to disability and 
mental health. Unlike other qualitative methodologies, however, grounded theory places the 
major engagement with such literature after data analysis. This is intended to allow concepts 
to emerge from the data and reduce the likelihood of pre-existing concepts being ‘read in’ to 
the data. The flow of grounded theory is from data to concepts to theory. Concepts emerge 
 
23 See Spandler et al. (2015, pp.1-9) for an overview of the unsettled relationship between 
disability and mental distress. 




first from the data and are then compared with the wider literature, rather than concepts from 
the wider literature being identified first and sought in the data (Charmaz, 2014). It is unclear 
to what extent this theoretical position really works in practice. Researchers cannot disregard 
their knowledge of the wider literature and context which prompted them to notice the 
phenomenon in the first place and the interaction between data and literature continues 
throughout the life of a project. However, I share grounded theory’s commitment to centring 
the data – in this case the narratives of the participants – and so wider relevant literature is 
introduced in later chapters, drawing on social sciences, medicine, and other areas of 
theology. Some of the disability theology literature in this section is also carried forward and 
discussed further in later chapters, in particular contextual disability theology and work on 
images of God. Approaching the literature in this way is also consistent with the dialogic 
methods of practical theology. 
 
The development of disability theology has mirrored changes in the way that disability is 
constructed and studied in other disciplines. In the traditional theological view disability is 
viewed as a consequence of living in a fallen world, conceptualised as a problem within the 
disabled person – what is called the personal tragedy model of disability or the moral model 
(Swinton, 2012). This traditional view is also a moralising account, in that disability is linked to 
the concept of sin (either of the individual or more broadly via the fallen nature of the world). 
This view of disability is a theological version of the sociological, medical or rehabilitation 
models of disability, discussed above, in which disability is seen primarily as a medical problem 
requiring individual treatment or rehabilitation. Both the traditional theological and medical 
models have been challenged since the 1980s by disabled people’s groups (e.g. Disability 
Rights or Disability Pride movements) and disability scholars who argue that disability is more 
appropriately conceptualised as a social phenomenon rather than a functional problem of an 
individual.  
 
Social approaches to disability have led to a number of different developments in disability 
theology. In many ways these have developed in parallel with disability studies more generally. 
For example, both started with a focus on mobility and sensory impairments, that focus was 
challenged and expanded by work on intellectual disability, and then continued to develop 
into fields of mental health and neurodiversity. It is therefore possible to identify three 
clusters of disability theologies: 1) Liberation theologies, 2) Relational and pastoral theologies 
of vulnerability, 3) Contextual theologies. 
 




Firstly, liberation theologies of disability. One prominent theme in the literature explores the 
experience of marginalisation and discrimination described by many disabled people, including 
in faith communities. From this perspective, to be disabled is to be part of a stigmatised 
minority group. In the same way that contextual liberation, feminist or black theologies have 
arisen from within other marginalised groups, one strand of disability theology is therefore 
explicitly concerned with developing disability theology from the perspective of disabled 
people as an oppressed group. This definition of disability leads to a particular kind of 
theology. This cluster of disability theologies therefore have strong connections with the social 
model and disability rights movement and can be described as both contextual and liberatory. 
They follow the pattern of other liberation theologies by treating disabled people as a minority 
group with shared experiences of oppression and tend to emphasise autonomy and a view of 
impairments as simply expected forms of human diversity. They are liberation theologies 
because their primary aim is social change: the liberation of disabled people. This commitment 
to social struggle and change is intended to lead not only to social transformation, but also to 
transformed knowledge of God (Bevans, 2002). Writing about the black theology of James 
Cone, Bohache notes: 
 
Using traditional Christian imagery, Cone speaks of Christ freeing persons 
from sin, but then, in the style of every liberation theology, names that sin in 
terms of the context of a particular oppressed people: for Cone, this is the sin 
of racism; thus, in his theology, Jesus Christ came to liberate blacks from 
racism (Bohache, 2008, p.68). 
 
The sin in the case of disability liberation theology is named as ableism (or disablism). Lewis, 
writing in the context of Deaf liberation theology, describes what this kind of liberation 
theology means:   
 
For me, social liberation as a Deaf person means above all the freedom to 
develop as a ‘first class Deaf person’ rather than constantly playing catch up 
as a ‘second-class hearing person’ in today’s world. This is in accord with 
‘liberation’ as defined by the American theologian Walter Wink who 
understands it as liberation from whatever deprives human beings of the 
opportunity to realize as fully as possible their own God-given potential 
(Lewis, 2013, p.16). 
 
The consequences of stigma (both social barriers and self-stigma) associated with mental 
health conditions may certainly limit the ability of people to ‘fulfil their God-given potential’, 
and in liberation theology terms can be considered a type of sin: “whatever keeps humanity in 




a state of poverty or oppression is contrary to God’s will and is therefore sin” (Bohache, 2008, 
p.85). Stigma is oppressive rather than life-giving and is not reflective of the kingdom of God. 
Structural causes of mental distress, such as poverty or poor housing would be considered 
similarly oppressive. In these respects, theology of mental health could be a liberative theology 
analogous to disability theologies of liberation. Where the comparison seems to break down, 
however, is in the ways in which people themselves experience and conceptualise altered 
moods. They do not usually consider altered moods to be a social identity similar to sexuality, 
gender, ethnicity and so on.  
 
These liberation theologies can also be described as contextual, because they arise from what 
is identified as a shared social context (in this case, of oppression).24,25 Commenting on the 
relationship between contextual and liberation theologies, Lewis notes that: 
 
All liberation theology is contextual theology (as all liberation theology speaks 
about a very specific context of oppression) but not all contextual theology 
has liberation (in terms of resistance to oppression and the production of 
social change) as its primary purpose (Lewis, 2013, p.11). 
 
One of the first to develop such a liberation theology of disability was Eiesland (1994), who, in 
The Disabled God, sought to transform the Christian symbolism that had been used to exclude 
and marginalise disabled people. Eiesland writes from the perspective of a physically disabled 
woman, and limits her remit to physical disabilities only. She begins with the body, writing 
about the varied embodied experiences of individual disabled people who are “unwilling and 
unable to take our bodies for granted” (Eiesland, 1994, p.31). Eiesland argues that disabled 
people are particularly aware of the ways in which knowledge of the social and physical world 
is mediated through our physical bodies, and suggests that these ‘bodies of knowledge’ 
function as a primary source for liberatory disability theology. Moving from the individual to 
the community, she charts the development of the disability rights political movement, and 
identifies the minority group model of disability as an appropriate framework for liberatory 
theology. This framework is then used to challenge what she identifies as traditional 
theological constructions of disability, specifically the relationship between disability and sin, 
and the ways in which Christian communities have responded to disabled people. Finally, 
 
24 The term ‘contextual theology’ is defined further in Section 2.1.2. It is used here to refer to 
theologies that explicitly draw on social context as a central part of the theological endeavour.  
25 Contextual theology therefore draws on a standpoint epistemology, in that social identity is 
thought to give epistemic advantage in relation to that social context (Anderson, 2020). 




Eiesland strongly challenges traditional images of God by imaging God as physically impaired 
and thus disabled -  a user of a ‘sip-puff’ wheelchair. The image she offers of Jesus is similarly 
transformed from “suffering servant, model of virtuous suffering, or conquering lord, toward… 
disabled God” (Eiesland, 1994, p.94). Eiesland’s liberatory theology, and particularly the 
striking image of the disabled God, has been extremely influential. Symbolising God in this way 
– as ontologically disabled – is common to a number of later contextual and/or liberatory 
disability theologies. For example, Lewis, quoted earlier, poses the question of whether Jesus 
can sign, describing him as the “SIGN-of-God” (rather than “word of God”, with its implication 
of spoken language) (2013, pp.150–51). Writing of his experiences as a blind theologian, Hull 
argues that while the Bible images God as sighted, Jesus is nonetheless his “blind brother” 
(Hull, 2014, p.33). Kevern reflects on the imago Dei and concludes that taking this doctrine 
seriously means that God is subject to dementia (Kevern, 2010). In these theologies God is not 
simply viewed as present with marginalised disabled people; instead disability is brought into 
the very centre of the nature of God (Swinton, 2012).  These contextual images of God and 
Jesus are discussed further in Chapters 6-8. 
 
With respect to mental health and altered moods, the social model and liberation perspective 
helpfully broaden the discussion out from locating the ‘problem’ of mental health problems 
exclusively in the (brain of the) individual. However, a rights-based model does not capture the 
whole range of disability contexts, especially in relation to fluctuating or progressive 
conditions, severely painful or life-limiting conditions, and severe or enduring intellectual and 
emotional impairments. It is hard to argue that societal accommodations could transform 
severe chronic pain into mere difference, and the emphasis on autonomy, self-representation 
and empowerment may exclude those with cognitive, intellectual or social impairments. As 
Kevern points out: 
 
In particular, this theological methodology presupposes the presence of 
identifiable communities of shared experience, groups of people who have 
the articulacy and intellectual capacity to discuss and reflect on the basis of 
what they hold in common (Kevern, 2012, p.45). 
 
A second cluster of disability theologies have arisen in response to this kind of challenge to the 
implications of liberatory theology and its focus on physically disabled people who are able to 
be autonomous with the right kind of material access and support. This is probably the cluster 
that contains most literature; including work by Brock (2019), Block (2002), Clifton (2018), 
Gillibrand (2010), Reinders (2008), Reynolds (2008; 2013), and Yong (2007). They can be 




characterised as pastoral and relational theologies of vulnerability. Key themes in this cluster 
of theologies are the vulnerabilities and limits that are part of being human, and the 
theological concepts of friendship and hospitality. These theologies have not usually been 
situated within contextual or liberatory theology. They are mainly written from the perspective 
of someone  (often a parent or carer) in relationship with an intellectually disabled 
person/people, and their aim is for churches and Christians to respond to disabled people in 
ways that are faithful to tradition and life-giving for disabled people. As with liberatory 
theologies, experience is also the starting point for these theologies. However, in this case, the 
experience is often the inclusion or exclusion of families that include someone with an 
intellectual disability. Reynolds, for example, begins with a description of his young son being 
excluded from Sunday School because of behaviours associated with Tourette’s Syndrome and 
autism, Gillibrand starts with a biography of his son Adam, who has severe autism, and Yong 
refers to his brother, who has Down Syndrome. Yong describes this perspective as not directly 
concerned with liberation or emancipation, but as being “in solidarity with emancipatory 
researchers and people with disabilities (and their care-givers) in their resistance towards a 
form of discrimination called ableism” (Yong, 2007, p.10). This literature has a dual focus – 
firstly disability itself, but also the ways in which Christians, the church, and theologians 
respond to disability. The second aim of these theologies, that of transforming Christian 
practice, and the church, means that I would therefore also include in this category some 
literature that does not offer a ‘disability theology’ per se, such as works that explore disability 
in relation to the Bible (e.g. Black, 2006; Yong, 2011; Melcher et al., 2017) or homiletics (e.g. 
Black, 1996).26 Yong’s description of his disability theology makes this distinction well: it is 
concerned with disability in theological perspective, with the aim of shaping and transforming 
the witness of the church. As a Pentecostal theologian, Yong develops this theology within a 
framework he calls the ‘pneumatological imagination’ (2007, pp.10–14) –  pneumatological 
because it draws on the biblical account of the one Gospel being proclaimed in many 
languages at Pentecost. He suggests that this theological methodology “[preserves] the 
integrity of difference and otherness” (2007, p.11) while allowing engagement and 
understanding between different voices (such as science or disabled people).  
 
26 Some authors I have included in this category would not describe themselves as writing 
disability theology or as disability theologians. For example, the edited volume by Melcher et 
al. (2017) consists of chapters by biblical scholars writing on disability in the Bible; the aim of 
the volume is to bring together the two disciples of biblical studies and disability studies, but 
written by biblical specialists within the norms of critical biblical studies. Yong, while describing 
his work as disability theology, describes himself as a systematic theologian. 





Literature in this category primarily approaches the first aim – of changing how Christians think 
about disability and disabled people – by engaging experience with theological anthropology 
to produce theological accounts of humanity and personhood that include those with 
profound intellectual impairments. (Yong, as a systematic theologian, also engages with other 
broad aspects of Christian doctrine, including soteriology, ecclesiology, and eschatology.) 
While at first sight this may not seem difficult – the Christian doctrine of imago Dei claims that 
all people are made in the image of God, not just some of them – the history of this tradition 
suggests otherwise. Historically, the image of God in humanity has been taken to refer to 
characteristics that are thought to differentiate humans from non-human creatures – primarily 
reason, language, a sense of self-identity and agency, i.e.  precisely the types of characteristics 
that may not be present in those with profound intellectual disabilities. Definitions of 
personhood in bioethics still rely on this type of argument, so that, ethically speaking, persons 
are those who meet certain criteria and some humans may not be counted as persons. 
Relational theologies try to address these concerns by focusing on the relationship that imago 
Dei sets up between God and humanity. To be human is to be in a particular relationship with 
God, regardless of the ability of the person (i.e. even if the person appears to lack the capacity 
for relationality). Relational theologies of disability approach this anthropology through the 
lens of disability, emphasising the ways in which some characteristics which come into focus 
through disability (such as vulnerability and limits), are in fact simply characteristic of what it is 
to be human. None of us are fully autonomous, unlimited individuals. Imago Dei, and the 
contemporary conceptualisation of this doctrine, is discussed further in section 7.1 in relation 
to representations of God.   
 
These pastoral and relational theologies of vulnerability occupy a significant place within 
disability theology and indeed practical disability theology. Their emphasis on access and 
inclusion within Christian communities is applicable to experiences beyond intellectual 
disability, including mental health challenges. The recognition that diverse abilities and 
experiences, including the kind of diversity that might be diagnosed as mental health 
conditions, is often not welcomed or valued in Christian communities therefore forms an 
important backdrop to this thesis. Participants certainly described a variety of church and 
Christian responses to their mental distress or diagnosis; some were very helpful, others, (such 
as exorcism or suggestions that mental distress is indicative of spiritual weakness), either 
unhelpful or actively harmful. However, this is not the focus of the thesis. The focus is on the 
theology of the participants, as expressed in their narratives, rather than the practices of 




Christian communities. Correspondingly, the rest of the thesis engages less with this cluster of 
literature than the other forms of disability theology. 
 
The third cluster of disability theologies are what I have described as contextual theologies. 
This includes recent work by Cook (2016) & Kevern (2010; 2012) in addition to Swinton (2017) 
previously mentioned in section 1.2. It is focused on the theology of dementia. These 
theologies are positioned as contextual without necessarily claiming to be liberation theology 
in the traditional sense, although the goal in Kevern’s work is to explore what it would mean 
for “the Church to proclaim a liberating Christ”(Kevern, 2012, p.46) in relation to those with 
dementia. Cook (2016), for example, has explicitly situated his work with contextual theology. 
He recognises that ‘context’ usually relates to culture or enduring aspects of identity, rather 
than mental health. Any theology of dementia therefore also needs to take account of other 
relevant contexts (such as ethnicity or wealth) that would affect the experience of dementia. 
Nevertheless: 
 
[W]ithin each of these contexts, we might imagine that the experience of 
dementia will impose its own influence on the way in which we do our 
theology, and that theology in turn might have some more or less consistent 
things to say which will inform our understanding of the experience in 
question (Cook, 2016, p.85). 
 
Cook draws links between commonly experienced aspects of dementia (e.g. impairment, loss, 
dislocation) and aspects of the biblical passion narratives. He suggests that this theological 
reflection on the lived experience of dementia leads to an expectation that God might be 
encountered in this experience, but cautions that the experience of dementia is only 
meaningful if it is interpreted as such. 
 
Kevern (2010) addresses the question ‘what sort of a God may be found in dementia?’ He 
identifies three distinct but interrelated theological areas relevant to this question: pastoral 
theology (how to respond to a person undergoing dementia), theological anthropology (what 
it means when a person seems to ‘lose’ their identity), and the concept of imago Dei (what can 
we say about God if people with dementia are made in God’s image and are the body of 
Christ?). It is this final area of theological reflection on the imago Dei which has the most 
connection with this thesis.  
 




Kevern criticises ‘Remembered by God’ models27 of pastoral care for implying that God is not 
present in dementia, that the person is left ‘abandoned by God’, and relying on eschatological 
hope rather than accompaniment by God in the experience of dementia. It is unclear why 
abandonment should be a necessary pastoral implication of this model, since remembering (by 
God) could presumably be experienced as an active process of involvement rather than God 
being “on the outside of the process of change and deterioration… waiting at the door, as it 
were, for it all to be over and the victim to be released into death” (Kevern, 2010, p.177). As 
we learn from contemporary debates around passibilism – the idea that God suffers in Godself 
(Scrutton, 2020, p.169ff) – not everyone finds comfort from the idea that God suffers or wants 
a saviour ‘just like them’ (Bohache, 2008, pp.67–80). (This point is picked up in section 8.2 in 
relation to contextual theologies.) Nevertheless, the wider point stands. If God is characterised 
as always remembering then it is at least an open question as to whether forgetfulness, an 
experience at the heart of dementia, is something that God in Godself experiences. Kevern 
addresses this question by introducing the outcomes of what he calls a ‘strong’ doctrine of the 
imago Dei in this way:  
 
[T]he world is not divisible into carers and patients in any stable way: the 
dividing line between these constituencies runs through each of us. The 
second implication is that the resemblance between God and humanity is not 
a chance similarity, considered useful as a source of sermon aids and poetic 
imagery; but a solidarity (albeit an interrupted one) between Creator and 
created. We learn the truth of our experience by reflection upon God; and we 
learn the truth of God by reflection on our experience (Kevern, 2010, p.177). 
 
The truth about God that we learn by reflecting on experience is mediated by Christ – the 
visible image of the invisible God. Drawing on Bonhoeffer’s well-known phrase that, in the face 
of the suffering associated with the evils of Nazism, “only a suffering God can help”, and other 
recent contextual theologies that present God as disabled, Kevern concludes that “only the 
dementing God can help… God is subjected to dementia in solidarity with the dementing 
person” (Kevern, 2010, p.180) As with Eiesland’s image of the disabled God, this is a startling 
conclusion. Kevern, however, suggests that this is a new context, rather than a new task; the 
task is to hold together God’s vulnerability and God’s power (Kevern, 2010, p.181). 
 
Kevern turns to relational models of the Trinity to help with this task of articulating the 
 
27 The ‘Remembered by God model’ is described by Goldsmith (1999); Kevern assigns the 
recurring slogan “God never forgets” to the popularity of this model in which God is said to 
remember the person regardless of their own ability to remember. 




relationship between these two apparently opposing characteristics of God. An alternative 
theological resource would be the theology of the cross, theologia crucis. The foundation for 
theology of the cross is the way in which the power of God is exercised through the weakness 
(and vulnerability) of the cross. A contemporary theologian of the cross, Douglas John Hall, 
describes his theology as a ‘contextual systematic’ theology of the cross. Hall argues that in 
this theology God is ‘other’ not because of God’s transcendence but because of God’s radical 
immanence – God’s ‘costly proximity’ to humanity (Hall, 2003, p.21). The key divine 
characteristic is thus God’s compassion – ‘suffering with’, which breaks down the 
subject/object divide – not God’s omnipotence, which would maintain that division. Power has 
historically been seen as the dominant divine characteristic; theology of the cross reinterprets 
what the power of God means. Contemporary forms of theologia crucis proved to be an 
important dialogue partner in the practical theology developed in this thesis; theology of the 
cross is therefore discussed at much greater length in Chapter 8. 
 
These, then, are the three major clusters of disability theology literature; liberation theologies, 
pastoral and relational theologies, and contextual theologies. There is, however, one final 
cluster of literature that must be included in this overview. This is the literature on mental 
health and theology. Perhaps for some of the reasons outlined above, this is not typically 
considered as disability theology; at least, the authors do not identify it in this way, and do not 
primarily draw on the wider disability theology literature. Looking across the literature, three 
major areas of focus can be identified: pastoral (frequently with an autobiographical aspect 
and aimed either at Christians experiencing mental health problems or to improve churches’ 
responses to people with mental health challenges),28 biblical studies (exploration of texts 
thought to relate to mental health),29 and theological perspectives on concepts or experiences 
of mental health (sometimes, but not always, sited within practical theology).30 In the 2013 
edited volume, Spirituality, Theology and Mental Health (Cook, 2013b), Cook observed the 
limited range31 of contemporary theological works on mental health. This neglect has, to some 
 
28 E.g. Greene-Mccreight (2006), Colwell (2014), and Coleman (2016). 
29 E.g. Webb (2012), Cook and Hamley (2020), Lawrence (2020). 
30 Including sustained work by Scrutton (2015a, 2017; 2020) and Swinton (2015; 2017; 2020a); 
also Hessamfar (2014), Webb (2017), and Oh (2018). 
31 Cook describes this as theology being given “little to no attention” resulting in a “significant 
area of neglect”, although he does note a number of exceptions in these same three focal 
areas (Cook, 2013a, xi). 




extent, clearly been noted in more recent years; at least three notable books32 on theology 
and mental health were published in 2020. Nevertheless, there is still a surprisingly small body 
of theological literature that directly addresses contemporary concepts of mental health when 
compared with either the substantial body of social scientific literature on religion and mental 
health, or indeed popular books on mental health and wellbeing. 
 
As with pastoral disability theologies, pastoral work on mental distress provides background to 
this thesis – pastoral experiences are one of the motivators of the study – but pastoral practice 
is not the focus of the research. There are, however, significant points of connection between 
this thesis and the biblical and theological literature. There is also noticeable overlap between 
the biblical and theological categories.33 Accordingly, this literature is overviewed briefly 
together here and discussed again in the relevant chapters.34  
 
In Toward a Theology of Psychological Disorder, Webb (2017) challenges stigmatising ‘negative 
lay theologies’ by examining those beliefs in relation to the Bible. For example, the belief that 
mental health problems may be caused by demonic influence is compared to the biblical texts 
relating to the demonic. Webb finds that biblical narratives about demonic influence primarily 
relates to what would today be considered physical health problems (e.g. epilepsy or arthritis). 
Only two cases (Legion, in the Synoptic Gospels, and possibly someone who violently attacks 
the sons of Sceva in Acts 19) link demonic activity with mental or social difficulties. On this 
basis, Webb suggests that current negative lay theologies may “reflect and facilitate 
conceptions of demon possession that are not based in Scripture” (Webb, 2017, p.65). Having 
challenged these negative lay theologies, Webb then offers alternative biblical themes that 
more accurately relate to the experience of those with mental health challenges. Webb draws 
on psychological literature relating to the relationship between God- and self-images and 
theological work on the suffering God to conclude that negative lay theologies do not 
recognise “the strength that may be manifest in human weakness” (Webb, 2017, p.149), 
 
32 Swinton (2020a), Scrutton (2020) and Cook & Hamley (2020). Cook (2020) also published a 
further book about Christian experiences of hearing voices. 
33 Both Webb and Cook & Hamley interweave biblical studies and theology but with a focus on 
the Bible; Cook & Hamley by being concerned with developing a specifically biblical theology 
and Webb by directly addressing texts in the Bible that may be thought to say something 
about mental ill-health. 
34 The exception to this is Bible and Bedlam (Lawrence, 2020) which takes a purely biblical 
studies approach to madness in the Bible with little overlap with the theological category. It is 
therefore not discussed further here, but provides relevant context to the final chapter on 
mad theology.  




having an inadequate view of the relationship between God’s power and suffering. Instead, a 
theology of psychological distress should begin at the cross. While Webb does not expand this 
further to discuss the theology of the cross more specifically, it is notable that the practical 
theology developed in this thesis ends up in a similar place; her theoretical, biblically focused 
work (informed by her professional experience as a psychologist) triangulates with the 
qualitative/sociological.  
 
Also sited within the biblical and theological literature, Bible and Mental Health (Cook and 
Hamley, 2020) offers edited chapters concerned with connecting Christian scripture to 
contemporary medical and social scientific discourses on mental health and wellbeing. Two 
chapters provide particularly relevant context for this thesis and will be outlined below: 
Collicutt (2020) on the madness of Jesus, and Swinton (2020b) on developing a hermeneutic of 
mental health.  
 
Starting from the position that it is possible to uncouple the concept of madness from both 
irrationality and ill-health,  Collicutt uses madness as a lens through which to examine the 
Gospel accounts of Jesus: the ‘mad God incarnate’ (Collicutt, 2020, p.59). She introduces 
several alternate ways of categorising anomalous (‘mad’) behaviour: her own taxonomy of odd 
> weird > strange, Helman’s anthropological model,35 and the first-century Near Eastern 
distinction between clinical/simple madness and divine madness. She poses the question 
“where would Jesus sit in these models?” (2020, p.64), and concludes that the Gospels not 
only present Jesus’ behaviour as at least odd and potentially weird, but that they also indicate 
a known debate about Jesus’ behaviour and whether it should be classified as simple madness 
or divine madness.36 Collicutt suggests that changing cultural conceptions of madness mean 
that there is no contemporary room for the idea of divine madness (God is associated with 
 
35 In this model behaviours are assessed by communities along two dimensions: culturally 
sanctioned/not sanctioned and mundane/bizarre axes. The resulting quadrants of behaviour 
are normal (sanctioned/mundane), religious (sanctioned/bizarre), bad 
(unsanctioned/mundane), and mad (unsanctioned/bizarre).  
36 Since some kinds of anomalous behaviour – madness - are presented as caused by evil 
spirits/demons, the divide between mad and bad is not watertight; the categorisation of 
madness has moral implications. Collicutt summarises this as: “All the Gospels in their different 
ways describe a similar process: Jesus’ behaviour and message are anomalous; various 
hypotheses are advanced to explain it, but there is a relentless move by the authorities 
towards placing him in the ‘bad’ quadrant of Helman’s model; this is effected by the 
introduction of a narrative that moves beyond dismissing his madness in terms of having a 
demon… to explaining it in cosmic moral terms” (Collicutt, 2020, p.68). 




health, not illness), although she notes the dissonant note sounded by liberative disability 
theologies that image God as disabled. She concludes that there is a need to “face and 
embrace more fully the challenges posed by the madness of Jesus in our theological thinking” 
(Collicutt, 2020, p.79, italics in original). This line of argument is taken up further in the 
Penthouse chapter, where I suggest that, in relation to altered moods, a more fruitful way of 
embracing the madness of Jesus is to look to the cross and his solidarity with those who suffer 
mental distress, rather than concepts of divine madness.  
 
Swinton’s (2020b) chapter in the same volume addresses the use of Scripture in pastoral 
mental health care. He outlines the disability hermeneutic employed within disability theology  
- i.e. addressing the assumption of ability that has been implicit in many interpretations of 
Scripture relating to disability (e.g. accounts of healing) – and suggests that a mental health 
hermeneutic is similarly necessary to counter assumptions of mental health in biblical 
interpretation.37 In this work Swinton is mainly concerned with the ways in which the Bible is 
interpreted by Christians living with mental health challenges such as depression. He suggests 
a number of different hermeneutics that arise from their experiences, some of which mean 
that the Bible is a positive pastoral resource for them and others which make Bible reading 
more difficult (a hermeneutic of silence) or inadvisable (a hermeneutic of suicide).  This focus 
on the pastoral and biblical is intentionally not the focus of this current thesis. Nevertheless, 
there is significant overlap in the aims of the work, i.e. to take seriously “the mental health 
experiences of all of the members of Jesus’ body” (Swinton, 2020b, p.208) by contributing to 
the development of a mental health hermeneutic analogous to the far more extensively 
developed disability hermeneutic.  
 
Continuing this overview of the literature, recent work by Scrutton completes this section on 
mental health and theology. The most recent book by Swinton (2020a), Finding Jesus in the 
Storm, has already been discussed earlier in this chapter. As noted earlier, Scrutton has 
published extensively on the theology and philosophy of religion in relation to mental health, 
particularly depression, including the concept of potentially transformative accounts of 
suffering and mental distress (Scrutton, 2015a; 2015b; 2017). The most recent monograph, 
Christianity and Depression (2020), discusses and evaluates several common Christian 
interpretations of depression (sin, demonic, biological, dark night of the soul, and potentially 
transformative accounts) and the im/passibility of God in relation to suffering. Scrutton’s 
 
37 What Lawrence (2020) referred to as ‘sanism’ implicit in biblical interpretation. 




conclusion is that “it is in trying to 'spiritualise’ mental illness that Christian responses to 
depression often go wrong” (Scrutton, 2020, p.191), but it is nevertheless possible to outline a 
distinctively Christian but  still helpful pastoral and theological response to depression. This 
response includes four ‘core emphases’ that recast some of the interpretations discussed in 
the opening chapters. For example, the themes of sin and the demonic recur, but in the guise 
of social sin and the political demonic, rather than the personal sinfulness and demonic 
oppression of individuals. The other emphases are Christ’s solidarity with human suffering, 
resurrection and hope, and animality and the senses. Again, the empirical practical theology in 
this thesis triangulates with the theoretical. Hints of all these emphases, as well as the varying 
interpretations of depression, are present throughout this project’s interviews and analysis. 
For example, participants in this research refer to several of the interpretations of distress 
mentioned by Scrutton: biological, sin, demon, and potentially transformative accounts. The 
suffering and solidarity of Christ also emerges as a very significant theme. Scrutton argues that 
neither passibilism nor impassibilism are inherently more helpful in the context of depression, 
suggesting that, “Whether God suffers is a matter of debate. What we do know is that in his 
life Jesus shows us God's solidarity with those who suffer” (Scrutton, 2020, p.193). This 
emphasis is reflected in this thesis; the question of whether God suffers in Godself does not 
arise for the participants. What is significant for most participants is that Jesus – understood to 
be both human and God, the Christ - understands human suffering ‘from the inside’ and is in 
solidarity with those experiencing mental distress. These themes are developed further as a 
possible direction for ‘mad theology’ through the contextual Christologies and theology of the 
cross in the final penthouse chapter. 
 
It is apparent from this overview that contextual disability theologies, along with the work of 
Scrutton, Swinton, and some contributors to Cook and Hamley, have the closest links with the 
practical theology developed in this thesis. Altered moods are not, however, a traditional 
context for contextual theology, which has typically arisen from enduring sociological 
characteristics such as gender, race, ethnicity, or class. Contextual theologies arise at the 
intersection of a particular characteristic (e.g. gender), the wider social context (e.g. 
patriarchy) and theological thought, leading to theologies that are grounded in the shared 
experiences of identifiable groups (e.g. feminist or womanist theology). This is not claiming an 
essentialist position; what is of most interest is the reasonably stable context surrounding the 
characteristic, rather than the characteristic per se. Contextual theologies are in that sense 
provisional; if the context changes then so might the theology. More recent work in contextual 
theology has shifted focus from broad sociological categories of gender, ethnicity or class onto 




categories of identity, including non-normative gender or sexualities, post-colonial cultures, 
and dis/ability. It has been noted, however, that disability “differs from gender, race, and 
other identity markers in significant ways, particularly in its fluidity and porousness" (Creamer, 
2012, p.345). The concept of altered moods is perhaps even more fluid and porous than 
disability, making it difficult to identify a shared context that could form the foundation for a 
fully contextual theology. Nevertheless, the work of Kevern, Cook, and Swinton on the 
contextual and practical theology of dementia, raises a question: is it possible to say that there 
is something distinctive about the experience of altered moods which might shape theology in 
‘more or less consistent’ ways? 
 
I propose in this thesis that the answer to this question is an imperfect yes. It is imperfect 
because of all the considerations outlined above – altered moods are not a straightforward 
social context or marker of identity that are directly comparable with the more traditional 
social contexts of gender, race, or class. I contend, however, that the experience of the kinds 
of mental distress or pain – suffering - that might be identified as depression or bipolar 
disorder may influence the ways that people think theologically, and that certain areas of 
theology speak back into that experience.38 This is, therefore, practical theology which is 
contextual, rather than ‘a contextual theology’, occupying a similar space to the contextual 
theologies of dementia. It is similarly not a liberation theology, although it does have a 
liberative and ameliorative39 aspect – as with the theologies of dementia it is about liberation 
within the circumstances of suffering, rather than liberation from social oppression.  
 
Specifically, I contend that these narratives of the lived experience of altered moods and 
Christianity show signs that participants engage in different kinds of ‘identity-talk’ when 
discussing their lived experiences. Spiritual disruption is a common experience, which for some 
participants includes disruption associated with a disconnection between theology and 
experience. This disconnection also arises in relation to the ways in which participants 
 
38 In support of this position, McCallum (2007) helpfully differentiates between contextual 
theologies of identity and theologies of experience, suggesting that “I might say I'm a feminist 
theologian because feminist theology is a justice-seeking theology when, really, I've more in 
common with a Black gay theologian who has an in-patient psychiatric history.... My 
experience of psychiatry, not my identity as a woman, is far more potent in affecting my sense 
of justice, style of theology, understanding of other people and thinking about God. I think 
each of our experiences, perhaps more than our contextual identities, influence our theologies 
more than we know” (McCallum, 2007, p.51). 
39 ‘Ameliorative’ here taking inspiration from the philosophical approach of Haslanger (2000). 




interpret their mood experiences. Participants interpret and label their mood experiences in a 
number of different ways; both medical and spiritualised interpretations are evident. 
Participants also draw on theological resources to interpret their mood experiences. Central to 
these resources are images of God, and images of Jesus; for many participants there is a two-
way relationship between their mood experiences and these images. The concept of suffering 
runs as a thread through the whole thesis and emerges as particularly significant in relation to 
images of Jesus. 
 
From these narratives, five main themes therefore emerge: 
• Identity-talk, spiritual disruption, and disconnects between experience and theology 
• Diverse interpretations of altered moods 
• Images of God and the ways in which these are related to mood experiences 
• Christology, especially the Passion and suffering of Jesus 
• Theology of experience. 
 
These emergent themes are brought into dialogue with relevant areas of Christian theology, 
specifically: disability theology, contextual Christologies, trauma theology, and theology of the 
cross. The thesis ends by drawing these themes together into a theological redescription of 
altered moods which develops potential directions for a contextual theology of experience – 
mad theology. This thesis therefore contributes to the emerging literature on contextual 
theologies of experience, utilising a robust and innovative methodology to ground theology in 
experience. 
 
1.5 Research aim and questions 
 
The aim of this research project is to explore the ways in which the lived experience of altered 
moods is informed by the lived experience of Christianity, and vice versa. The specific research 
questions are: 
 
1. How do people with lived experience of Christianity interpret their experiences of 
altered moods?40 
2. Does the experience of altered moods change people’s theology?41 
 
40 This question is addressed in Chapter 4 ‘Interpreting altered moods’. 
41 Addressed in Chapter 5 ‘Imaging God’. 




3. How might the experience of altered moods inform or challenge Christian theology?42 
4. How congruent is wider Christian theology with the lived experience of altered 
moods?43 
5. What theological themes might provide the contours of a contextual theology of 
mental health?44 
 
The topic of contemporary mental health and Christianity is broad enough to necessitate a 
number of disciplinary and methodological choices at the outset of this project. For example, it 
could have been fruitfully investigated from other disciplinary perspectives (such as sociology, 
psychology, or philosophy of religion), sited within various sub-disciplines of theology (such as 
pastoral theology or congregational studies), and using different qualitative, theoretical, or 
even quantitative research methods. However, based on my research questions, preliminary 
interview data, and the literature outlined above, I have situated this research primarily within 
the sub-discipline of academic practical theology, informed by the wider discipline of disability 
theology. There is also a practical consideration, which is that the more specific field of mental 
health theology is not currently as well developed as the broader area of disability theology.  
 
The topic of altered moods, and the fact that much lived experience of Christianity comes 
through church communities or other forms of pastoral ministry, means that some aspects of 
pastoral theology are also very relevant. However, the research is broader than pastoral 
theology, and is not primarily concerned with the Christian care of individuals who experience 
altered moods. Rather, the central focus is on the interaction between different kinds of lived 
experiences, and the meaning attributed to those experiences and to the relationships 
between them. This focus is better suited to practical theology, which can be broadly 
described as the discipline “where religious beliefs and practice meets contemporary 
experiences, questions, and actions” (Pattison and Woodward, 1994, p.9). The relationship 
between pastoral and practical theology is discussed further in section 2.1.1. 
 
The research therefore brings together qualitative methods, specifically grounded theory and 
in-depth individual interviews, with the methods of practical theology to address these 
questions. 
 
42 Addressed in Chapters 5 and 6, ‘Imaging God’ and ‘Christology’. 
43 Addressed in Chapters 7 and 8, ‘Imaging God and Jesus in dialogue with disability theology’ 
and ‘Mad theology’. 
44 Addressed in Chapter 8 ‘Mad theology’. 




1.6 Outline of chapters 
 
Chapter 2, ‘Blueprint and construction’, sets out the methodology and methods of the thesis: 
qualitative constructivist grounded theory (Charmaz, 2014), and practical theological dialogic 
mutual critical correlation (Pattison, 2000). These methodologies complement each other and 
the nature of the research; both are committed to centring the participants’ experiences, and 
are suited to topics that are interdisciplinary. I suggest that, in order to most appropriately 
reflect the methodological commitments and design, the reflexive researcher’s voice should be 
introduced as a fourth dialogue partner, alongside experience, Christian tradition, and other 
disciplines. In terms of method, grounded theory is used to guide data collection and analysis, 
with these then taken forward as one of the voices in the theological critical correlation 
dialogue. The data is obtained through in-depth semi-structured interviews with 21 
participants, and these are briefly described at the end of the chapter, along with a discussion 
of the ways in which known questions about qualitative methods (such as reflexivity) arose 
and were addressed in this specific project. 
 
Chapter 3, ‘Foundations: Narrative shape’, begins the process of practical theological 
reflection. Later chapters continue this process, and follow a similar pattern, namely an 
introduction to the theme and relevant literature, description of the data, then analysis. 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the shape of the narratives, focusing on narrative 
construction and providing a foundation for the more detailed analysis of later chapters. This 
chapter presents overarching themes that I coded in the analysis stage as ‘meta-themes’ – 
these were elements of the narratives that reflected wider social categories (such as gender), 
narrative devices that shaped the ways in which people told their stories or presented 
themselves, or observations (such as the strength of virtually all participants’ Christian 
identity) that were important for interpreting the content of the narratives. When looking at 
the shape of the narratives as a whole, participants engage in a range of ‘identity-talk’ in the 
ways in which they tell their narratives and present themselves. God, and faith, are sources of 
stability in the disequilibrium associated with altered moods. However, contrary to the 
expectations raised by sociological literature on chronic illness, and especially the literature on 
biographical disruption and recovery (Bury, 1982), they do not present their altered moods as 
challenging or transforming their identity or self-concept. Instead, participants identify 
spiritual disruption that occurs as a result of their altered moods. A significant aspect of this 
spiritual disruption is the result of conflict between their lived experience of altered moods 




and their theology (or the theology of their church community). This negotiation of experience 
and theology is taken forward into the next chapters, which explore the content, rather than 
the shape of the narratives. The absence of biographical disruption and recovery is picked up 
again in the final chapter, where I suggest that trauma theory offers a more appropriate 
dialogue partner, in the guise of ‘post-traumatic remaking’ (O’Donnell, 2021).  
 
Chapter 4, ‘Ground Floor: Interpreting altered moods’, provides the base and boundaries on 
which, and within which, participants construct their theology. It analyses the ways in which 
participants interpret their mood experiences. These interpretations form the context for the 
theological content presented in the following chapters. The analysis presented in this chapter 
finds that accounts of the aetiology and nature of altered moods can be organised around the 
central concept of altered moods arising from a ‘chemical imbalance’.  Participants’ attitudes 
to this concept fall into three broad groups: 
• simple acceptance of the concept (biochemical model)  
• qualified acceptance (biopsychosocial model)  
• rejection (alternative models). 
 
These models are paralleled by participant responses to the biomedical labelling or diagnosis 
of altered moods – empowered, questioning, rejecting. Those in the biopsychosocial group are 
more likely to find medical labels empowering/liberating. 
 
Christian interpretations of altered moods can also be found in this ground floor. The analysis 
finds that these spiritualised interpretations present altered moods as one or more of the 
following: 
• evidence of evil spirits  
• symptomatic of poor spiritual health  
• spiritual testing 
• a time of spiritual growth  
 
The analysis also highlights that the participants’ theological perspective on the role of 
suffering in life is related to their interpretation of their mood experiences.  
 
Chapters 5 and 6, ‘First floor: Imaging God’ and ‘Second Floor: Christology’ are companion 
chapters. They introduce theological resources which participants use to interpret their mood 




experiences and the ways in which those interact with their faith and spiritual life. Images of 
God and Jesus were two areas which emerged consistently from this analysis (although this 
was not true of every participant). The analysis in these two chapters is the primary voice of 
experience in the practical theology of altered moods that is developed further in the final two 
chapters. 
 
In Chapter 5, I analyse the ways in which participants conceptualise God in Godself, their 
‘images of God’.45 
 
Specifically, I claim that: 
 
• There is an interaction between (many but not all) participants’ images of God and 
their mood experiences, and that the experience of altered moods is perceived by 
those participants as changing their predominant images of God. 
• Participants consistently image God as personal, present and pervasive, stressing “the 
nearer side of God” (Macquarrie, 1975, p.131). 
 
In Chapter 6, I focus on Christology. There are two aspects to this: 
 
• Participants consistently image or conceptualise Jesus as having an insider 
understanding of human vulnerability, meaning that they feel assured God 
understands their mental distress. 
• Many participants (with some notable exceptions) find meaning in the humanity and 
vulnerability of Jesus as it is described in the Passion narratives. In the events of the 
Passion, they experience Jesus as in solidarity with their own suffering and find in him 
a companion for the journey of altered moods. 
 
The preceding chapters introduce my data analysis and set this in the context of some of the 
relevant wider interdisciplinary literature. Chapter 7 moves forward with the critical 
correlation, by more thoroughly and explicitly engaging the analysis with the voice of theology. 
In this chapter, ‘Imaging God and Jesus in dialogue with disability theology’, I discuss the points 
of connection and disconnection between the analysis and some of the theological literature 
 
45 In the sense of representations of God, not the doctrine of imago Dei. 




and themes introduced earlier in this chapter. Images of God are discussed in relation to the 
doctrine of imago Dei and the ways in which contemporary disability theologies have imaged 
God as disabled. This discussion continues by bringing the images of Jesus (as the one who 
understands suffering from the inside, and who offers solidarity in that suffering of altered 
moods) into dialogue with contextual Christologies. The ways in which theology arising from 
altered moods differs from both disability theologies and contextual theologies is brought into 
focus by this dialogue. Rather than imaging Jesus as experiencing depression or altered moods, 
this theology focuses on the traditional image of Jesus suffering on the cross. That traditional 
image is reinterpreted, however, as an image of extreme mental distress, similar to the 
distress associated with altered moods. 
 
Chapter 8, ‘Penthouse: Mad theology’ further develops that insight about the image of Jesus. 
It builds on the previous chapters to outline a possible direction for a practical theology of 
altered moods – a mad theology. This chapter differs from the preceding chapters, in that it is 
less explicitly based on the narratives of the participants. It intentionally goes beyond their 
narratives, introducing a stronger sense of the researcher’s voice that I identified as missing 
from the original model of dialogic critical correlation. This final chapter therefore offers a 
practical theological reflection on the theology of altered moods, based on the previous 
analyses but from my own perspective and position. It gathers up the varying threads of the 
analyses and seeks to weave them together into a thick theology of altered moods that is 
reflective of the varying perspectives of the participants but is not limited solely to their 
narratives. These threads consist of the image of Jesus as in some way reflecting the suffering 
of altered moods, the ways in which the power and vulnerability of God are addressed in 
contemporary accounts of the theologia crucis (theology of the cross), and the effects of 
suffering, specifically the kind of trauma likely to be associated with the events of the Passion. 
Unlike contextual Christologies and other work on the madness of Jesus, this mad theology 
and theological redescription of altered moods looks to the cross and the solidarity of God 
revealed there, rather than finding solidarity in the (mad) life and ministry of Jesus or through 










Blueprint & construction: Methodology and 
methods 
In this chapter I introduce the blueprint and construction methods of this project; that is, the 
overarching methodological approach taken to the research and the ways in which data was 
collected to address the research questions (Howell, 2013, ix). It brings together two different 
methodologies: social scientific constructivist grounded theory (Charmaz, 2014) and 
theological dialogic mutual critical correlation (Pattison, 2000). Grounded theory is utilised as a 
guiding methodology for the project, which included empirical data collection through semi-
structured in-depth interviews and analysis; the grounded data and analyses form one ‘voice’ 
(that of ‘experience’) in the practical theological dialogue that follows. I describe this 
combination as grounded practical theology,46 which offers a way to ground theology in 
experience.  
 
Constructivist grounded theory is not the only possible qualitative methodology; alternative 
methodologies could equally well have been used to guide the empirical aspects of the 
research.47 Similarly, there are alternative theological methods.48 My choice of grounded 
theory and dialogic mutual critical correlation was based on the fit between the values and 
principles of those two methodologies and the aim of the research. The intention of the 
research is to thoroughly centre and take seriously the voices of those with lived experience of 
mental distress and therefore it was appropriate for the research process to be as inductive as 
possible. I did consider alternative methodologies and methods (especially interpretative 
phenomenological analysis), but judged that the values and methodological strategies of 
constructivist grounded theory and dialogic mutual critical correlation were most consonant 
with the motivations and wider context of the research. 
 
 
46 I am not aware of this phrase being used elsewhere to refer to the integration of grounded 
theory in a theological methodology, although it is the subtitle of an ethnographic practical 
theology on food justice (Ayres, 2015). As noted in Chapter 1, Barnsley (2016) uses the phrases 
‘grounded theology’ and grounding theology’. 
47 See Ritchie and Lewis (2003), Liamputtong and Ezzy (2005), and Bryman (2008) for an 
overview of qualitative research methods. 
48 See Graham et al. (2005), Ford (2010), and Stausberg and Engler (2011) for an overview. 




The intention of this project is not to produce a formal substantive grounded theory of the 
kind typically produced by social scientists. Rather, the intention is to use the social scientific 
methodology to foreground the empirical data and to construct a robust and plausible 
interpretive rendering of the lived interactions between altered moods and Christianity. This 
use of grounded theory is congruent with the injunction by Charmaz to “Use grounded theory 
guidelines to give you a handle on the material, not a machine that does the work for you” 
(2014, p.216). This rendering of the data is presented in each of Chapters 3-6 as ‘description of 
data’ and ‘analysis’. This voice of experience is then engaged with the practical theological 
methodology in the introductions to each theme and in the Mezzanine and Penthouse 
chapters through being brought into conversation with relevant interdisciplinary and 
theological resources; the two aspects of the grounded practical theology methodology are 
thus interwoven in the thesis. Grounded theory is thus used as a theological method and not 
simply as a way to collect data. 
 
The rest of this chapter outlines these social scientific and theological methodologies and 
brings them together as a grounded practical theology methodology. I firstly outline the 
discipline and methods of practical theology, followed by a discussion of contextual theology, 
and indicate why this thesis is most appropriately considered a work of practical theology with 
contextual elements. I then turn to a discussion of qualitative research methodology as applied 
to theological research, and to grounded theory as a methodology particularly suitable to this 
research area. Section 2.3 outlines the research methods that I am using, including a 
discussion of specific issues that arise from the use of qualitative interviews and details of the 
research process. 
 
2.1 Theological methodology 
 
2.1.1 Practical theology 
 
The beginnings of practical theology as a distinctive academic discipline can be traced back to 
the late 18th Century, when pastoral or practical theology was first recognised as an academic 
discipline within European universities. This early form of practical theology was primarily 
concerned with pragmatic questions about Christian clerical ministry, and was often described 
as applied theology (Dingemans, 1996; Schweitzer, 2012). This characterisation was 
developed, and to some degree challenged, by Schleiermacher in the early 19th Century. He 




described theology as consisting of three sub-disciplines: a bedrock of philosophical theology, 
which is verified by historical theology, which is itself the foundation for practical theology. In 
Schleiermacher’s outline practical theology incorporates church service (liturgy, worship, 
homiletics, pastoral care) and church government, and is the link between historical theology 
and the active Christian life (Schleiermacher, 1811). In later work he identified and resisted the 
idea that practical theology simply consists of the application of systematic theology, writing 
that: 
 
But if theology as a whole is so defined that dogmatic becomes theology 
proper and practical theology merely an application of dogmatics, and if we 
consider how little of dogmatics - indeed nothing, insofar as it is truly 
dogmatics - is ever applied in the field of practical theology, then it seems to 
me that this view is very skewed and inadequate to the actual state of affairs. 
(Schleiermacher, 2002, p.84) 
 
Nevertheless, despite the space given to practical theology in Schleiermacher’s work, the 
relationship between theory and practice only flows in one direction – theory influences 
practice, but practice is not thought to change theory.  
 
This understanding was challenged by scholars of theology and religion from the 1950s 
onwards (Hiltner, 1958; Tracy, 1983; Campbell, 1990; Browning, 1996; Osmer, 2008). 
Intellectual, institutional, and professional changes fostered a new interest in empirical 
research, the relationship between theory and practice (in particular phronesis, practical 
wisdom), and ‘grass roots’ theology (such as liberation theologies) and lived religion. Hiltner 
was one of the earliest of these scholars to propose a new understanding of the discipline, 
saying that the “proper study of practice would illuminate theological understanding itself” 
(Hiltner, 1958, p.47). These developments were not unique to practical theology, with similar 
shifts and a ‘turn to practice’ happening in the social and political sciences, humanities, and 
various fields of professional education (Miller-McLemore, 2012b, p.16). 
 
There is now a cluster of related theological sub-disciplines that take as their subject this 
relationship between experience and Christian Scripture/tradition. These include pastoral 
theology, practical theology, ordinary theology, theological reflection, and contextual 
theology. These titles have shifted over time, reflecting changes in the way that these 
disciplines are understood by practitioners. Central to these changes has been this shift from 
understanding the discipline as applied theology (i.e. concerned with applying the theological 
insights supplied by systematic theology or biblical studies), to conceptualising it as a source of 




theology in its own right. In discussing the contemporary shape of practical theology, Ballard 
characterises this current understanding as a recognition that:  
 
practical theology, as a theological discipline, itself contributes directly to the 
theological process in its reflection on and analysis of the human situation in 
the context of faith. Insights will emerge that offer a critique of the 
theological tradition. Practical theology, therefore, provides primary 
theological data, shaping and forming Christian belief and action (Ballard, 
1995, p.116). 
 
The distinction between pastoral theology and practical theology has been particularly 
debated. Hiltner (1958), for example, rejected the desirability or possibility of an overarching 
discipline of practical theology that would hold together the diverse areas of practice-
orientated theology. Browning (1996) took the alternative view that practical theology 
included the sub-dimension of pastoral theology. In a contemporary review of the relationship 
between pastoral and practical theology, Miller-McLemore describes their shared purpose as 
being to “articulate a dynamic theology that complicates and enriches the study of religious 
traditions and texts through proximity to practice, activity, events, and situations” (Miller-
McLemore, 2010, p.814). They are both concerned with the analysis of theology in the midst of 
people’s lives. She argues, however, that they differ in scope – practical theology is, in 
principle, concerned with the whole potential range of Christian practices, activities, events, 
and situations, and how people or communities integrate religious knowledge and practice. 
Pastoral theology is concerned with individual experience and the activity of care, and has 
strong interdisciplinary connections with psychology and psychoanalytic theory. Borrowing 
from Kleinman’s (1997) concept of ‘ethnography of experience’, Miller-McLemore describes 
pastoral theology as a “theology of experience”, organised around a set of shared theological 
concerns to do with “human angst and flourishing” (Miller-McLemore, 2010, p.823).  
 
Ordinary theology is a further sub-discipline of practical theology. Ordinary theology refers to 
the ways that people think and talk about God outside of formal academic environments 
(Astley, 2012) It aims to articulate the ways in which ‘ordinary’ people (i.e. those not trained in 
academic theology) think and talk about God and to bring those ordinary theologies into 
critical dialogue with Christian tradition (Astley, 2013).  
 
This history perhaps explains why the methods and limits of contemporary practical theology 
seem less clearly defined than other theological disciplines, and why there is such a cluster of 




related disciplines. Broadly defined, practical theology then is “a place where religious beliefs 
and practice meets contemporary experiences, questions, and actions and conducts dialogue 
that is mutually enriching, intellectually critical and practically transforming”(Pattison and 
Woodward, 2000, p.7). Over all, the approach of practical theology is grounded in the life of 
the church, society, and the individual; it is critical, dialogic, and often has the explicit aim of 
transforming practice (Graham et al., 2005; Swinton and Mowat, 2006; Osmer, 2011; Miller-
McLemore, 2012b). 
 
If systematic theology is thought of as interpreting tradition and doctrine and biblical theology 
as interpreting Scripture, then practical theology’s contribution is to interpret practices and 
situations. This is the heritage from Schleiermacher and the way in which theology 
departments and curricula are often still structured. And yet the boundaries of practical 
theology are not as clear as these structures might indicate. It should not be assumed that the 
other theological disciplines are purely theoretical, for example, nor, as has been discussed, 
that the aim of practical theology is to apply the theory developed elsewhere. The ‘practices’ 
in practical theology are historically, culturally, theologically, socially, and morally situated, and 
so the relationship between theory and practice in theology is not equivalent to the 
relationship between, for example, science and technology (Swinton and Mowat, 2006, p.19). 
Christian practices, such as healing or worship, carry meaning for the people or community 
engaged in them; as Browning noted, the distinction between theory and practice breaks 
down because practices are theory-laden, and theories are practice-laden (Browning, 1996, 
p.6). Practical theology does not only attend to explicitly Christian practices. Some situations 
and practices, including those involved in the experience of altered moods, are obviously not 
exclusively Christian. However, because these human practices are inescapably value-laden, 
there may also be dissimilarities between the Christian experience and other experiences. For 
example, the practice of ‘healing’ might be quite different depending on the theological or 
cultural context.  
 
Recognising the diversity of approaches and sometimes unclear boundaries, Pattison and 
Woodward (2000, p.13) list the essential characteristics of practical theology, suggesting that it 
is: 
• a transformational activity 
• concerned with emotions, symbolism, art and imagination 
• confessional and honest 
• unsystematic 




• truthful and committed 
• contextual and situationally related 





• analytical and constructive 
• dialectical, holding in tension a number of polarities such as theory/practice, 
tradition/experience, theology/other disciplines, religious community/wider society 
• skilful and demanding. 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, I am following Miller-McLemore’s structure and regarding 
practical theology as an over-arching discipline with pastoral theology and ordinary theology 
as sub-disciplines. The study of altered moods fits well within the “human angst and 
flourishing” focus of pastoral theology (Miller-McLemore, 2010, p.823), yet this thesis is not 
primarily concerned with the pastoral care of people with altered moods. Rather, it is situated, 
both methodologically and in terms of focus, within the broader discipline of practical 
theology. By attending theologically to the lived experience of altered moods this thesis 
explores the conviction expressed by Fulkerson, that “theologies that matter arise out of 
dilemmas – out of situations that matter” (Fulkerson, 2007, p.13). Some aspects of this thesis 
also fit within the sub-discipline of ordinary theology, in the sense articulated by Astley when 
he notes that, for ‘ordinary theologians’: 
 
their beliefs and values matter to them, often very much indeed. And they 
"work" for them, in the sense of providing the resources of meaning and 
spiritual strength that they employ to lean into the force fields of their lives 
(in James Fowler's memorable phrase), enabling them to cope and even 
flourish, day to day (Astley, 2014, p.3). 
 
From this perspective theology is not just applied to previously analysed qualitative data. 
Instead the data itself is treated as (potentially) theological, as theology embedded in words 
and practice (Cameron et al., 2010, pp.51–4).  By attending to the lived nature of religion “… it 
demonstrates the creative edge of practical theology as it morphs, creates hybrids, and 
constructs new forms of practice, material religion, and nuanced beliefs in response to 
suffering” (Dunlap, 2012, p.49). 





Based on this discussion and list of characteristics I suggest a working definition of practical 
theology as the art of disclosing, analysing, and understanding embedded (or ordinary) 
theologies, and of theologically interpreting real-world practices and experiences. This broad 
definition does not, however, address the specifics of exactly how practical theology 
approaches embedded theologies, practices, and experience. To answer that question, in the 
following sections I outline the most common methods of practical theology, and highlight a 
key debate about the role of experience in theology. 
 
2.1.1.1 Methods of practical theology 
 
Practical theology lacks a unique or distinctive research method, but instead has adopted 
methods, methodologies, and perspectives from other disciplines. Some of these, such as case 
study, psychological theory, feminist theory, hermeneutics, and quantitative empirical 
research are well embedded within practical theology. Others, such as ethnography, have 
shorter histories but are increasingly being adopted by theologians.49  
 
Despite this diversity of potential methods, two predominate in theological reflection – critical 
correlation and the pastoral/hermeneutical cycle. Critical correlation is based on the work of 
Tillich (1967) and aims to correlate human culture and experience with Christian theology and 
revelation, creating a two-way dialogue. However, this does not necessarily imply that there 
can be an equivalent effect in both directions, nor that human experience is a source of 
revelation. In Tillich’s model theology must speak to human experience, and it can only do this 
by attending to and interacting with real situations.50 Tillich described this as correlating the 
Christian message with the questions present in the human situation. Reason and experience 
are the source of questions which are then addressed to scripture and tradition. Later 
developments of the critical correlation model (e.g. Tracy, 1983) more strongly emphasise 
mutuality and equality between partners in the dialogue, so that both theology and 
reason/experience are able to correct and enhance the other. Tracy even goes so far as to 
identify critical correlation with practical theology, saying that, “Practical Theology is the 
mutually critical correlation of the interpreted theory and praxis of the Christian fact and the 
 
49 See Miller-McLemore (2012c) for a discussion of different methods. 
50 Tillich suggests that the situation is analysed and articulated in philosophical terms; later 
authors recognise that the correlative approach does not specifically answer the question of 
exactly what method is used to articulate the situation (Graham et al., 2005, p.167).  




interpreted theory and practice of the contemporary situation” (Tracy, 1983 p. 76). In later 
work Tracy clarifies what this looks like in practice, suggesting that the outcomes of critical 
correlation may be “identities of meaning, analogies, or radical nonidentities” (Tracy, 1987, 
p.140). 
 
Pattison’s (2000) model of mutual critical correlation takes this further by emphasising the 
dialogic nature of the process. He characterises theological reflection as a dialogue between 
three conversation partners: personal experience, Christian scripture and tradition, and 
context. As with an actual conversation, there may be different outcomes – agreement, 
disagreement or silence. The model recognises that there may be a gap between 
contemporary situations and Christian tradition and allows for the possibility of living with 
those gaps. Pattison accepts that the theological reflection produced through this process 
would not be systematic or generalisable to other people or contexts. He argues that this is 
not necessarily a negative, saying that there needs to be a shift to understanding that 
theologies can be “disposable, contextual, and thoroughly idiosyncratic” (Pattison, 2000 p. 
143). This methodology therefore has a strong contextual element.51 
 
The second significant model is the pastoral or hermeneutical cycle (or spiral). It has roots in 
the work of liberation theologians (e.g. Gutiérrez, 1973), in which praxis is the starting point 
for theological reflection and theology arises from participation in the struggle against 
injustice. The idea of a cycle of practice-theory-practice is now widely used within practical 
theology. The pastoral cycle typically has four stages: experience, analysis, theological 
reflection, and action (Ballard and Pritchard, 2006; Graham et al., 2005). The aim of the cycle is 
orthopraxis, with theological interpretation fuelled by practical engagement. For example, 
Osmer’s (2008) version of is aimed at congregational leaders who want to understand 
situations that confront them. It includes four ‘tasks’ of practical theology: descriptive (What is 
happening?), interpretive (Why is it happening?), normative (What ought to be happening?), 
and strategic (How should we respond?) The hermeneutical cycle is similar, but with an a priori 
assumption of commitment to liberation theology – the stages are immersion (in the social 
context of economic or political exclusion), social analysis, theological 
reflection/hermeneutics, and pastoral planning (Segundo, 1976).  
 
51 This contextual aspect does not necessarily lead to the classical forms of contextual 
theologies such as black, feminist or womanist theologies. The definition of contextual 
theology is discussed further in section 1.4. 





It can be seen from this outline that human experience has a key role in the methods of 
practical theology. All forms of practical theology take experience seriously and have 
developed methods for engaging with and representing experience (Graham et al., 2005). Yet 
there are ongoing debates about the appropriate relationship between experience and theory.  
 
2.1.1.2 The contested role of experience in theological reflection 
 
Since at least the nineteenth century… [there has been] a profound turn to 
concrete human experience in Christian theological studies. While it was 
always implicitly important, in the contemporary era there has been a self-
conscious awareness of the context of daily life in which people indelibly 
experience religious faith (Weaver, 2013, p.70). 
 
The history and development of the discipline of practical theology, outlined above, 
demonstrates this ‘turn to concrete human experience’ described by Weaver. It also 
demonstrates that the relationship between theology and experience is not without 
controversy. Western theological reflection typically includes one or more of four possible 
sources: Scripture, tradition, reason, and experience. Different traditions recognise or 
emphasise different sources, so that, for example, classical Anglican theology draws on 
Scripture, tradition, and reason, but with Scripture the primary source (Bartlett, 2007, p.47). 
The ‘Methodist Quadrilateral’ includes all four sources, again with Scripture as the primary 
source (Phillips, 2016). These different configurations demonstrate that experience is not 
automatically included in theological reflection. Even when it is included, the term ‘experience’ 
may be given a particular meaning. Experience, and religious experience in particular, is taken 
to mean the inner, subjective, life of a person rather than the outward experiences of 
everyday life (McGrath, 2017 p. 131). 
 
Even when experience is viewed as a source for reflection, different traditions vary as to the 
status given to it. Experience may be seen as simply a topic for reflection (e.g. much pastoral 
theology), a lens through which revelation is viewed (e.g. hermeneutical practical theology), or 
as a foundational source of revelation and/or theology in its own right (e.g. feminist practical 
theology) (Cahalan and Mikoski, 2014). There is an “unresolved agenda about the role of 
experience vis-à-vis that which is claimed as “revelation”, and of the status of nontheological 
disciplines in the theological endeavor” (Bennett, 2012, p.492). Scharen and Vigen (2011 p. 61) 
have succinctly described the anxiety that underlies the debate for many theologians:  





[T]he persistent fear is relativism – in belief and in ethics…  If experience is 
given too much weight in the analysis, claims to transcendent or universally 
normative truth will degenerate into biased, or at least problematically 
limited visions, based on one’s own preferences and encounters.  
 
Swinton and Mowat, for example, explicitly assert that taking human experience seriously 
does not mean that human experience can be a source of revelation (2006 p. 5). Reason and 
experience are appropriately used to provide data for theological reflection, but are always 
subordinate to Christian scripture and tradition. To resolve the apparent tension between 
experience and theory, Swinton and Mowat make an appeal to Barthian theology, asserting 
that revelation is found only in the person of Jesus Christ, as God’s self-disclosure to the 
Christian Church. Practical theologians from a more contextual perspective are less likely to 
resolve the tension between experience and theology in this way. For example, writing from a 
feminist liberation perspective Cooper-White argues that practical theology is not only a 
“constructive theology in its own right” but also that human experience is an authoritative 
source for theology (2012, p.36). Similarly, Pattison’s (2000) model strongly implies that 
theology has no privileged place in describing reality.  
 
As described in the introduction, this research project is primarily concerned with individual 
experience rather than corporate practices, is potentially highly interdisciplinary, and has a 
contextual aspect without being a full contextual or liberation theology. For these reasons, I 
have chosen to use dialogic mutual critical correlation as the ‘best-fit’ primary practical 
theological methodology. Building on Pattison’s (2000) model, there will be at least four voices 
represented in the conversation – the experiences of interview participants as recounted 
through their interview transcripts; the Christian tradition; other disciplines in the arts and 
humanities; and my own voice as I narrate, interpret, and analyse the other conversation 
partners. The inclusion of this final voice is to make explicit the fact that, in qualitative 
research, the researcher cannot be removed from the equation, and as a reflexive recognition 
of some of the complexities involved in representing ‘experience’ in theology. Carrying out 
robust and honest practical theology seems to requires at least an acknowledgement that 
there is no ‘view from nowhere’ (Flood, 1999). The voice of experience is thus present in the 
analysis in two ways – through the verbatim quotations from participants, and through my 
research choices, analysis and interpretation (guided by grounded theory). 
 
 




2.1.2 Contextual theology 
 
As described in the introduction, this project draws on elements of contextual theology in 
addition to practical theology. It seeks to explore ways in which the experience of altered 
moods shapes theology, to develop a practical theology of experience. Contextual theologies 
arise from within particular forms of shared culture or identity (e.g. gender and feminist 
theology). They are strongly grounded in lived experience. Contextual theology therefore takes 
a particular perspective towards the relationship between experience and theory. The 
discipline is related to practical theology, being similarly grounded in human experience, but 
need not have a practical focus. It is common for contextual theology texts to state that all 
theology is contextual, in the sense that all theology originates within a particular context (e.g. 
Bevans, 2002). This is an important acknowledgement – it is not that there is one kind of 
objective, universal (usually white, male, Western) theology while all others are limited and 
contextual – but this epistemic claim is not the same as saying that all theologies acknowledge 
context as significant (Pears, 2009). Contextual theologies not only recognise the significance 
of context for the development of theology; the theologies themselves are explicitly shaped by 
that recognition and context. This is a theological and methodological stance. Contextual 
theologies are therefore those theologies which fundamentally and explicitly incorporate 
context. “Contextual theology can be defined as a way of doing theology in which one takes 
into account: the spirit and message of the gospel; the tradition of the Christian people; the 
culture in which one is theologising; and the social change in that culture” (Bevans, 2002). 
Contextual theology traditionally focused on certain types of sociological context such as 
poverty (e.g. South American liberation theology), gender (e.g. feminist and womanist 
theology), and ethnicity or race (e.g. black theology). More recent work has arisen from a 
wider range of contexts, including Deafness, disability, and post-colonialism.  
 
The history of contextual theology has roots firstly in missiology and situations of inter-cultural 
or inter-religious dialogue and encounter, and secondly in South American liberation theology. 
Describing the origin of local theologies (the term ‘local theology’ given a similar, although 
broader, meaning to ‘contextual theology’), Schreiter (1986) identified a missiological shift 
from the 1950s onwards. As Schillebeeckx describes it in the foreword to the same book, 
“Previously one almost took for granted that the theology of the Western churches was 
supraregional and was, precisely in its Western form, universal and therefore directly 
accessible” (Schillebeeckx, 1986, p.ix). This perspective started to change with the realisation 
that the theology inherited from the Western (North Atlantic) churches did not fit well into the 




very different cultures of Asia and Africa. Schreiter (1986) identifies three concerns that 
encouraged this shift in thinking. Firstly, new contexts meant that new questions were being 
asked, secondly, the old answers to these new questions were inadequate, and thirdly, the 
emergence of a new type of Christian theology (exemplified by liberation theology) which was 
attentive to the local context. Prompted by this shift, Schreiter suggests that there are three 
different models of local theologies, and that these models differ in their approach to the 
cultural context. It is important to note (as Schreiter does in the Introduction to the 30th 
Anniversary edition) that these models were described at a particular time and in a particular 
context of missiology; from the mid-1970s onwards in areas where Christianity had not 
previously been a dominant tradition (Schreiter, 2015). 
 
Firstly, translation models. These use a two-step process whereby the core Christian message 
is firstly freed from its original cultural context and is then translated into a new context. This 
type of model may be useful in situations of immediate pastoral need, but has significant 
limitations. The underlying assumption that Christian revelation occurs in a cultural vacuum 
ready to be translated into different contexts is highly problematic, and it is far from clear how 
to decide what is the core revelation, what is cultural and thus incidental, and what an 
appropriate translation would be.  
 
Secondly, adaptation models, which “seek a more fundamental encounter between 
Christianity and culture” (Schreiter, 1986, p.9). During this encounter Christian theology is 
adapted to make sense within a specific culture. The adaptation may happen in different ways; 
in the most contextual approach the ‘seed of faith’ interacts with the new cultural soil to grow 
a new expression of Christianity which is faithful to both Christian tradition and local culture. 
This approach takes context seriously, but seems to be based on an idealised view of an 
isolated culture. Global communications, power dynamics, and historic missionary efforts 
mean that few cultures have no pre-existing Christian concepts, and these concepts may well 
reflect a particular kind of Western Christianity. 
 
Thirdly, contextual models, which begin their reflection with the cultural context, rather than 
the Christian tradition. Schreiter suggests that they can be divided into those that emphasise 
identity (what he calls ethnographic theologies), and those that emphasise the need for social 
change (liberation theologies). These theologies begin with the questions and needs of 
particular people, seeking to allow the Christian tradition to answer the new questions posed 
by that context, rather than just answering the old questions. The weakness and risk of this 




approach is very much as discussed in the previous section – how to resolve the relationship 
between local culture and Christian tradition.  
 
First published shortly after Schreiter’s book, influential work by Bevans (2002) addressed this 
question by identifying different models of contextual theological method. Each model seeks 
to take context seriously, but different models take different approaches to the relationship 
between experience (including personal/communal experiences, culture, social location, and 
social change) and Christian scripture and tradition. Approaches range from the counter-
cultural model that recognises the importance of context but is sceptical of any claim of 
sanctity or revelation coming from human culture, to the anthropological model that 
emphasises cultural identity more than Christian identity.  
 
Of particular note for this thesis is Bevans’ ‘synthetic model’. This is a middle-of-the-road 
model which seeks to balance insights from present experience, the past (scripture/tradition), 
and contexts. It is described using the image of someone writing a Filipino diary in between 
the lines of a Western book – not obliterating the Western legacy but creatively working 
around it and filling in the spaces with Filipino thought. The synthetic model “…tries to 
preserve the importance of the gospel message and the heritage of traditional doctrinal 
formulations while at the same time acknowledging the vital role that context has played and 
can play in theology” (Bevans, 2002, p.89). This model takes account of insights from other 
perspectives, and rather than just coming to a compromise seeks to use a ‘creative dialectic’ to 
develop something acceptable to all dialogue partners. Cultural and social contexts are viewed 
as composites, where different cultures have some unique and some shared aspects. Identity 
is formed through a dialogue that includes these unique and shared aspects, so that, for 
example, an Indonesian identity has some overlap with Asian, Malaysian, Muslim, and Western 
colonial identities but is greater than the sum of the parts. In this model context is treated as 
morally ambivalent, with some neutral and some good or bad aspects. Revelation is 
conceptualised as both historically bounded and operating within specific contexts – both 
finished/once for all and ongoing. Bevans uses a gardening metaphor for each of his models; 
the synthetic model is described using an image of cross-pollination, where new and more 
robust plants are created for particular environments (2002, p.95).  
 
The strengths of this model are that it promotes dialogue and creative solutions to diversity. 
Truth is not reached by one point of view dominating all others. “The synthetic model really 
makes an effort to make theologizing an exercise in true conversation and dialogue with the 




other so that one’s own and one’s culture’s identity can emerge in the process” (Bevans, 2002, 
p.94). The model also witnesses to the idea that there is something constant in Christian 
identity across cultures and time. All cultures can learn from all other cultures, including those 
in the past. The weakness of any synthesis model is that the resulting theology can appear in 
danger of ‘selling out’, with a dominant culture exercising subtle power and manipulation. The 
theology may appear neither faithful to tradition nor to contemporary society. Some of these 
weaknesses are off-set by the realisation that contextual theologies are no longer primarily 
concerned with cross-cultural mission in a situation of Western colonialism and cultural 
dominance. Diverse post-colonial theologies demonstrate that ‘context’ is now as much about 
fine-grained experiences of gender, ethnicity, and dis/ability as it is about traditional cultural 
or nationalistic identities.52  
 
Qualitative research is one of the major ways in which it is possible to understand the 
‘experience’ aspect of both practical and contextual theology. It is designed to give insight into 
the ways in which people experience and make sense of the world, and is particularly useful to 
explore meanings, contexts, and processes (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994).  Working from the 
more general to the more specific, each qualitative research project may involve a 
foundational epistemology and ontology, a theoretical perspective or paradigm, a 
methodological framework informed by that theoretical stance, and then specific methods 
used to collect and analyse data. Theoretical perspectives include, for example, hermeneutics, 
phenomenology, or feminism. Common methodologies include discourse analysis, 
ethnography, or survey research; methods of data collection are various and may include focus 
groups, interviews, participant observation, or collection of online texts. The guiding 
theoretical stance and methodology may be more or less explicit, and there is often some 
theoretical overlap between method and methodology. For example, research from a feminist 
perspective often has a very strong theoretical stance, and grounded theory is often described 
as both a methodology and a method of data collection and analysis (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; 
Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; Crotty, 1998; Creswell, 2013). 
 
There is a degree of debate about how exactly these different aspects of qualitative research 
should be articulated and categorised. Crotty, for example, describes them as four hierarchical 
research design elements, with the decision made at each stage affecting the choices available 
at lower levels. So, for example, choosing a subjectivist epistemology would limit the choice of 
 
52 See Pears (2009) for a review of contemporary contextual theologies. 




theoretical perspective to those which are consonant with subjectivism (Crotty, 1998). Others 
group epistemology, ontology, and paradigm together as philosophical and theoretical 
assumptions that underpin the action taken in a particular research project  (e.g. Creswell, 
2013). Perhaps the most important points of consensus from these debates are that a) the 
research question should ideally determine the research design (with the proviso that 
question-asking is not a neutral, context-free, activity - a researcher’s context will inform and 
shape the questions that may be asked in the first place) and b) that there is reflexivity and 
transparency, so that philosophical and theoretical assumptions and decisions are considered 
and reported. This reporting may include a discussion of the assumptions, experience, and 
perspectives of the researcher as well as the research project. With these points in mind, the 
following section outlines the philosophical foundations and theoretical approach that I have 
taken in the empirical aspects of this thesis.  
 
2.2 Qualitative research methodology 
 
The aim of this research is to examine the question, “in what ways is the lived experience of 
altered moods informed by the lived experience of Christianity, and vice versa?” As an 
exploration of lived experience this research question fits squarely within qualitative rather 
than quantitative or mixed-methods research designs. It is concerned with understanding the 
social reality of the participants, as that reality is constructed through the interaction between 
individual, community, and experience. The most appropriate theoretical perspective for this 
kind of research question is the interpretive or constructivist paradigm. The interpretive 
paradigm is underpinned by a relativist ontology and subjectivist epistemology; social reality is 
considered to be constructed by social actors (either individual or community), and that 
knowledge is subjective – the knower and the knowledge are inextricably linked (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 1994; Swinton and Mowat, 2006; Creswell, 2013). The interpretive paradigm originally 
arose from a dissatisfaction with the use of the scientific method in social science research. It 
was developed in contrast to the realist and objectivist position of the positivist (and later 
postpositivist) paradigms. A positivist approach to social research assumes that social 
phenomena have an objective existence apart from social actors, and that this reality can be 
known and accurately represented. This approach has later been modified by critical or subtle 
realists, who assert that there is an objective reality, but that it may not be possible to 
accurately know and represent it (Liamputtong and Ezzy, 2005; Ormston et al., 2013). The 
interpretive paradigm, on the other hand, assumes that there are multiple constructed 




realities i.e. that the same phenomena can be subject to different but valid interpretations. 
Interpretive research is typically inductive, seeking to understand specific situations or 
phenomena by accessing the meanings that people attribute to them. The interpretive 
paradigm regards research as inherently value-laden, since the values and assumptions of both 
participants and researchers are present throughout the research process. Results, or 
knowledge claims, emerge as the research progresses and as conflicting interpretations are 
analysed and negotiated. Interpretive research is fundamentally a search for meaning – how a 
situation is understood by those within it, and the reasons why individuals or communities act 
in certain ways (Breckenridge et al., 2012). Within this paradigm narrative and experience are 
seen to be legitimate sources of knowledge. 
 
This thesis is, however, a work of Christian theology rather than social science. Practical 
theology encompasses a range of methodologies and methods. Graham et al. (2005) identified 
seven different methodologies, ranging from ‘The Living Human Document’ using 
autobiographical methods to ‘Local Theologies’ using ethnographic methods. In general, the 
various models of practical theology are consistent with the interpretive paradigm outlined 
above. There is a clear degree of resonance between, for example, the way in which mutual 
critical correlation allows space for different voices to participate in the dialogue and the idea 
of multiple realities arising from one situation (Swinton and Mowat, 2006). Qualitative 
methods are typically utilised within practical theology as a way of outlining and exploring the 
situation of interest. The qualitative data is then brought into conversation with scripture, 
tradition, and insights from other disciplines. This is an egalitarian model, with each voice 
given equal weight in the conversation. This egalitarianism and concept of multiple realities 
can, however, appear incompatible with some forms of Christian theology. If Christian 
theology claims revelation and thus (some kind of) objective truth, then the conversation is 
never truly mutual and it may not be compatible with the interpretive paradigm. As an 
example, van Deusen Hunsinger (1995) draws on Barthian Christology to suggest that, in 
mutual critical conversation, theology has logical priority over social sciences. Within this 
understanding of practical theology research, theology utilises qualitative data but is 
ultimately independent from it, whereas qualitative data acquires its significance from 
theology. Rather than working within an interpretive paradigm, these interpretations of 
practical theology are more consistent with a critical or subtle realist position.53 
 
53 In that practical theology, being a theological discipline, typically takes the perspective that 
reality is neither entirely knowable nor entirely constructed.  





Developing a theory of empirical theology, van der Ven (1998) addressed this same dilemma 
from a methodological rather than epistemological perspective. He argues that lived religion is 
the direct object of theology, and that therefore practical theology is dependent on the social 
sciences. Despite this difference of perspective, his practical conclusions are similar to van 
Deusen Hunsinger (1995), namely that because empirical theology is a theological enterprise, 
the methodological framework and questions are theological in nature. He argues that, rather 
than seeing empirical theology as an inter- or multi-disciplinary exercise (theology that uses 
empirical methods), theology should expand its traditional range of methods to include 
empirical methods, thus becoming an empirical discipline in its own right. The approach I have 
taken in this thesis is in line with van der Ven’s intra-disciplinary model, in that constructivist 
grounded theory is being used as a theological methodology.  
 
Mindful of the potential discrepancy between the interpretive and critical/subtle realist 
paradigm, in this research I am using constructivist grounded theory primarily because of the 
methodological strategies that flow from the interpretive paradigm, while holding lightly to 
the philosophical assumptions underlying it. This is essentially a pragmatic research paradigm, 
seeking to combine methodologies with different philosophical assumptions in order to best 
answer a specific research question (Chilisa and Kawulich, 2012; Morgan, 2014). It is also 
consistent with Charmaz’s claim that pragmatism is an interpretive theoretical position with 
which constructivist grounded theory is aligned (Charmaz, 2014, p.231). I therefore turn now 
to explore constructivist grounded theory in more detail. 
 
2.2.1 Grounded theory 
 
Grounded theory is a specific form of qualitative research methodology which was originally 
developed within the social sciences. It is now widely used within a range of disciplines and 
subject areas, including to some extent in empirical or practical theology.54 Grounded theory is 
a structured framework which can function as both a guiding methodology and method. It is 
designed to allow the development of theory which is strongly grounded in the systematic 
collection and analysis of data and is especially concerned with action and process. Grounded 
theory thus resonates strongly with the practical and contextual theology emphasis on taking 
 
54 See Strauss and Corbin (1994 pp. 275–6) for examples in other disciplines; theological 
examples include Barnsley (2013) and Shooter (2012). 




human experience seriously and is an appropriate methodology for investigating the 
interactions between different experiences. 
 
2.2.1.1 History and key literature   
 
Classic grounded theory was developed by sociologists Glaser and Strauss in response to a 
perceived gap between theory and empirical research and the debate around the legitimacy 
and status of qualitative research (Glaser and Strauss, 2009). It emerged as a response to two 
opposing theoretical paradigms within sociology – structuralism on the one hand, and 
positivism on the other. Grounded theory was positioned as a middle-way between strongly 
deductive sociological theories and strongly inductive and quantitative scientific methods. 
Reflecting that position, the methodology was intended to explicitly link theory and empirical 
research as two parts of the same process (Strauss and Corbin, 1994), so that qualitative 
research could move beyond description into the development of explanatory theoretical 
frameworks. Based on their study of death and dying in hospitals, in particular the ways in 
which they collected and then analysed their data as the basis for theory, Glaser and Strauss 
outlined systematic strategies that could be used in other settings. The concept of constant-
comparative analysis, in which data is collected and analysed simultaneously in an iterative 
process, was emphasised as a way in which theory and data could be held together. Grounded 
theory as advocated by Glaser and Strauss was strongly influenced by their respective schools 
of sociology - the positivist Columbia University and the pragmatism and field-work expertise 
of Chicago. Positivist influences can be seen in, for example, the striving towards dispassionate 
empiricism and the rigorously systematic techniques recommended in the book. The 
pragmatic and symbolic interactionist tradition can be seen in the emphasis on action and 
social processes as the appropriate subject for study (Charmaz, 2014, p.17).   
 
This emphasis on the inductive move from data to theory has remained constant throughout 
later developments in grounded theory. There have, however, been some changes. Glaser and 
Strauss themselves have taken the methodology in slightly different directions. Perhaps 
reflecting his original background, Glaser continued to emphasise the methodical and 
structured nature of the process, arguing that careful attention to each stage of the process is 
necessary for research to discover emergent theoretical categories rather than just producing 
a ‘full conceptual description’ (Glaser, 1978; Glaser, 1992).     
 
Strauss and Corbin published the first version of their grounded theory in 1990 (Strauss and 




Corbin, 1990). By this time grounded theory was seen by some researchers as problematically 
based on positivist assumptions, which they addressed by reinterpreting the role of the 
researcher. Their methodology has been developed further in later publications and editions 
(e.g. Strauss and Corbin, 1994; Corbin and Strauss, 2008). The main differences between the 
classic (or Glasserian) methodology and Straussian grounded theory are centred around 
different approaches to induction/deduction and verification (Heath and Cowley, 2004). 
 
Grounded theory methodology typically places the literature review towards the end of the 
research project. This is consistent with the concern that theory should emerge from the data, 
rather than pre-existing theory being used to generate hypotheses that are then tested 
empirically. Both approaches acknowledge that the researcher will not, and cannot, approach 
the data as a blank slate. The approaches differ in the point at which the literature is 
introduced, and the emphasis given to it. Glaser promotes the importance of ‘learning not to 
know’, and reading only broadly in the general subject area in order to be sensitised to 
possibilities in the data (Glaser, 1998). Focused reading is introduced late in the process of 
theory generation. He suggests that reading relevant literature too early in the process may 
skew or bias the emergence of new theory. In the Straussian methodology (Corbin and Strauss, 
2008) relevant literature and past experience of the researcher are invoked earlier in the 
process, being used as the basis for theoretical sensitivity and to formulate hypotheses or 
research questions. 
 
This difference carries through into the concern with induction/deduction and verification. 
Classic grounded theory heavily stresses the emergence of theory from the data. Insights are 
recorded in theoretical memos; it is the data that provides theoretical sensitivity. All of the 
data is important, with deduction and verification always subservient to emergence. 
Researchers who easily find verification of their ideas in the data are cautioned to be wary of 
the dangers of forcing data into categories (Glaser, 1992). Straussian grounded theory also 
maintains the idea of emergence, but suggests that induction was over-emphasised in the 
original methodology. Deduction and verification become more important, with the data being 
interrogated for possible meanings and to verify hypotheses. The constant-comparative 
method of analysis and theoretical sampling are also de-emphasised, for example by 
suggesting that researcher experience and the literature may be used to expand and guide 
analysis (Corbin and Strauss, 2008).   
 




2.2.1.2 Constructivist grounded theory 
 
A third grounded theory methodology was developed by Charmaz. This constructivist form of 
grounded theory is the methodology used for the empirical aspects of this research (Charmaz, 
2014). Constructivist grounded theory aims to take seriously the epistemological critique of 
previous versions while retaining the inductive, comparative, and emergent methods. In 
particular, Charmaz intended to divorce the method from a modernist epistemology which 
“fragmented the respondent’s story, relied on the authoritative voice of the researcher, 
blurred difference, and uncritically accepted Enlightenment grand narratives…” (Charmaz, 
2014, p.13). Constructivist grounded theory shares the essential characteristics of grounded 
theory with the earlier versions. It is inductive, rigorous, comparative, and aims to develop 
new theoretical concepts. It differs primarily in its philosophical assumptions and in strategic 
choices that flow from those assumptions. Whereas the emphasis in previous versions was on 
the researcher ‘discovering’ truth in the data, Charmaz assumes an interpretive paradigm and 
emphasises the construction of truth within the research situation, attempting to foreground 
relativity and subjectivity. Constructivist grounded theory research is concerned with how 
participants interpret given situations, theorising from the participants’ interpretations while 
also recognising that the theory is itself an interpretation (Charmaz, 2014, p.239). Key areas of 
difference are the encouragement of multiple voices and blurred theoretical categories, and 
the emphasis on the co-construction of research (Breckenridge et al., 2012).  
 
Constructivist methodology explicitly encourages the inclusion of multiple voices and 
perspectives in grounded theories. Classic grounded theory does not deny multiple 
perspectives, but these are analysed with the intention of discovering an over-arching pattern 
in the data. Individual stories contribute to an organising theoretical concept. Charmaz argues 
against this way of looking at the data, suggesting instead that there should be an attempt to 
portray the fullness of the participants’ experiences. This commitment to rendering multiple 
voices means that constructivist theories are less concerned with identifying one core 
theoretical category and are more concerned with capturing multiple participant perspectives.  
 
Constructivist methodology also encourages researchers to be explicit about their subjectivity. 
“The theory depends on the researcher’s view; it does not and cannot stand outside of it” 
(Charmaz, 2014, p.239, italics in original). Classic grounded theory also recognises that 
researcher bias exists and treats it as an additional source of data. Where constructivist 
grounded theory differs is in the recognition that every stage of the research will be affected 




by the researcher’s perspective; unlike classic grounded theory it does not expect that 
researcher biases can be neutralised by rigorous application of the methodology (Glaser, 
1998). 
 
Glaser (2002) has criticised Charmaz’s commitment to a constructivist perspective as 
unhelpfully forcing the data in a particular direction. He argues that classic grounded theory is 
a general method that can be adapted to any theoretical perspective; the emerging concepts 
are said to guide the choice of theoretical perspective. A constructivist perspective may be 
relevant for a particular study, but it should not be decided in advance. Some of Glaser’s 
criticisms of later grounded theory developments have been described as naïve (Bryant, 2003), 
a description that may be relevant here. The complexities of qualitative research are such that 
neither the researcher nor the methods can ever be entirely neutral. Nonetheless, it is 
important to note Glaser’s criticism, given the previous discussion about philosophical 
differences between theology and social sciences. The evaluation of qualitative research, 
including evaluation of the way in which biases are recognised and handled, is not always 
straight-forward. The following section discusses this evaluation in more detail, and outlines 
some of the implications for this research. 
 
2.2.2 Evaluation of qualitative research 
 
Valid scientific research must produce results that are falsifiable, replicable, and generalizable. 
Qualitative research, however, does not typically seek to produce findings that are true across, 
for example, all culture groups at any given time. Validity in qualitative research must 
necessarily look very different to validity in quantitative research. A number of different 
approaches have been adopted, ranging from simply using quantitative criteria to disregarding 
validity entirely. Angen (2000) has helpfully divided these approaches into two categories: 
those which take a broadly subtle or critical realist approach and therefore recommend the 
use of validity criteria designed specifically for qualitative research, and an interpretive 
approach that reformulates the concept of validity as a moral question. 
 
The criteria approaches broadly seek to translate the scientific concept of validity into terms 
that make sense for qualitative research. Specific methodological or procedural techniques are 
recommended to increase the credibility or trustworthiness of qualitative studies. Creswell, for 
example, lists eight techniques and suggests at least two of them need to be in place for 
qualitative research to be valid. The techniques include prolonged engagement, triangulation, 




peer review or debriefing, negative case analysis, clarifying researcher bias, member checks, 
thick description, and external audits (Creswell, 2013). Many of these techniques are 
commonly incorporated into qualitative research, especially prolonged engagement (either 
with participants or with the data), member checks (for example by sending analyses to 
participants for comment), thick description, and some degree of peer review and/or 
considering alternative perspectives. However, these criteria can be criticised on both practical 
and philosophical grounds for attempting to adhere too closely to a broadly realist and 
positivist position which is not consistent with an otherwise interpretive research paradigm. 
For example, member checking may imply that there is one, fixed version of reality. If a 
participant disagrees with an analysis, or even with what they themselves said in an interview, 
this could be because they have had more time to reflect on a question, because the interview 
itself changed their perspective, or because they have since had new experiences (Morse, 
1994). In general, criteria-based approaches were developed in response to ongoing academic 
and funder doubts about the value of qualitative research, in particular questions of relativism 
and objectivity. The criteria are undoubtedly useful for considering how to access and take 
account of alternative perspectives, how to conduct an ethical and transparent study, and how 
to situate the study in a wider context. However, the interpretive paradigm is not based on an 
idea of objective truth; and the role of the researcher as an active participant and co-creator of 
the research means that methodological techniques are not a guarantee against subjective 
bias (Barnsley, 2013).  
 
Interpretive approaches to validity therefore reject the concept that qualitative research must 
use specific techniques in order to be credible.  Instead, the emphasis is on broad principles 
that can be used to evaluate the trustworthiness of a study. Angen summarised these 
principles as “ethical and substantive validation” (2000, p.378). Ethical validation involves 
evaluating research against ethical principles such as beneficence or justice, and being 
prepared to give a clear answer to the question, ‘so what?’ “Ethical validation requires that we 
provide practical, generative, possibly transformative, and hopefully nondogmatic answers to 
the questions we pose as researchers” (Angen, 2000, p.389). Substantive validation requires 
researchers to show that they have adequately attended to the complexity of the subject, by 
creating a dialogue between the data and the various ways in which it can be understood. This 
involves attending to the researcher’s own understanding of the subject and to other relevant 
sources, and documenting this process. The subjectivity of the researcher is considered the 
background from which further understanding can flow, rather than as a distortion and threat 




to the quality of the research. It is a process of validation, rather than a one-off judgement of 
validity.  
 
The reliability and generalisability of qualitative findings is also a complex situation. 
Transferability is perhaps a better term to use, but even then many aspects of human 
experience are unique and unrepeatable. Repeating the same research process even with the 
same participants would most likely not produce the same data, although the final analysis 
may well be similar. One way to address this is to take the view that the researcher is not 
responsible for evaluating reliability and generalisability. Their responsibility is to provide a 
sufficiently detailed (thick) description of the situation and sufficiently transparent description 
of the research process so that other people can decide if the research is replicable or 
generalizable to their situation of interest (e.g. Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Another approach is 
to evaluate the research in terms of resonance or identification – for example, do the 
conclusions about altered moods and Christianity resonate with other people who share those 
experiences? (Swinton and Mowat, 2006, p.47). A third approach is to think in terms of 
theoretical generalisability, so that the aim of research is to develop or contribute to theory 
which will be relevant beyond the particular situation.  
  
2.2.2.1 Implications for this thesis 
 
This is a work of practical or empirical theology, not social science. This means that the over-
arching methodology is theological, with qualitative research data being utilised as one 
conversation partner. Grounded theory is used as a theological method. Nevertheless, the aim 
is still to collect and analyse the data in a way which social scientists would recognise as good 
practice. To facilitate this, constructivist grounded theory is being used as the guiding 
methodology for the empirical aspects of the research, and Charmaz’ evaluation criteria 
(credibility, originality, resonance, and usefulness) will be applied to the results. Other 
considerations discussed above will be addressed throughout the research process:  
 
• Member checking. This is being carried out not to imply a fixed version of reality, but 
rather as a balance to the cultural tendency to discount the testimony of people 
experiencing mental distress, and the reports from participants that their experiences 
are unheard within both their Christian community and wider society. Participants 
were given the chance to comment on their interview transcript and also on drafts of 
papers based on their data.  





• Transparent and self-reflexive process. I maintained a research diary including notes 
taken before and after each interview. Grounded theory also has this process ‘built in’ 
to some extent, with the use of close coding. 
 
• Ethical validation. The inter-disciplinary methodology has been chosen carefully to 
produce practical and potentially transformative answers to the research question. For 
example, the results may influence future pastoral practice in churches. 
 
• Substantive validation. The research question arose from anecdotal evidence gained 
during my professional practice, i.e. that people often reflected theologically on their 
lived experience of altered moods and Christianity. The literature review stage of the 
grounded theory methodology offered further substantive validation, for example 
through the triangulation between theoretical or quantitative work and the results of 











The previous sections outlined the methodologies of dialogic mutual critical correlation and 
constructivist grounded theory and how they are brought together in this project to form a 
grounded practical theology methodology. The rest of this chapter is concerned with the 
methods of the project; the ways in which the empirical material was collected and analysed. 
As well as being a methodological approach, grounded theory entails a particular research 
process. These methods are discussed below.  
 
2.3.1 Outline of grounded theory methods 
 
Like Strauss and Corbin, Charmaz suggests that the constructivist methodology is a set of 
flexible guidelines rather than rules, and that the research process is iterative, cyclical, and not 
necessarily linear (Charmaz, 2014, p.18). I summarise the stages of the method in the following 
















2.3.1.1 Research question 
 
Constructivist grounded theory recognises that the development of a research question 
cannot take place in a vacuum. Researcher experience and knowledge, as well as the practical 
requirements of funding processes, shape the choice of research topic as well as frame the 
research process as a whole. These kinds of researcher insights and biases are taken into the 
research process as guiding interests and sensitising concepts. Sensitising concepts are broad 
concepts that prompt ideas or questions about a topic. They are pursued tentatively, and 
discarded if they prove to be irrelevant to the data (Charmaz, 2014, p.30).  
 
Within the broad area of exploring the experiences of people with lived experience of altered 
moods and Christianity, I identified and documented a number of sensitising concepts for this 
research project at an early stage of the research: 
 
• Knowledge of the literature gained from previous academic work 
o Episodes of altered mood have been conceptualised as biographical disruption 
and recovery, and as affecting identity 
o The recovery model in mental health, and the use of spirituality as a resource 
for mental wellbeing 
o The existence of different explanatory accounts of altered mood 
o The narrative turn in social sciences, ethics and theology 
o Disability, liberation and contextual theologies  
• Awareness of the life stories of people with lived experience of altered moods and 
Christianity gained through professional experience   
• A particular perspective on the lived experience gained from an insider perspective. 
 
2.3.1.2 Recruitment and sampling 
 
Sampling, data collection, and analysis are presented here as distinct stages but in fact overlap. 
The inductive, iterative and cyclical nature of grounded theory research and the constant 
comparative method of analysis means that there is a two-way relationship between each of 
these stages. Data collection and analysis happen simultaneously and guide the process of 
recruitment and sampling. This means that data collection may begin earlier in the process of a 
grounded theory project than in other methodologies. 




I recruited participants for this study via local Christian and mental health networks. The 
participants whose narratives are reported in this thesis are all adults who have, at any point in 
their lives, self-identified as a Christian or as a member of a Christian community, and have 
also experienced at least one episode of altered mood which was significant enough to cause 
disruption to their daily life. Potential participants could access the project information 
anonymously on a project website, and express interest via a short, anonymous, screening 
survey. Participation in the research was based entirely on self-report, so that participants who 
had not received or had rejected a medical diagnosis were able to participate. Those 
participants who reported that they met the criteria and want to be contacted were sent a full 
participant information sheet. Participants who then indicated a willingness to be interviewed 
were added to the pool of potential participants.  
 
Theoretical sampling is a key concept within constructivist grounded theory, and is used to 
guide participant recruitment and selection of participants from the pool. The number of 
participants should first of all be large enough to gain a range of perspectives and develop 
preliminary analytic categories, but the later sampling of participants is guided by those 
theoretical categories. The aim is to continue developing the analytic categories until no new 
data emerges – this is theoretical saturation, the point at which data collection should stop. 
Purposive maximum variation sampling, i.e. sampling participants with the aim of achieving 
maximum variation with respect to relevant characteristics, is not specifically a grounded 
theory strategy but was adopted in this research as a way to guide the early sampling of 
participants. Initially the relevant variables were age, gender, ethnicity, and current 
religion/belief identity.55 Later recruitment of participants was guided by the emerging analytic 
categories relating to suffering as well as maximum variation. This meant that I specifically 
sought to recruit Roman Catholic participants, as these participants were both 
underrepresented in the pool and offered the most reflections on suffering. I also sought to 
recruit participants who did not identify as heterosexual/cisgender as sexuality/gender was 
 
55 The recruitment and sampling strategy achieved a degree of variation with respect to 
Christian tradition, mood experiences, gender, sexuality and neurodiversity. It did not result in 
a significant amount of participant variation with respect to ethnicity/cultural heritage and 
current religious identity. This may be related to my use of personal networks to recruit 
participants, and it is possible that the language of ‘altered moods’ or the over all topic of 
contemporary mental health and Christianity was too specific to my own social context and did 
not attract the attention of those who no longer identified as Christian. 




unexpectedly absent from the early narratives.56 There is some debate about the robustness 
of the ‘theoretical saturation’ claimed in much qualitative research (e.g. Thorne, 2020), and 
the intention in this study was never to produce a formal theory. Nevertheless, I concluded 
recruitment once the data analysis ceased producing new codes and categories relating to 
suffering.    
 
2.3.1.3 Data collection  
 
Constructivist grounded theory is not tied to any particular method of data collection. For 
example, it has been used to analyse focus groups and written documents. Nonetheless, by far 
the most common data collection method is the in-depth interview. The aim of an in-depth 
interview is to create a space for the participant to relate their experience of the subject 
matter. Interviews typically rely on open-ended questions and are concerned to understand 
the participant’s perspective and the meanings they attribute to a situation. In-depth 
interviewers may well use an interview schedule to guide the interview, but it is not typically 
used as a standardised list of questions that must be asked of each participant. Unexpected 
lines of inquiry can be followed, as can hints or beliefs that are implicit in the participant’s 
account. Word and question choice and interaction style change to reflect the tradition and 
situation of the participant. The Christian tradition, current religious identity and current mood 
state of participants had a particularly strong effect on my interviewing style in this project.  
 
In total I interviewed 21 participants. Each was interviewed only once, for around 1 hour. 
Interview locations were determined by the location of the participant and their preferences; I 
offered them the choice of being interviewed on the Leeds University campus or in a public 
venue of their choice. Two participants asked to be interviewed in their homes due to 
disability or illness. Appropriate safety procedures were followed for each interview. Each 
interview was audio-recorded and then transcribed; pre- and post-interview notes were also 
recorded. I used an interview schedule to guide the questioning, but this functioned as a 
memory prompt rather than as a list of questions.57 The interview is therefore relatively 
unstructured, but not entirely so. I initially constructed the interview schedule based on the 
sensitising concepts and in accordance with Charmaz’s suggestion of a very detailed schedule 
 
56 Purposive and theoretical sampling aims to address these kinds of gaps, but is only effective 
if a wide range of participants can be recruited.  
57 Interview schedule is included at Appendix A. 




with questions focusing on change and action, such as “What were you like then, and what are 
you like now?”. This did not work well for my interviewing style, and I subsequently simplified 
it to ask questions about the participant’s experience in four broad areas: mood experience, 
religious experience, the interaction between mood and religion, and the impact of their 
experiences. Grounded theory methodology is flexible and expects that data collected and 
analysed from earlier interviews will shape the direction of later interviews. This allows the 
research direction to emerge from, and respond to, the concerns of interview participants, 
even if it was not the direction originally envisaged by the researcher. The interview schedule 
therefore evolved over time to allow the investigation of concepts that arise from the 
concurrent data analysis.   
 
2.3.1.4 Coding, data analysis & theory building 
 
Constructivist grounded theory describes the first steps in data analysis as a non-linear 
movement from initial/open coding (which should be close coding – Charmaz recommends 
line by line), to focused coding (which produces a number of categories that are shared across 
the interviews), and possibly theoretical coding (which introduces relevant disciplinary 
theoretical concepts such as gender, class, or power). Coding and data collection are carried 
out in parallel, meaning that coding from earlier interviews can influence the content of later 
interviews, and also that coding can be compared across interviews.  The aim of this process of 
in-depth coding is to ensure fit and relevance: “Your study fits the empirical world when you 
have constructed codes and developed them into categories that crystallize participants' 
experience. It has relevance when you offer an incisive analytic framework that interprets 
what is happening and makes relationships between implicit processes and structures visible” 
(Charmaz, 2014, p.133). 
 
Grounded theory therefore relies on the close coding of data. Charmaz recommends a process 
of initial and then focused coding (2014, chaps 5–6). Initial codes should correspond closely to 
the data rather than being too conceptual. Charmaz suggests initially coding every line of the 
interview, or even every word (Charmaz, 2014, p.124). In this project I initially attempted to 
follow Charmaz’ suggestion of line-by-line coding but rapidly found it too unwieldly and 
difficult to create meaningful codes when one line might only be part of a sentence. For the 
earliest interviews I coded roughly each sentence or each distinct thought. In later interviews, 
as codes and categories began to emerge, I assigned larger chunks of text to each code. This 
resulted in between 130 and 367 initial codes per interview.  





Charmaz also recommends coding in gerunds to emphasise action and process (2014, pp.120–
124). This is in contrast to other coding methods which code in themes. Identifying a suitable 
gerund for every code also became too time consuming, but I did primarily code with action 
phrases. Comparing these with equivalent theme/topic codes I accept Charmaz’s argument 
that action-coding produces a set of codes that more accurately reflect the participants’ 
narrative (rather than my perception of it), and also assigns a more active role to the 
participant. For example, in an early interview with Belinda, coding other people’s perceptions 
of her mood experiences as “not being taken seriously” gives a clearer indication of the 
narrative when compared to a thematic code of “stigma”.  
 
Initial codes are then gathered into a smaller number of focused codes. Codes are compared 
with the data and with each other, and the most relevant codes selected or a new umbrella 
code is created. This process resulted in between 11 and 24 focused codes per interview. 
These focused coding then supplies a direction for future data collection and analysis, and 
become the basis for possible analytic categories. The process of analysis is assisted by memo-
writing throughout. These memos can themselves be coded as data, and also bring together 
ideas from different interviews. They are part of the process of reflexivity and of documenting 
the emergent research process. There is also the possibility of a further level of theoretical 
coding, where theoretical concepts are identified in the data. This level is optional within 
Charmaz’s methodology and is recommended only if it seems to emerge naturally from the 
empirical data. It is not a decision that is made in advance. Continuing the analytic movement 
from the concrete to the abstract, the most relevant focused and theoretical codes are then 
used as the basis for conceptual categories. A category may include the themes and patterns 
expressed by several codes. Categories are then developed to identify substantive processes, 
which may extend beyond the situation of interest. The final analytic step is theorising from 
these categories and processes. A positivist concept of theory emphasises explanation and 
prediction, whereas an interpretive concept of theory tends to emphasise abstract 
understanding. Constructivist grounded theory has both positivist (empirical) and interpretive 
aspects, but leans more towards the interpretive, building “from specifics and mov[ing] to 
general statements while situating them in the context of their construction” (Charmaz, 2014, 
p.232). Categories are ‘raised up’ to theoretical concepts on the basis of their ability to account 
for a wide range of data and make basic processes evident.  
 
Within grounded theory, memo writing is the process of describing and making connections 




between different parts of the data and between the data and other literature. It is also the 
process by which categories are explored and defined, creating analytic concepts out of 
descriptive categories. Purposive and maximum variation sampling is also employed to search 
for richer content to add to the emerging categories. The end-point of sampling is theoretical 
saturation, which is said to have occurred when interviews cease to provide any new 
theoretical insights into a concept. Dey (1999) has helpfully challenged the usefulness of this 
idea, arguing instead for theoretical sufficiency, on the grounds that this more closely reflects 
how researchers conduct grounded theory studies.  
 
As per the methodology, I also proceeded simultaneously with data collection and analysis. As 
expected, some of the sensitising concepts described in 2.3.1.1 were discarded as they were 
not apparent in the data from early interviews. For example, the concept of biographical 
disruption, and the idea that altered moods challenge one’s identity, did not seem to have 
resonance with the actual data. I used this initial and then focused coding of the first 
interviews to guide the topics explored in later interviews. For example, in this instance I 
removed the questions “How would you describe the person that you were then?” and “how 
would you describe yourself now?”. I introduced the question “how would you describe 
God/Jesus” in the second iteration of the interview schedule, in response to the emergence of 
codes such as ‘God being a stronghold’ (Amy), ‘being sure of God’ (Caleb), and ‘seeing God as 
confidante’ (Diane), which eventually came together as the focused code ‘imaging God’. I 
introduced the question “Do you have a view on the role of suffering in life?” in the third 
iteration of the interview schedule, in response to codes such as ‘God being present in tragedy’ 
(Helen) and ‘experiencing spiritual distress’ (Emma), as well as a large number of codes 
relating to suffering associated with altered moods. I initially brought these codes together as 
‘suffering in life’ but with further analysis later separated them – these codes formed the basis 
of section 4.3.2.4 (potentially transformative interpretations) and contributed to section 6.3.2 
(solidarity in suffering). 
 
As the aim of this project is not to develop a full grounded theory I did not continue the 
research process into theory building, but instead carried the analysis forward into the 








2.3.2 Specific issues arising from qualitative methods 
 
2.3.2.1 Interviews as unreliable narrative 
 
The use of in-depth interviews is commonplace within qualitative research, but is not free 
from criticism. Silverman, for example, has criticised the idea that interviews are able to access 
the authentic ‘deep interior’ of a person (Silverman, 2007, p.39). People draw on a variety of 
resources and social expectations when narrating their experiences, and these narratives 
should not be considered precise representations of reality. If the research interview is co-
constructed between the participant and the researcher, the resulting narrative is a 
construction of reality, a performance shaped by social norms, identities, the research setting 
and the wider context (Yanos and Hopper, 2008). The aim of an in-depth, rather than an 
informational or investigative interview, is therefore simply to allow the participant to narrate 
their experiences. It is not intended to produce a detailed, factual chronology, nor is it aiming 
to uncover hidden processes or discover support for the researcher’s private agenda or 
hypotheses. Grounded theory is also attentive to the interactional dynamics within an 
interview, such as the participant directing the conversation to suit their own purposes, or 
reporting events in such a way as to justify their own behaviour. The interviews in this thesis 
have been conducted in this spirit of co-construction, aiming to achieve what Hiller and DiLuzio 
(2004) have described as mutuality and reflexive progression. Rather than interviews being 
seen as a neutral space in which participants can disclose pre-existing thoughts and feelings, 
the interview is a directed conversation during which participant’s views may arise, be 
articulated, or change.  
 
2.3.2.2 Researcher role and responsibilities 
 
The description of the interview as a co-constructed conversation should not be taken to mean 
that interviewer and participant roles are entirely reciprocal. Some feminist authors (e.g. 
Etherington, 2006) have suggested that interview ethics require a high degree of reciprocity, 
with the interviewer sharing aspects of their own stories. This was to counteract the power 
imbalance and hierarchical nature of interviews in which the interviewer took a distant and 
dispassionate position. Other authors (e.g. Olesen, 2005) have identified that this degree of 
reciprocity does not necessarily lead to ethical interviews and may encourage manipulation of 
the conversation. Discussions about reciprocity have implications for interviewing style, and 




for the amount of personal information shared across the whole interview process (including 
in the participant information sheet).   
 
For this research there were some specific points to consider about reciprocity. Firstly, 
interviewing style. Not all of the participants had received treatment or therapy, but at least 
some were familiar with therapeutic interviews as practiced by psychiatrists or 
psychotherapists. Similarly, some participants may have had experience of receiving spiritual 
or pastoral support from a religious leader. Care was taken to ensure that participants 
appreciated as fully as possible that these research interviews were not a psychotherapeutic, 
medical, or pastoral intervention, although some participants reported that they appreciated 
the opportunity to tell their story and so may have found the experience therapeutic to some 
degree. The nature of the interview was explained to participants verbally and on the 
information sheets. With respect to interviewing style I deliberately chose to take a role that 
included more than minimal verbal intervention but without typically sharing anything of my 
own life or experiences and without engaging in problem-solving. The aim was to avoid an 
interaction style that would be reminiscent of a therapeutic intervention or pastoral support 
but also to minimise the likelihood of the participant feeling in some way responsible for my 
experiences or emotions, as might happen in an everyday conversation. This style adapted to 
suit different participants, e.g. two participants spoke so fully and fluently that there was little 
need for my verbal participation.  
 
Researcher-participant interactions also include a degree of responsibility towards the 
wellbeing of the participant. Although severe distress is unlikely, it is possible that a participant 
could have become distressed when talking about their mood and religion or faith. A 
recognition of this responsibility was built into the research process, for example by excluding 
hospital inpatients, and having a crisis procedure in place. Other aspects are addressed in a 
more ad hoc way during the interview, reflecting a sense that it was co-created between the 
researcher and participant. E.g. when a participant revealed she had experienced psychosis 
and had not sought medical advice, I explicitly checked with her that she was now in contact 
with appropriate support services. 
 
Secondly, sharing personal information. I am an ordained Anglican priest and work as a 
University chaplain. As such I have a public role and personal religious tradition and 
commitment that can be easily determined with an online search. This may be seen positively 
by some participants but negatively by others. After consideration I decided the best way to 




manage this was to not explicitly mention it to participants but acknowledge it if participants 
ask directly or if it seemed that sharing this information is important to sustain rapport. 58 
During one interview I judged that sharing some personal information would significantly 
increase rapport with the participant. She knew that we shared a profession and had disclosed 
an experience that is usually stigmatised (panic attacks in a professional setting) – I mentioned 
that I had also had that experience.  
 
There is inevitably a degree of personal judgement exercised in qualitative research where the 
main data collection instrument is the researcher herself. These decisions about interviewing 
style or what narrative account I give of myself are just two examples that highlight the need 
for reflexivity throughout the research process. This need is well accepted within social 
sciences, but is perhaps less common within theology. Nevertheless, Cartledge (2012) has 
described a kind of theological reflexivity, whereby the researcher (who comes from a 
particular confessional perspective) engages with the two poles of the lifeworld (concrete 
reality) and the system (theological identity) in a dialectical process.  
 
Having reviewed the constructivist grounded theory research process and demonstrated how 
it was implemented in this project, it is now possible to turn to the empirical material that 
forms the basis of the later chapters. This final section therefore presents an overview of 
participant characteristics.   
 
2.3.3 Details of interviews and participant characteristics 
 
In total I conducted 21 interviews. 19 participants requested pseudonymisation, while two 
participants requested their real name should be retained. In view of the potentially sensitive 
topic of the data and the ethical and legal requirement to retain only essential identifying 
information, I did not routinely collect demographic data.59 Participant demographic 
 
58 During the research process I did not explicitly tell the participants about any of my roles 
beyond PhD researcher. However, since recruitment drew on my existing networks, some 
participants were already aware of my role as chaplain/clergy: Emma, Helen, Fiona, Paula, and 
Quentin. Others (Diane, Matthias) were aware that I was part of the Church of England. It 
would not have been difficult for any participant to discover this information online. 
59 The intention was for participants to feel that they remained in control of their narratives. In 
retrospect, this decision was not ideal as it limited potential analyses. In future research I 
would seek ethical approval to ask participants for this information, while allowing them not to 
disclose it if they preferred not to. 




information described in this text was therefore offered freely by participants during their 
interview.60  
 
Nationality and ethnic heritage: All participants were living in England. Of those participants 
who mentioned nationality or ethnic heritage, two had North American backgrounds (one said 
that he had grown up in the United States, one that he was a US citizen when younger), three 
had Irish heritage, one had Sri Lankan heritage, and one had Eastern European heritage.  
 
Gender: 10 women, 10 men, one person identified as both a woman and gender neutral. 
 
Sexuality: It became apparent during the interview process that few participants were openly 
identifying as LGBTQ.61 In some circumstances the experience of identifying as LGBTQ and 
Christian is associated with poorer mental health (Chalke et al., 2017), so this was a noticeable 
omission. Targeting recruitment to LGBTQ Christian groups redressed this balance to some 
extent, although potential participants may have been unwilling to volunteer if they have had 
negative experiences with the church. Two participants described themselves as gay, one as 
bisexual. Two other participants made reference to their sexuality, implying that they were not 
heterosexual, but did not explicitly state an identity or orientation. The remaining 15 
participants did not specify an orientation. 13 participants made reference to an opposite-sex 
partner or spouse. 
 
Education: The education level of the participants was relatively high when compared to the 
UK in general,62 with around 70% (15/21) of the participants indicating that they had studied 
at University level. Higher education level is known to be associated with volunteering to take 
part in research (Patel et al., 2003), and could shape the outcome of this research if, for 
example, increased education is associated (e.g. through the practice of forming arguments, 
 
60 This approach differs from what might be expected in social scientific research. However, 
the aim of this practical theology is not to explore associations between participant 
characteristics, experiences, and theology. Participants are too diverse (or the sample size too 
small) and the interview data inappropriate (because that was not the aim of the interview) to 
make those kinds of connections. The aim instead is to look for commonalities across 
experiences, while acknowledging differences and outliers. Limitations of this approach are 
discussed in the Conclusion.  
61 Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer. 
62 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) figures for 2019 indicate 
that 23% of UK adults have a Bachelor’s degree or higher; however the figure is considerably 
higher for younger adults, at 52% of those aged 25-34 (OECD, 2020).  




assimilating information, or abstract/theoretical thought) with an increased ability to 
articulate and narrate one’s own experience. 
 
Christian identity: 18 of the participants currently identified as Christian, from a range of 
different traditions (Table 1). One participant was a former Jehovah’s Witness and identified as 
agnostic at the time of the interview. One participant was a Quaker at the time of the 
interview but said that he did not necessarily identify as Christian. One participant was unsure 
about her Christian identity. 
 
Mood experiences: The mood-related inclusion criterion for interview participants was 
deliberately broad to maximise variation, and to reflect the fact that not everyone who 
experiences altered moods will have a medical diagnosis and not everyone accepts the 
biomedical description of these experiences as ‘mood or affective disorders’. Participants were 
asked to opt-in by agreeing that they had at some point experienced very high or very low 
mood that had disrupted their everyday life. Beyond that there was no screening or purposive 
sampling of mood experiences. It would have been difficult to do so in a mostly online 
recruitment process without accidentally excluding people for the reasons above, or without 
asking for an unreasonable amount of sensitive information before the person had consented 
to participate. It was also apparent early on in the process that this broad opt-in strategy was 
recruiting people with a sufficient range of mood experiences and perspectives. Purposive 
sampling was carried out in later rounds of recruitment, but only in relation to demographic 
characteristics (gender, sexuality) and Christian identity. 
 
Participants in this study used a range of language to describe their experiences, ranging from 
the very medical to positions that rejected medical labels entirely. However, the majority (19) 
of participants had received a mood-related medical diagnosis at some point, whether or not 
they accepted it as accurate. Some participants had received different diagnoses over time. 
Diagnoses include anxiety, depression, bipolar disorder (previously called manic depression), 
cyclothymia, dysthymia, schizo-affective disorder, and emotionally unstable personality 
disorder (EUPD, previously called borderline personality disorder, BPD). I did not specifically 
ask about other, potentially related diagnoses, but some participants disclosed these in the 
course of the interview: attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (1), autism (1 diagnosed, two 
suspected by self), fibromyalgia (1), unspecified chronic physical illness (1) and alcohol 
dependence (2). 
 




Table 1, below, provides details of participants’ Christian tradition, mood experiences, 
occupation and an indicative age range. 63 The penultimate column gives the medical 
diagnosis, if any, that was disclosed by the participant. The mood related inclusion criterion 
was simply that participants had experienced high and/or low mood to a degree that it had 
disrupted their daily life. I therefore left it up to participants to decide whether they wished to 
disclose any medical diagnoses they might have received. 18 participants disclosed one or 
more medical diagnoses in the course of the interview, although not all of them accepted their 
diagnosis as meaningful or accurate. Two participants had not sought medical intervention 
(listed as ‘not applicable’ in this column). One participant disclosed that they had a medical 
diagnosis, but not the nature of the diagnosis (listed as ‘not disclosed’ in this column). 
To reflect the participants’ different orientations towards medical diagnoses, the table also 
includes verbatim quotes indicating how the participant themselves described their mood 
experiences.  
 
All the participants described significant distress, impairment, and disruption associated with 
their altered mood experiences. The recruitment criterion asked only that their altered mood 
had at some point affected everyday life, yet the interview data paints a picture of people 
coping with a substantial level of long-term (lasting for a number of years) mental pain and the 
resultant disruption to life. This may be to some extent an artefact of recruitment – perhaps 
those with lower levels of distress were less likely to apply – but the level of distress is notable. 
One third of the participants disclosed a history of trauma, while just under a third disclosed 
experiences that could be medically described as psychosis. (This included two people who did 
not have a diagnosis that included psychotic symptoms). All the participants had experienced 
low moods, with a third having experienced some degree of high mood as well – three of these 
reported enjoying short periods of somewhat elevated mood while the other four had more 
mixed experiences. Within this sample, therefore, low mood was the most common mood 
experience. 
 
Throughout the following chapters I have indicated the age, predominant mood experience 
and Christian tradition of the participants in brackets after their name on the first occasion it is 
 
63 As per footnote 59, I did not routinely ask the age of participants. Ages given are therefore 
indicative and refer to a decade; in some cases participants stated their exact ages, in other 
cases age has been estimated based on the timeline given by participants. 




mentioned in a section. To improve readability, I used the following conventions for this 
information: 
 
• Where participants disclosed and accepted a medical diagnosis of their mood 
experiences, I used that diagnosis (e.g. depression-anxiety). 
• Where participants rejected or had not received a medical diagnosis I used the 
predominant mood experience they described in the interview (e.g. high-low). 
• Abbreviations used for mood experiences: 
o Anomalous = predominantly symptoms that could be diagnosed as psychosis64 
o BPD = borderline personality disorder 
o High-low = periods of high and low mood 
o Low = periods of low mood 
o PTSD = post-traumatic stress disorder 
• Only the current Christian tradition is indicated, except for Gail and Paula who did not 
identify with any tradition at the time of the interview. Their former traditions are 
given. 
• To maintain the flow of the text, participants names and characteristics are given in 






64 As in ‘anomalous experiences’, see e.g. Taylor and Murray (2012). 
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Table 1: Participant characteristics 
 
Name Age Christian 
tradition 
Occupation Example ways in which mood experiences were 







Amy 30+ Anglican Mental health 
worker 
“I still suffer with depression… So I know when I'm 





Belinda 50+ Methodist Minister “I got very very stressed, and ended up having what, 
I suppose it would be acknowledged as a 
breakdown... And, it was diagnosed as depression… 
But, then I fell into this pattern of be-, of having 
mood swings, not swings really, times of feeling 










Writer “I started getting manic episodes where I would get 
delusional... [A]ny anxiety or stress can trigger 
delusions, paranoia, mood- feeling- intense feelings 
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can see 3 Caleb’s in one day, because there's such an 
extreme reaction. So my mood's fairly unstable. 
Well, there's- I'm trying to make them more stable 
now, because I'm diagnosed with borderline 








Chris 30+ Pentecostal  “Diagnosed with bipolar disorder, and, it doesn't fall 
under Type 1, Type 2, it falls under cyclothymia, 
which is fast becoming known as Type 3… So you're 
either ridiculously hyper, or ridiculously depressed. 





history of trauma) 
Bisexual 




“I think, really, that, there's been.... three or four 
different periods where I've had, anxiety or, or 
something. And then it's gone… I sort of crashed into 
depression - it was anxiety first 12 months - and 
then it did go into depression. And it'd lift, and then 




Emma 40+ Anglican, 
former 
Artist “I think I would've never used the term feeling 











when I look back I can see that's what it was… So it 
was both, depression and anxiety. Cause I was 
having panic attacks and stuff like that. But, but at 
the time it was a feeling of just being completely out 
of my depth and unable to cope with stuff.” 
alcohol use, 






Priest “I've experienced probably quite mild to moderate 
depression for most of my adult life… 
And, but this- actually this time anxi- I've always had 
a bit of anxiety, I've always been quite an anxious 
person, but this time anxiety's been the real big 
feature… I had my first ever - joy - psychotic episode 
recently, a few weeks ago. And that was really 
frightening… [A]lthough I think I know what the 
cause of it was… one of my chronic illnesses, I've 













“I first started having problems - but it was an acute 
problem - when I was 50. And it was a major 
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went into a hypermanic state. And I ended up very 
quickly, even though I had no prior history, with 
bipolar 1 diagnosis. And I always contested it, but I 
had 6 months in hospital as a result, with all type of 
treatments, with m- medication and then with ECT. 
Because I became, what's the term they use? 




Anglican Administrator “Depression and anxiety. Yeah, the anxiety sort of 
drops into depression, the longer it goes on… It's 
that feeling of, I'm not good enough- everything I do 
is rubbish, and not having any confidence. And then 
it spirals into just actually not being bothered. And 
not actually being able to just do anything. Or being 









“I had been to see, back and forth some counsellors 
at different points in my life but I would see 
someone when I was at a- quite a low point, and 
got- and was sort of diagnosed with something that's 
Dysthymia (also 








called dysthymia… a kind of consistent low mood not 
to the point of being non-functional but to the point 
of it being sort of noticeable.  
James 30+ Charismatic 
evangelical, 
Anglican 
IT professional “I've had a lot of ups and downs, and long periods of 
downs, but- been quite resistant to the idea of 
drugging myself to get through them. And I reached 
a point, about 3 years ago, where I kind of got to a 
point where actually I was going to work and I was 
just sitting there. And I was unable to get myself to 






Kieran 30+ Roman 
Catholic 
Academic “Well, from adolescent days, really, I've had low 
patches more often, sometimes intensely low... 
Anger, despair, just pretty dreadful periods. Much 
more occasionally, ups. In- Involving things like 
spending sprees, sort of jumping in to ill advised 
relationships… It came to a head with, you know, 
prolonged thoughts of suicide, and piling up pills. At 
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I was under the care of the, the home treatment 
team, and then just flipped up again. At which point 
I was diagnosed with bipolar disorder.” 
Laurence 50+ Quaker Mental health 
worker 
“I was- I was taken into hospital, hallucinating 
wildly…. I found myself going through periods of 
crashing depressions, and then something would 
happen that made me think that maybe my life was 
gonna be ok. And I think I actually started to get 
quite high… And I ended up face to face with a 
consultant psychiatrist who told me that, after 
having hummed and ha'd over a diagnosis of 











 “I just went down so much further than I thought 
was possible… [I]t just felt like it was qualitatively- 
quantitively different in such a way that it really was 
just- well- Yeah, I'd never been- in my life before I'd 
been a bit upset by stuff but I'd never been at the 
stage where I was actually just lying on the floor for 
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four hours, just not knowing what on earth I was 
going to do, or how I was gonna get back up off the 
floor…” 




“I would class myself as someone who does go 
through mood swings… So I'm talking about the kind 
of highs, rather than the lows… To describe it is 
difficult. It's more that- usually I've been in some 
sort of state of anxiety, or state of trying to 
understand what's going on, in my life, or in- or 
something which is, which I'm involved in. And then 
pulling through that, has resulted in, you know, 
realisation moments, or, or- You know, that's when I 
do feel this kind of euphoria… I definitely went 
through it in my second year… I would say I was in a 
depressed state… that whole period in my life was a 
mixture of anxiety, depression, addiction as well.” 







Orla 50+ Roman 
Catholic 
Education “I have had, quite a history of mental illness. Never 
been sectioned, or anything like that. But I have had 
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they considered me to be possibly bipolar, but there 
was some contradiction between different 
consultants as to whether it was bipolar. And one 
said yes, and the other one said no… So, I don't 
know, but I- I- definitely have had severe 
depression.” 





“Basically it just went- my mood, just used to fly all 
the time. Just chaotically… And then, too- yeah, very 
very very down… I had in the space of a year 54 A&E 
attendances… There was a few, like weird cocktail 
overdoses but I'm not 100% sure they were there to 
kill myself, I think they were more trying to see- it 
was more one of the testing, am I actually alive?... 
They decided to diagnose me with emotional 
unstable personality disorder, as they like to do with 
anybody who self harms... I was like, [what about] 
when you've got someone in your head telling you 
to [self harm]?... Then they rethought my diagnosis!” 
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“I had a minor breakdown, went back to work and 
then had a major breakdown, and they just signed 
me off as depressed and unable to work… And since 
then I've just been- I mean I've been up and down 










“I have schizoaffective disorder, which is a mood 
disorder and- encompassing psychosis as well. So I 
encountered periods of depression, kind of 
moderate to severe, I have periods of hypomania 
but not full-blown mania, and I also have periods of 
prolonged psychosis as well. And, sometimes I can 
have a mixed episode where I have a mood disorder 
and psychosis at the same time, sometimes it's one 










“I've had depression, though I didn't recognise it as 
depression, really from childhood. Along with an 











after I had my daughter, that was proper post-natal 
depression but wasn't diagnosed, so it was left to 
rumble on for a very long time. And I had 
depression, on and off, until I met- I was- I would call 
somebody my soulmate… I actually had no 
depression whatsoever, until he was diagnosed with 
cancer, and then it started to come back again… [H]e 
died very suddenly. Actually from a heart attack. And 








Civil servant So, first year of University, proper… I pretty much 
fell through the floor. Proper nervous breakdown, 
everything sort of collapsed. Can't eat, can't sleep. 
Constantly shaking, just- completely through the 
floor. Drinking obscene amounts of alcohol and 
things, just to numb things… So I-I- I have very 
irregular manic periods. The doctor wanted to say 
bipolar, but he said- he said it's actually so irregular 











2.4 Summary: Methodology and methods 
 
This chapter outlined the overarching research strategy and specific methods used to explore 
the research questions, which combine the established methodologies of constructivist 
grounded theory and dialogic mutual critical correlation into a grounded practical theology 
methodology with contextual aspects. This methodology is designed to ground theology in 
experience by combining robust social scientific methods with practical theology. Grounded 
theory is therefore used as a theological method and not just as an empirical tool. Combining 
methodologies in this way is relatively unusual; I was only able to find two published examples, 
by Shooter (2012) and Barnsley (2013; 2016). Both these authors write from a feminist 
standpoint and develop methods that utilise grounded theory as a theological method. 
Barnsley combines grounded theory with the Quaker practice of silent waiting while Shooter 
applies the concept of theoretical saturation to her theological resources as well as the 
empirical data. Both identify this approach as innovative; Shooter describes use of grounded 
theory as a theological method as “unprecedented in practical theology” (2012, p.30), while 
Barnsley suggests that the use of qualitative methods in theology “remains unusual” (2016, 
p.110). I believe that this thesis is the first time such methods have been applied to the lived 
experience of altered moods and Christianity; it is therefore a contribution to the 
methodological literature as well as the emerging literature on contextual theologies of 
experience.  
 
The aim, rationale, and methodology of this project means that it is situated within the 
discipline of practical theology. It also draws, however, on elements of contextual theology, in 
order to explore potential directions for a theology of altered moods. The shape of this thesis 
reflects these methodological commitments. Chapters 3-7 take a dialogic approach, bringing 
the analysed experiences and ordinary theology of participants into critical conversation with 
key concepts from Christian tradition, with disability theology, and with the wider 
interdisciplinary context. Each of these chapters represents one area that emerged from the 
grounded analysis of the interview data. As with an actual conversation, there might be 
different outcomes to this process.  This methodological shape is very close to Pattison’s 
(2000) dialogic model of theological reflection, while the final chapter draws more explicitly on 
contextual theologies, especially Bevans’ (2002) synthetic model of contextual theology. The 
next chapters therefore move from blueprint to construction, starting with what I have called 
the foundations of the building, i.e. those elements that give shape to the narratives. 





Foundations: Narrative shape 
3.1 Introduction to theme 
 
The previous chapters situated this project in relation to the wider literature and 
methodological approaches to the topic of mental health and theology. This chapter, and 
those that follow, present the main body of the research. Chapters 4-7 analyse and present 
cross-cutting themes that emerged from the interviews: diverse interpretations of altered 
moods, imaging God, and Christology. This current chapter also takes an overview across the 
interviews, but focuses on narrative construction by the participants rather than the content 
of the interviews per se. Paying attention to narrative construction includes noting elements of 
the narratives that might reflect wider social categories (e.g. gender), narrative devices that 
influence the ways people tell their stories or present themselves (e.g. presenting themselves 
as competent, or positioning their mood experiences as being at a certain level of severity), 
and observations that provide important background for interpreting the content of the 
interviews (e.g. that many participants provided a much longer and detailed narrative of their 
lived Christian experience than their mood experiences).  This chapter therefore forms a 
bridge or pivot point between the earlier chapters and the later ones; as the thesis moves 
from the wider context to the specifics of the participants’ narratives, and from the literature 
to the empirical material. Through introducing the empirical material for the first time it also 
serves as an introduction to the participants. 
 
Looking across the interviews, it is apparent that participants engage in a range of what I have 
called ‘identity-talk’ in the ways in which they tell their narratives and present themselves. 
God, and faith, are described as sources of stability in the face of the emotional and 
psychological instability associated with altered moods; spiritual disruption is said to occur as a 
result of their altered moods. For some participants a significant element of this spiritual 
disruption is a disconnection between their lived experience of altered moods and their 
theology (or the theology of their church community).  
 
The idea that that narratives are essential to a sense of self is controversial within the 




philosophical literature.65 However, the emphasis in this chapter is not on the role that 
narratives play in the sense of self, nor on philosophical concepts of self, but instead on the 
relationship between experience (of altered moods) and the ways in which people articulate 
their identities – identity-talk. Two areas of sociological literature are therefore particularly 
relevant conversation partners for the analysis in this chapter. These are illness narratives, and 
work on biographical disruption and recovery. These two areas were ‘sensitising concepts’ 
identified early in the research process.66 These are introduced briefly below, before the data 
analysis is presented in more detail. The analysis demonstrates that these two sensitising 
concepts are not evident in the interview data in a straightforward way; contrary to the 
expectations raised by the literature on chronic illness and biographical disruption/recovery 
(beginning with Bury, 1982, see below for further discussion), participants do not present their 
altered moods as a challenge to their identity and self-concept, followed by a recovery 
identity:  
 
A storied narrative is the linguistic form that preserves the complexity of 
human action with its interrelationship of temporal sequence, human 
motivation, chance happenings, and changing interpersonal and 
environmental contexts. In this context, story refers not only to fictional 
accounts but also to narratives describing "ideal" life events such as 
biographies, autobiographies, histories, case studies, and reports of 
remembered episodes that have occurred (Polkinghorne, 1995, p.7).  
 
The idea of ‘storied narratives’ emphasises the ways in which people construct their narratives 
when asked to recount an experience. Increasing research interest in these ‘storied narratives’ 
has been referred to as the ‘narrative turn’ in social research. This narrative turn can be 
observed across the disciplines, including in health research.67 Work by Bury (2001) has 
highlighted the forms of narrative that are commonly identified in health narratives. These are: 
contingent (reflecting beliefs/knowledge about illness, normalisation and coping), moral 
(typically presenting the person as virtuous), and core (shaped by underlying narrative 
structures that receive collective validation in a particular culture). The topic of the narrative 
affects the form of that narrative. Narratives about altered moods may tend to take a different 
 
65 See e.g. Bortolan (2017) for a phenomenological argument in favour of the narrative self 
(and its disruption in depression), and Strawson (2004) and Woods (2014) for arguments 
against. 
66 See section 2.3.1.1 for discussion of sensitising concepts. 
67 This phrase is often attributed to John Polkinghorne, see Czarniawska (2021) for an 
overview. 




form to those about arthritis, for example, either because different questions are used to elicit 
the narrative or because of different cultural expectations.  
 
Frank, writing about core narrative structures that receive collective validation in 
contemporary America, identified restitution, chaos, and quest as the most common 
structures in health and illness narratives (Frank, 1998; 2013). In restitution narratives the 
protagonist is restored to full health, often through medical treatment or their own efforts. 
The emphasis is on the final result, with the illness as a brief interruption to the person’s life. 
Chaos narratives consist of a series of unresolved problems, often seemingly unconnected, 
with the person going from bad to worse and back again. The person might develop other 
health problems, or lose their job, or suffer a sudden bereavement. Narratives about long-
term illnesses with limited treatment options often follow a chaos plotline, as do narratives of 
severe mental distress, at least in the early stages of the narrative. Quest narratives are 
concerned with sharing the experience and wisdom that has been gained from it; the person 
may or may not recover completely from their condition but recovery is not defined as being 
restored to the original state. Frank’s typology has been widely used as a framework to explore 
illness experiences.68 Given the long-term and fluctuating nature of much mental distress, full 
restitution narratives about altered moods are relatively rare while limited restitution, chaos 
and quest narratives are far more prevalent. This ‘narrative of narratives’ is helpful for the 
emphasis on narrative construction and as a way of thinking about the ways in which people 
‘tell the story’ of their experiences. It is, however, too simplistic to imagine that all narratives 
can fit into one of these types, and the categorisations may well be culture-specific. The 
empirical material complicates the simplistic categories of these typologies. For example, 
quest and chaos core narratives can both be discerned in the narratives offered by participants 
in this research project, as can contingent and moral narrative forms. However, not all 
accounts offered by participants seemed to have a clear narrative plot-line, and the data 
analysis did not reveal any strong common threads in these storied narratives of altered 
moods. 
 
An alternative way to consider narratives of altered mood is through the concept of 
biographical disruption and recovery. There is a substantial body of sociological literature 
 
68 See e.g. Whitehead (2006) in relation to chronic fatigue, Diver et al. (2013) on fibromyalgia, 
Chandler (2014) on self-injury, and Carless (2008) on schizophrenia.  




about this concept, beginning with the work of Bury (1982).69 In this literature, serious and/or 
long-term medical conditions are described as a disruption to individuals’ autobiographical 
narratives, which are then reconstructed to take account of this crisis. Narratives are said to 
have a stabilising role, and there is a close link between biographical narrative and self-
identity; the narrative is viewed as a verbal presentation of the self. As Frank puts it, “The 
subject is, foremost, one engaged in a process of knowing himself or herself through available 
discourses, expressed in narratives” (2016, p.14). The challenge to self-identity posed by 
significant illness (e.g. if a person is no longer able to fulfil roles that were important to them) 
is ameliorated by explaining disruption through reference to biographical events. For example, 
depression may be explained as the result of inherited ‘genetics’ or adverse life situations. 
Narratives allow individuals to find meaning in traumatic events, and provide a sense of 
continuity across time. Altered moods, especially depression, have been explored in the 
biographical disruption literature, and the idea of biographical reconstruction has considerable 
resonance with the concept of mental health recovery.70 For example, research has found that 
people who have experienced altered moods speak about being completely different 
afterwards, or about their old and new selves (Lafrance and Stoppard, 2006; Ridge and 
Ziebland, 2006). Recovery in this sense is about living well with a diagnosed mental health 
problem; ‘recovery’ refers to reconstructing the person, rather than being fully free from 
symptoms. Recovery narratives commonly present the person as active rather than passive; 
gaining new insight, self-transformation, and being reconciled to the ‘new normal’. This 
sensitising concept was also not apparent in the empirical material of this study. The 
disruption associated with altered moods is presented in terms of spiritual disruption rather 
than as a challenge to identity or self-concept.  
 
The discrepancy between these two sensitising concepts and the empirical material could be 
due to weaknesses in the concepts themselves,71 or it could be due to a difference between 
 
69 See also: Charmaz (1990); Williams (2000); Lawton (2003); Kralik et al. (2006); Locock et al. 
(2009); Reeve et al. (2010). 
70 The recovery model focuses on supporting people to live well with their diagnosis and any 
ongoing mental health challenges. The model emphasises connectedness, hope and optimism, 
identity, meaning and purpose, and empowerment (CHIME) as key aspects of recovery. See 
Anthony (1993) for an early discussion of the mental health recovery movement and Leamy et 
al. (2011) for a systematic review of the conceptual literature which led to the development of 
the CHIME model. 
71 For example, it is possible that narratives of reconstruction could be at least partially an 
artefact of the interviewing process – the questions that are asked determined the kinds of 
 




the experience of altered moods and other kinds of chronic illness experiences. It is not 
possible to differentiate between these options based on the interview data, but it seems 
likely that it is a combination of both factors. Whilst the data analysis did not support a 
straightforward application of these sensitising concepts, it did bring out other aspects related 
to identity, sense of self, and self-presentation; the participants did not talk in terms of 
biographical narrative but they did engage in identity-talk. These aspects, along with the data 
that complicated the sensitising concepts, are discussed below in a more detailed analysis of 
the data. 
 
3.2 Description of data 
 
The analysis in this chapter is based on sections of the interviews that I originally coded as 
‘meta-themes’. These were elements of the narrative that seemed worth noting, but that 
related to the shape and construction of the narrative, rather than the content. These codes 





I begin this section by using verbatim quotes from the interview transcripts to provide an 
overview of the different ways in which participants constructed their narratives, presented 
themselves, and reflected wider social categories. These accounts and quotes are more 
extensive than in later chapters, as this is the first time that the participants’ voices are being 
introduced. This is followed by a discussion of the sensitising concepts and then the more 
complicated ways in which identity-talk emerge in the data. 
 
Amy’s (30+/depression-anxiety/Anglican) narrative of her altered moods emphasises 
relationships, family, and children. For example, she talks about seeking help through 
relationships and the need for safe and supportive friendships and life partnership to cope 
with her altered moods. She describes her altered moods as arising from an absence of 
relationships in which she could talk openly about her feelings. Throughout her narrative she 
 
answers that are given (Lawton, 2003). To some extent this possibility is made less likely by the 
fact that I developed the original interview schedule expecting to find evidence of biographical 
disruption and yet still did not find it.   




positions herself in relation to these significant relationships, for example describing worry and 
guilt about the effect that her altered moods have had on her children, and the strain that her 
depression has placed on her relationship with her husband. Amy describes a long-term 
experience of managing altered moods, but with distinct episodes of very low moods; one of 
the key episodes she describes happened during a period of maternity leave and was 
diagnosed as postnatal72 depression, and the examples she offer as to its impact on her life 
involved her children: 
 
Amy: And at the same point while I was upstairs the children also managed to 
ring 999... And they couldn't get anything from the children so sent a police 
officer round, and I answered the door with tears streaming down my face, 
kids had baked bean juice all over them, I just fell apart, you know. But, not 
while the police officers were there. ‘Everything's fine!’ 
 
Amy positions herself as competent and her altered moods as manageable. For example, she 
contrasts her own experiences with more severe ones, although she accepts that both types of 
experience can be labelled ‘depression’. She says that to some extent she is able to hide her 
altered moods from others, to continue to appear capable. 
 
Belinda (50+/depression/Methodist) also refers to the effect that altered moods may have on 
professional or role identity, saying that people feel ‘a waste of space’ if they’re unable to 
work. In her case she feels that she carries her mental health history with her to each new 
workplace, and that this external marker of identity is used as the basis for discrimination – 
she says there is a sense in which employers won’t fully trust her because of their assumptions 
about her mental health. She recognises that in many circumstances she is able to ‘pass’ as 
non-depressed, and talks about ‘playing the game’ in order to maintain a valued social 
identity. 
 
Belinda: … and insurance and things, you know, you have to play that game – 
‘mild’ depression, you've got to put it down. It's mild. It's very annoying.... 
They just see you as this, you know, a bit of a liability, you're going to crack up 
at any moment! 
 
 
72 Postnatal depression is the term that Amy used. While postnatal and postpartum are often 
used interchangeably, postpartum is the term used in DSM 5; technically speaking, postpartum 
may refer to the parent, while postnatal refers to the child (World Health Organization, 2010, 
Section 6.3). 




Belinda speaks specifically about identity, suggesting that her altered moods affect her sense 
of self by amplifying her pre-existing (negative) feelings about herself. At times she has sought 
to differentiate her ‘true’ self from her distressed self, but has now incorporated her 
experience of altered moods into her understanding of herself and now considers altered 
moods to be part of life rather than episodes of illness.  
 
Interviewer: Do you see them as "episodes" or do you just see it as part of life 
really? 
Belinda: I think, I think that's changed, that's an interesting question. I think... 
Before the last couple of years, I would have seen them as episodes, but now 
I realise that this is who I am, you know. And it's been under the surface for a 
long, I managed it for a long time. Um, so... yeah. So no I think it's just, it just 
is part of the person that I am.  
 
Belinda also speaks explicitly about gender and mood, linking her altered moods to the 
menopause. She also links her altered moods to caring responsibilities, both directly as a result 
of the responsibility and indirectly once the responsibilities have been lifted and there is no 
longer the need for her to be mentally strong.  
 
Caleb’s narrative was unusual in that he offered an extensive autobiographical account of his 
altered moods, which in many ways was a ‘classic’ account of biographical disruption. His 
answer to the initial interview question “tell me about your mood experiences” included a 
detailed chronological biography, and he gave a number of examples of ways in which his 
expected biography has been, and continues to be, interrupted by altered moods. For 
example, his altered moods have been responsible for his marriages coming to an end, and he 
describes this as losing his wife and children to the altered moods. His altered moods are 
severe and often chaotic, meaning that any recovery identity seems somewhat insecure. 
However, he has thought in quite some depth about this identity, choosing to think of himself 
in positive terms such as ‘successful’ and ‘overcomer’. He believes that these identity labels 
are the most likely to support his recovery, even if they do not always seem to accord with his 
experiences. He was also aware of the identity that can come with mental health diagnoses, 
describing how difficult it was when he was given a new diagnosis of borderline personality 
disorder, which he assumed had implications for his identity. 
 
Caleb: I went in a complete meltdown. I, I froze, I panicked, I thought I was 
evil, I thought only psychopaths have borderline personality disorder, I 
thought I was going to murder somebody, I had all kinds of terrible thoughts 
running through my head… I, I was struggling with an identity that I had no, I 




had no comprehension of what it meant.  
Interviewer: So it felt like it was a new identity, this new label? 
Caleb: Yeah, it felt like a complete new identity.  
 
Caleb’s account of the considerable disruption caused by his altered moods is presented as 
distinct from spiritual disruption. He acknowledges that his altered moods can be associated 
with short-term spiritual disruption (for example causing him to question if God is really 
loving), but over all he does not see his altered moods as disrupting his spiritual life.  
 
Caleb: Yeah, I do find that I can live with the mood swings and the problems 
and still try and maintain a reasonably balanced Christian outlook on life. 
 
Diane’s (60+/depression-anxiety/Anglican) account placed her altered moods in the context of 
a series of difficult relationships at work and at church. She also spoke about initially finding it 
difficult to incorporate altered moods into her self-image, and of self-stigmatisation; she 
assumes others will have a negative perception of her if they become aware that she 
experiences anxiety and low mood, but says that this is based as much on her own internalised 
sense of stigma as on reactions she has encountered.  
 
Diane: But what I've come to realise is, that from my point of view as 
somebody with mental health difficulties, I stigmatise other people – ‘They're 
gonna think of me’... I'm assuming they're gonna have a negative view when 
they might not. So, I think, we can stigmatise ourselves. 
 
Emma (40+/depression-anxiety/Anglican) talks about the experience of psychotherapy in 
terms of her identity. She says it allowed her the space to become a witness to herself, to gain 
some distance and be more objective about her self and her situation. Before the therapy she 
says that her identity had been lost and she was unable to believe herself, having grown up in 
a situation where she did not matter and was not permitted a voice. Therapy enabled her to 
locate herself again and enabled her to feel she could legitimately take up space in the world. 
 
Emma also discusses isolation and stigma, and the ways in which these interact with altered 
moods. She has felt isolated from what she perceived as the ‘sane’ world, not as a result of her 
own altered moods but as a result of mental distress within her birth family. She reflects that 
shame and stigma had contributed to a sense of isolation and aloneness, and that there is 
liberation in speaking openly about differences, even if they are differences that make people 
uncomfortable. She suggests that the discomfort of others is not really her problem! 
 




Emma: I think maybe having the experiences that I've had, are quite helpful 
for that. Cause I really do think that now. Cause I used to feel so ashamed. 
And now I kind of feel... It's like, it's wrong to expect anyone to be what 
they're not. We just have to be what we are.  
 
Fiona (30+/depression-anxiety/Anglo-Catholic) raises the topic of gender in relation to dealing 
with difficult work situations, specifically gender-based criticism of her as a minister in a role 
with a media profile.  
 
Fiona: Someone complained apparently- we had a special service and I sang - 
someone complained that women shouldn't be allowed to sing. Cause it's just 
crap and that, you know, ‘cos the composer meant it for men so only men 
should sing it. 
 
As an Anglican priest Fiona talks in some detail about her religious identity as a ‘professional 
Christian’ and especially the demands of the role; she also reflects on how these interact with 
altered moods, saying that depression ‘cuts to the heart’ of her vocation and identifying a 
tension between her own mental health needs and her professional role.  
 
Fiona: And I think for me, that's been the biggest feature of depression and 
faith, is that I often feel, in my particularly- particularly in my- the most 
difficult patches, that- that my faith just kind of disappears. And you know, I- I 
stop praying, and, and, I, I feel like God's just kind of disappeared on me, 
and... And when I- before I was ordained that wasn't such a problem. 
 
Over all, managing the disruption associated with altered moods is harder in the professional 
role. What might be considered spiritual- but not biographical- disruption for some people 
becomes more significant when there is an overlap between professional and faith identities.  
For example, low mood disrupts Fiona’s ability to pray, a situation that is much more difficult 
when one’s professional role includes prayer and leading/teaching others to pray. This 
interview was one of the few where the interviewee was aware of my dual identity as priest 
and researcher; we did not know each other but she was recruited through my social media 
friendship network. I did not usually volunteer that information to interviewees – although 
they could have found it quite easily online – as I judged that, on balance, it was more likely to 
inhibit the interviews rather than facilitate them. In this case I believe that the shared identity 
encouraged Fiona to be more open about some aspects of her story, such as the demands of 
the role. It did, however, make the interviewing role more challenging as I tried to be mindful 
not to slip into ‘colleague’ rather than ‘interviewer’ mode.  





Gail (60+/high-low/former Jehovah’s Witness) places her current experience of living with 
altered moods within the context of her ageing. She is the oldest participant and the only 
person who raises this topic specifically, although other participants offer a life-course 
narrative. Gail says that she feels she is becoming less resilient and more vulnerable with age, 
and feels anxious about what the future holds for her. She wants to continue living with 
meaning.  
 
Gail: Yeh, the reality is, as you're getting older, you are getting more 
vulnerable in some respects. You know, physically you can't do the same 
things. There isn't always someone to call on. 
 
Gail says that she often finds herself being a dissenting or lone voice in groups, and finds the 
experience of group conflict very distressing. Her ethical and spiritual principles, which form an 
important part of her identity, mean that she often feels singled out and picked on in groups. 
 
Like Amy, Helen (40+/depression-anxiety/Anglican) offers a relationally-centred narrative, with 
her children and spouse playing an important part in the story. Her caring responsibilities are 
significant, including supporting a disabled child to navigate her teenage years. Helen links 
these caring responsibilities to her mood, saying that the stresses of everyday life feed in to 
pre-existing anxiety and negative feelings about herself, so that: “…it feeds those anxieties that 
I'm no good…That I'm- that everything I do is rubbish, that- so, if I have a bad period with her, 
it-it it feeds that anxiety. About me.” 
 
Helen’s narrative of her altered moods is structured around 3 significant episodes of low mood 
and anxiety. Perhaps because of this clear distinction between well and unwell, she also has a 
sense of a recovery identity. She says that, having recovered from the last episode, she feels 
content in who she is, and that after each episode she likes and understands herself a little bit 
more. This is in striking contrast to her more negative self-descriptions when talking about 
altered moods. For example she talks about feeling a failure and entirely lacking confidence. 
 
Speaking about his experience of diagnosed dysthymia, Isaac (30+/dysthymia/Charismatic 
Evangelical) identifies the danger of ‘backfilling’ a narrative to fit earlier events into a later 
diagnostic framework. He can see ways in which his mood experiences are consistent with the 
diagnosis, but is cautious of retrospectively attributing meaning to events that he would have 




interpreted differently at the time.  
 
Isaac: And, it's very hard to when we backfill in narratives about ourselves, 
you know, because it's very easy to look back and say, ‘Oh yeah that is- that's 
true’. But in some ways I do think that I- it's fairly consistently true that I have, 
mentally and sort of spiritually, a quite positive outlook on life, but 
emotionally I have quite a- very low- like I sort of just generally find it very 
hard to feel motivated- 
 
Laurence (50+/high-low/Quaker) offers a coherent and fluent narrative account of his mood 
experiences. He says himself that this fluency may be attributed to his membership of 
Alcoholics Anonymous, meaning that he is often asked to tell his story. He describes significant 
biographical disruption resulting from altered moods, starting with being bullied at his 
boarding school, after a previously happy childhood. Then followed a long period of chaos, in 
which altered moods, substance dependence, and difficult life events (such as divorce and 
unemployment) were interwoven, after which he found a new equilibrium based on spiritual 
values and principles. He is cautious about the claims he makes for this recovery identity, but 
describes it as being able to live comfortably with himself, making choices to live in a way that 
is consistent with his values and accepting both past and current experiences as part of life. He 
explicitly rejects a fight narrative, normalising his moods as a part of life.  
 
Laurence: I regard my rejection of medical model as liberating. At the time I 
rejected it, I hadn't got a clue about the spirituality stuff. But I do feel that, 
that if I hadn't rejected it, I wouldn't have been able to embrace the 
spirituality which I have come to regard as fundamental to my wellbeing. 
Y'know, I, I regard myself these days as, as maintaining wellbeing. I am not 
fighting an illness. I am just a human being, like everybody else, struggling to 
make sense of the world.  
 
In his narrative Laurence contrasts the wisdom that comes with hindsight with his ‘in the 
moment’ experiences. Specifically, he sees that his experiences could be considered a type of 
spiritual crisis, although he would not have recognised that at the time.  
 
Laurence: I mean, I didn't, at the time, think, ‘Oh I'm in low mood, I must be 
having a spiritual crisis’- But it's- it-it-it it's comfortable for me to put that 
interpretation on it retrospectively. I mean, I- Y'know, I know people who 
have actually been through mood difficulties and have described it explicitly 
as a spiritual crisis. But- but, I don't know, that wasn't how it seemed for me. 
 
Matthias’ (30+/low/Anglo-Catholic) narrative identifies the onset of his first (and at the time of 




interview, ongoing though less severe) episode of altered mood as a biographical disruption 
arising from problems with his PhD and concern for his father’s health. He also talks about a 
recovery identity, which he achieved through spiritual practices. He says that his faith and 
spiritual life now are very different to before the altered moods, and that with hindsight he 
interprets his mood experiences as an important stage on his life’s journey. He also speaks 
about spiritual disruption as a result of life circumstances, but also a sense of continuity 
between the before and after. In some ways his experience of altered moods contributed to 
him overcoming the spiritual disruption.  
 
Matthias identifies the difference between ‘in the moment’ and hindsight, suggesting that 
looking back he might describe his experiences as a spiritual crisis, but that at the time he 
easily could have interpreted it as a medical condition needing medical treatment.  
 
Matthias: I was aware of that [spiritual crisis] as a kind of background idea. 
And- I mean that's particularly why I was interested in being involved with 
your research as well, because- It did- That experience changed the way I felt 
about my faith… In a way which kind of turned some things completely upside 
down. And so, with hindsight, it's kind of easier to think of it being that. 
 
Nicholas (20+/high-low/Roman Catholic) speaks about what he perceived to be his 
complicated and ambivalent Catholic identity. He says that he carries emotional baggage 
related to his Catholicism. For example, he suggests that Catholic teaching about sacrificing the 
self may be at the root of his tendency to tolerate damaging behaviour from others. Nicholas 
reflects on the interaction between cultural identity and religious identity, noting his mother’s 
Eastern European heritage and linking that to her conservative religious views. Nicholas sees 
his altered moods and biography as a process of transformation, whereby crisis is followed by 
epiphany and personal transformation. 
 
Nicholas: …you can see in various traditions across the world and in various 
beliefs and various, you know, human experience basically, that going 
through a stage of suffering you can-you can pull through and, you become 
transformed. And, I feel that in my life that that's happened multiple times so, 
so like I definitely-that's what I kind of understand. 
 
Orla (50+/depression/Roman Catholic) describes her Catholic identity in contrast to what she 
perceives as traditional or mainstream Catholicism. For example, she describes herself as pro-
choice, as believing that priests should be allowed to marry, and supportive of same-gender 
relationships. She says that she identifies as Catholic but does not accept all the doctrine, and 




that she had very positive and formative experiences of Catholicism in her childhood.  
 
Orla: So. I mean, I do see myself very much as a Catholic but I'm not- there are 
certain things in terms of my Catholicism that I don't match- I believe in a 
woman's right to choose. I believe that, you know, homosexual relationships 
are not a sin. Because to me God created love, so how can anything that is 
about love be anything other than positive. So, you know, and I- I believe 
priests should marry, and I think it's unnatural that you- that they don't 
marry. 
 
Paula (20+/anomalous/former Charismatic Evangelical) describes a changing and conflicted 
Christian identity and relationship with Christianity. She says that she is no longer sure if she 
ever ‘really’ was a Christian, although she did identify as such in her earlier life. Managing her 
altered moods requires her to avoid certain situations such as church services – she describes 
this as denying part of her identity in order to remain mentally well. She describes having been 
out of step with her Christian peers, for example when they reported interior religious 
experiences, and wonders if her altered moods played a part in her feelings of alienation. She 
speaks in ambivalent terms about her attitude to spirituality, having gone through periods of 
seeing it simply as a construct to deal with a fear of meaninglessness but also being aware that 
Christianity has formed an important part of her identity.  
 
Paula: Which is hard, because they're actually I think- the- so the meaning you 
get actually has quite a big positive impact on your mood and I guess your 
sense of self, and- Cause obviously your values and I- you know, your 
principles, and who you are, and all these things, they all underpin your 
identity, cause they make up who you are. And if they are gonna make up 
who you are, and having to not allow part of that to be part of your identity is 
quite a difficult thing. 
 
Paula’s recovery identity involves interpreting her mood experiences as a type of 
neurodiversity, with effects that can be managed, rather than as a diagnosed illness. Looking 
back, she can see that she had mood related experiences from childhood; she says that she did 
not participate in normal life and that her reactions to events were unusual. 
 
Quentin (60+/depression/Methodist) describes his Christian identity as a burden and feels that 
life would be easier without it. He feels alienated from the majority of Christians and his own 
denomination, although he is reassured by remembering that there are different forms of 
Christianity. He feels that he is finding his own way in faith; his narrative gives the sense that 
he feels he is forging an alternative (and difficult) path to mainstream Christianity.  





Quentin: I've moved to a different place… And I- I- I just- I just... If this is 
Christianity, I don't want to be there. And it's that tension that really-really 
gets me. And I lie awake, thinking, what do I do? How do I- how do I live that 
life that I have. In the end, you know, that light I was talking about is- because 
I've been doing a lot of reading about it and, on a retreat last year in Bruges I 
sort of, found it helpful. Because I can see- you know, it doesn't really matter. 
There are so many different forms of Christianity anyway, you know.  
 
Rashmi (20+/schizoaffective disorder/Roman Catholic) speaks about a strong Catholic identity 
that is nonetheless significantly different to the Catholicism of her parents’ country of origin. 
For example, she accedes to her family’s requests for her to meet with miracle priests in the 
hope that she will be fully cured of her altered moods but does not herself share that 
worldview. She believes that her mood experiences have improved her spiritual life. 
 
Rashmi: I think I'm- I think I am a better Catholic for having gone through all 
these things. Because I now have a better understanding of what the world is 
really like, and what the world can do to people… I think it's made me more 
inquisitive about my faith, which I think can only be a good thing. So I think 
now that I'm asking a lot more questions and doing a lot more spiritual 
reading than I was before I had my breakdown. I think that's been a really 
beneficial thing for me. 
 
Sam (50+/depression-anxiety/Anglican) locates her life-long experience of altered moods in 
the context of emotional needs that might or might not be met within relationships, both 
those in childhood with her birth family and adult romantic partners. She describes her altered 
moods as partially arising from difficult and emotionally lacking family relationships – a toxic 
mix of life circumstances - and as being held at bay by emotionally fulfilling adult relationships. 
Her current episode of low mood and anxiety was triggered by the death of a partner. Sam 
sees her altered moods as episodic and thus distinct from her ‘self’; accordingly she does not 
speak about a recovery identity.  
 
Sam: You say, ‘No, I am me, the depression is- something that's wrong with 
me’, if you like. I wouldn't even wanna call it part of me, I think that's a 
slippery slope as well, actually. But no, I try not to see it as my identity, 
because as I say, I had 11 years clear of it. 
 
Sam says that she does not feel that she fits with either feminine or masculine gender roles 
and does not really identify as a woman but does not feel like a man either (her preferred 
pronouns are she/her); she says that she has typically masculine traits and interests and 




compares herself to a child before they start to think about identifying with one gender. She 
wonders if this may have arisen from childhood experiences that led her not to identify 
strongly as a woman. For example, her early childhood led her to view women as cruel but 
weak. She wonders whether this sense of non-binary gender is simply part of who she is, or if 
it needs some kind of healing.  
 
Sam: My mother and my grandmother were very cruel, so I decided I didn't 
wanna be like that, so I associated women with, like, cruelty. But on the other 
hand, I also saw them as rather weak, and my mother in particular was- You 
know, you had to be tough, she didn't like you crying or anything, so sort- 
more sort of manly qualities were admired. So that set up, I think, some 
confusion in my mind. 
 
Steve’s (20+/depression-anxiety/Roman Catholic) Christian identity changed over time from 
evangelical Protestant to Roman Catholic. He left the evangelical church in response to their 
reaction to his sexuality, and was later intrigued by his encounters with cathedral Catholicism. 
Joining the Catholic church as an adult, he felt that the church offered enough space for 
alternative views on topics such as sexuality. In Steve’s narrative he discusses medication in 
some detail, explaining that he is reducing the amount he takes. He also normalises the use of 
medication, in contrast to the reactions of others around him. 
 
Steve: The medication's quite standard, I'm on SNRIs now. Sertraline just 
stopped working. So it's venlafaxine now. I've never been on a better drug 
actually, with least side effects. Really easy. Plus actually I'm going to stop 
taking them soon, we're gonna start working down from them, shortly… It 
keeps me level, and I don't need anything else. There seems to be a- an idea 
that if I don't take the medication I will snap, and run around with an axe or 
something! So there's a little bit of- an over exaggeration. It's just medication. 
 
3.3.1 Narratives of altered moods 
 
In describing the chronology of their altered moods, some participants73 identified a difference 
between ‘in the moment’ experiences and later reflections on the meaning of the experience – 
participants were aware that they were constructing a narrative and were cautious about 
interpreting their experiences with hindsight. There were also differences in the fluency of 
narratives; some participants offered extensive chronological biographies with little 
 
73 E.g. Belinda (50+/depression/Methodist) and Isaac (30+/dysthymia/Charismatic Evangelical). 




prompting,74 while the narratives of others were less fluent.75 It is likely that narrative fluency 
to some extent depends on practice and having opportunities to rehearse the narrative as well 
as individual factors.76 
 
The majority of participants located their altered moods in the context of their life as a whole. 
In most cases the introductory question “can you say something about your mood 
experiences?” elicited an autobiographical narrative. Some of these narratives were quite 
extensive. Participants could have described their diagnosis or explained what it felt like to 
experience altered moods, but instead the majority offer a chronological autobiographical 
account, often beginning in childhood. Participants frequently describe the adult experience of 
altered moods as being associated with or partially explained by difficult life circumstances, 
especially those originating in childhood. This is evidently an expected narrative arc, as some 
participants took pains to specifically explain that their altered moods were not related to 
childhood problems or bad parenting. Expected narrative or not, participants described 
significant levels of trauma and adverse circumstances, including childhood abuse or neglect, 
poor parenting and parental history of mental distress, dysfunctional relationships, 
bereavement, and substance dependence. Certainly the narratives present strong perceived 
links between altered moods and life experiences. Even participants who offered a strongly 
biochemical aetiology – such as Chris who said that bipolar is ‘a chemical imbalance, it’s as 
simple as that’ – also described a range of life events that interacted with their moods. No 
narrative presented altered moods as essentially random and occurring out of the blue. 
Instead they locate the experience of altered moods in the broader context of the participants’ 
biography. Looking across the interviews, however, the analysis did not reveal a strong sense 
of shared or collectively validated core narratives as described by Frank and others.  
 
Every participant described their distress in some way during the interviews, painting a picture 
of long-standing intense mental pain which was nonetheless not always immediately apparent 
to or understood by others. These accounts of distress and suffering framed the narrative and 
 
74 E.g. Caleb (50+/ bipolar-BPD-PTSD/Charismatic Evangelical), Chris 
(30+/cyclothymia/Pentecostal), Emma (40+/depression-anxiety/Anglican) and Laurence 
(50+/high-low/Quaker). 
75 E.g. Diane (60+/depression-anxiety/Anglican), and Sam (50+/depression-anxiety/Anglican). 
76 As discussed in the introduction in relation to Justin Welby and public awareness campaigns, 
attitudes to talking about distress (and the value attached to that) are to some extent 
culturally driven. There is likely to be a self-selection bias at work, in that all of the participants 
had volunteered to come and talk about this topic. 




included a significant degree of disruption associated with the distress. Specific descriptions of 
the distress varied among the participants, but include emotional (such as a profound sense of 
worthlessness, fear, or despair), cognitive (such as a lack of motivation or difficulty focusing), 
and physical aspects (such as being unable to move or talk).  
 
Emma: It was like, cause I've been through a lot in my life, but that was just 
too much. I just coul- couldn't... It's a sort of loss of hope, really, it was just 
too much… [I]t absolutely was depression. Because you know, that thing of 
like, walking out the door and actually feeling unable to walk, to move 
forwards. You know, physically.  
 
Fiona: And I think for me, that's been the biggest feature of depression and 
faith, is that I often feel… that my faith just kind of disappears. And you know, 
I- I stop praying, and… I feel like God's just kind of disappeared on me, and... I 
feel quite abandoned. 
 
Kieran: I had an intense down period, really really terrible, lasting over a 
couple of years… It came to a head with, you know, prolonged thoughts of 
suicide, and piling up pills. At which point I was hospitalised.  
 
This distress affects multiple aspects of life, including interpersonal relationships, religious or 
spiritual life, and education; employment was highlighted as a particularly important area of 
disruption. Participants had needed time off work or had been ineffective in their workplace. 
Some described feeling stigmatised or discriminated against at work, once their diagnosis was 
disclosed. 
 
James: And I reached a point, about 3 years ago, where I kind of got to a point 
where actually I was going to work and I was just sitting there. And I was 
unable to get myself to do anything, because of the state I was in. 
 
Orla: I know at work, my boss fluctuated from being very supportive to, ‘Oh 
we can't ask her to do that because she's- she's a, you know, manic-
depressive. She's got- she is bipolar.’ And, as soon as that label- 
 
This level of distress was not exclusively linked to seeking medical help and/or receiving a 
diagnosis. The two participants who had never sought medical help also reported significant 
distress and disruption, for example being unable to work for a number of months. 
 
Matthias: It completely knocked my confidence in my ability to write… This 
was supposed to be me finishing my PhD. And I did no work for 5 months!  
 




3.3.2 Biographical disruption and recovery 
 
So participants did place their mood experiences in the context of their biography, and they 
did describe various kinds of disruption to their lives. However, in contrast to the expectations 
raised by these studies in biographical disruption and recovery, most participants in this study 
did not typically explicitly talk about the ways in which their experiences altered or challenged 
their identity. They did not, for example, talk about being a different person after their altered 
moods, of having their expected life-course disrupted, or of conflict between a religious and 
mood identity. This may be partially explained by the length and chronic nature of most of the 
participants’ altered moods. For most participants the altered moods are woven into their 
autobiography, often from childhood, rather than being a distinct, disruptive, event. This 
possibility is supported by those participants, e.g. Gail (60+/high-low/former Jehovah’s 
Witness) and Laurence (50+/high-low/Quaker), who did offer something approaching a 
‘classic’ narrative of biographical disruption and a recovery identity. Their narratives had a 
clear sense of life before the altered mood, during the altered mood, and afterwards. Both 
have experienced a high level of disruption due to their moods, including psychosis. Gail did 
not experience altered moods until mid-adulthood and her current life is markedly different to 
her previous situation; Laurence started his narrative in childhood but also had a sense of a 
distress-free ‘before’ and a markedly different ‘after’. Matthias’ (30+/low/Anglo-Catholic) 
altered moods also started in adulthood, but at the time of the interview he was still in the 
‘during’ phase. It may also be partially explained by the framing of the research and the 
decision not to seek participants through health services – participants were not described as 
patients, and were recruited mainly via faith groups rather than mental health groups. 
Participants were perhaps less likely to have a strong mental health related identity (since they 
were not recruited as service users, or experts by experience) and more likely to evidence a 
strong Christian identity. This was borne out in the interviews, with a number of participants 
offering in-depth narratives about their Christian identity. 
 
In these Christian narratives, God, or sometimes faith in God, was described as a rock, an 
anchor, a light in the dark, a stronghold, the thing that stopped participants acting on suicidal 
ideation. 
 
Amy (30+/depression-anxiety/Anglican): And I was having quite a bad time at 
that point and on that day, so the psalm that I wrote was very much praise 
but it was, um, it was about God being there... Um – ‘When my mind's 
wobbling, you don't, you're the stronghold. And when all seems dark, you're 




still there, you're still the light.’ 
 
Similarly, Belinda (50+/depression/Methodist) described having faith in God who provides 
stability in the storms of life, speaking about being anchored, leaning on the rock, and having a 
solid foundation. A belief in the constant loving presence of God was described as giving 
stability and certainty to life, with participants77 asserting that they always know God is with 
them, despite their mental distress. Helen, for example, characterises God as a warm, 
comforting, nurturing and protective presence. God is the ultimate confidante, always present 
and the one who truly knows her. Her image of God gives her a sense of stability and solidity, 
despite the difficulties she has encountered in life.  
 
Gail, on the other hand, spoke from the position of being a former Jehovah’s Witness, and 
used similar imagery in relation to life with and without a belief in God.  
 
Gail: I never really had to think about it. Well- it- you know, to come from a 
background where you're so convinced, that there is an all-powerful being, 
and then to lose it, it's just interesting how that's happened, but- No, I don't 
have any image of God, no. 
 
She previously imaged God as an all-loving and holding presence – and herself as resting on 
everlasting arms – but now has no image of God as she does not believe in the reality of God. 
In one sense she has lost the stability that comes from that kind of image, and speaks about 
missing the experience of prayer and the sense of being in God’s care. However, Gail’s sense of 
herself as a spiritual person persisted and remained a significant part of her self-image.  
 
These kinds of images of faith providing stability during the disequilibrium of mental distress 
are in line with literature on the sociology of religion, in that religion and tradition are 
considered to have a potential stabilising function in uncertain circumstances such as diaspora 
(Mol, 1979; McLoughlin, 2010). Participants also, however, spoke about spiritual disruption 
(Watts, 2011) associated with altered moods. Rather than disrupting their overarching 
biography and identity, altered moods instead disrupt their Christian biography.78 The 
 
77 E.g. Caleb, Belinda (50+/depression/Methodist), Helen (40+/depression-anxiety/Anglican), 
Chris (30+/cyclothymia/Pentecostal), Diane (60+/depression-anxiety/Anglican). 
78 This disruption was expressed as difficulty in maintaining spiritual practices, difficulty with 
accepting what they perceived to be core Christian beliefs (such as that God loved them), and 
in some cases as a challenge to Christian identity. 




suffering of altered moods was associated with spiritual distress or disruption, such as being 
unable to pray, feeling abandoned by God, or wanting to know whether God could really 
understand human suffering.  
 
Caleb: I can swing from one extreme to the other quite rapidly. And when I'm 
depressed I think, I can't understand what God is doing to my life - I know 
there's a God, no doubt that there is a God, but I get extremely frustrated 
with him. I cry, I ask him why I feel so crap, why life has treated me so badly, 
why, why can't I have normal moods and be like a normal person, and I get 
incredibly depressed. And I, I wake up with depression most days. 
 
For some participants this disruption was framed as a challenge to their Christian identity, in 
terms of conflict between lived experience and theology (or church community expectations). 
There was a sense in which ‘top down’ theology, formed perhaps in the absence of concerted 
reflection on lived experience or with the assumption that systematic or biblical theology are 
context-free, was presented as conflicting with the individual’s mood experiences. Specifically, 
predictions based on theology (such as that depression is a spiritual condition, therefore 
spiritual practices should solve it), were found to be incongruent with participants’ 
experiences of chronic altered moods. This was articulated most clearly by participants who 
wanted to reject what they saw as an aspect of conservative theology,79 but can also be seen 
in, for example, participants’ uniform rejection of demonic aetiologies in their own case 
(rather than in general), or in participants feeling guilty for being depressed (because 
Christians are not ‘supposed’ to be depressed). For these participants, the theology explored in 
later chapters in some ways can be considered their Christian recovery identity.  
 
While few participants spoke explicitly about identity, there are therefore implicit and nuanced 
references to identity throughout the interviews. These were more apparent during analysis 
than during the initial interviewing stage. I adapted my initial interview schedule in response 
to the lack of explicit identity-talk, but the process of analysis highlighted other, more subtle 
aspects of identity. What is missing is the link between concepts of biographical disruption, 
recovery, and identity that the sociological literature had primed me to expect (Bury, 1982; 
Williams, 2000; Ridge and Ziebland, 2006; Lafrance and Stoppard, 2006; Bonney and Stickley, 
2008; Locock et al., 2009). These ways in which participants engaged in identity-talk are 
 
79 Chris (30+/cyclothymia/Pentecostal), Paula (20+/anomalous/former Charismatic 
Evangelical), Belinda (50+/depression/Methodist), Matthias (30+/low/Anglo-Catholic), 
Nicholas (20+/high-low/Roman Catholic). 








In addition to the points noted above in relation to narrative shape and biographical 
disruption, the following aspects of identity-talk emerged from the analysis. 
 
Presentation of self as competent  
Participants understandably presented themselves as competent and as ‘more than’ their 
diagnosis by including biographical information that was not entirely necessary for the 
narrative they were telling. For example, Caleb (50+/ bipolar-BPD-PTSD/Charismatic 
Evangelical) listed his work successes, while Laurence (50+/high-low/Quaker) demonstrated 
his familiarity with academic research and noticeably took charge of the interview, guiding the 
direction of the discussion and ‘confessing’ that he knew he may not have been eligible for the 
interviews as he does not identify as Christian. I was aware before the interview that he is a 
Quaker and well aware that Quakers do not necessarily identify as Christian, which added an 
additional layer of complexity to the negotiation of interview roles. 
 
Recovery identity 
While the classic version of biographical disruption and recovery did not emerge strongly from 
the data, some participants did describe a recovery identity. This new identity was markedly 
different to both their former life and their episodes of altered moods. These tended to be the 
same participants80 who offered a potentially transformative account of altered moods, i.e. 
those whose accounts emphasised potential transformation through suffering.81 
 
Self formed in relation to others 
Some narratives are particularly focused on the relationships surrounding the participants, 
especially spouse and/or children. For these participants their identity as spouse or parent is 
revealed as particularly significant. This may be related to cultural expectations of gender 
roles, since those narratives that most emphasised these relationships were by women, and in 
general those narratives that had fewest mention of these relationships were by men.  
 
80 Emma (40+/depression-anxiety/Anglican), Laurence, Paula (20+/anomalous/former 
Charismatic Evangelical), Matthias (30+/low/Anglo-Catholic). 
81 These accounts are discussed in section 4.3.2.4. The term ‘potentially transformative’ comes 
from Scrutton (2015b). 




Presentation of distress severity  
Medically, suicidal ideation or behaviour and medication were the two things most 
consistently noted by participants as markers of severity. A number of participants report that 
they have been significantly distressed, but not so distressed as to be suicidal. Or if they have 
experienced suicidal ideation, it had not been ‘serious’ and they would not have acted on it. 
Their distress has been recognised medically by the prescription of medication, but they do 
not need it long-term, or they only take a low dose. This could be read as participants 
unwittingly reflecting social stigma in their self-presentation – they are not like those ‘others’ – 
but a more generous reading recognises the complex ways in which stigma, identity, distress, 
and diagnosis may interact. For example, medical professionals commonly ask about suicidal 
ideation in a way that suggests it is a marker of severity – rather than protecting their self-
image participants may be concerned not to present their distress as greater than it is. 
 
Christian identity and spiritual disruption 
A majority of participants gave a clear narrative of their Christian or spiritual identity. It is 
evident in the accounts that this identity is highly significant for many; participants speak 
about spirituality and faith as fundamental to their identity, or describe putting considerable 
effort into developing and understanding their spiritual lives. Spiritual disruption associated 
with altered moods seems to be perceived as distinct from biographical disruption. 
Participants identified negative short-term spiritual disruption (such as an inability to pray or 
attend church) but in the longer-term this disruption from altered moods tended to be seen as 
either positive (such as leading to the development of a new image of God) or broadly neutral. 
Those whose altered moods cause long-term and substantial disruption to their spiritual life 
and practice may be an exception to this trend. Paula (20+/anomalous/former Charismatic 
Evangelical) and Rashmi (20+/schizoaffective disorder/Roman Catholic), for example, were 
both entirely unable to attend church and continued to perceive this as a negative disruption.  
 
3.4 Summary: Narrative shape 
 
This analysis of the narrative shape of the interviews draws on, but complicates, the sensitising 
concepts of core narratives and biographical disruption. Christian narratives emerge as highly 
significant; the disruption associated with altered moods is substantial but the experience of 
altered moods is not perceived as a challenge to self-identity. It is, however, perceived as a 
spiritual disruption. For some participants a disconnect between theology and experience 




forms an important part of that disruption. A kind of ‘Christian recovery identity’ of 
participants emerges from the ways in which they navigate this disconnection, and is 
expressed through the theology discussed in the following chapters.  
 
This chapter therefore flags up themes which are extended and filled-out in later chapters. 
These are: 
 
• Altered moods are not strongly associated with identity, neither in the sense of group 
identity nor as a challenge to the sense of self. Theology of altered moods is therefore 
most appropriately described as a theology of experience, rather than a theology of 
identity.82 
• Spiritual disruption is common and there may be a disconnection between lived 
experience and theology.83 
• A significant amount of suffering is associated with altered moods, and participants’ 
interpretations of that suffering tend to be framed in relation to their Christian 




82 Further developed in Chapters 7 and 8. 
83 Further developed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
84 Suffering runs as a thread throughout the thesis but is foundational to Chapters 6 and 8.  





Ground floor: Interpreting altered moods 
4.1 Introduction to theme 
 
This chapter reports and analyses the ways in which participants interpreted their altered 
moods. These interpretations provide important context for later chapters, which examine 
more closely the ways in which lived experience of altered moods and Christian theology 
intersect. This chapter represents the ground floor of the grounded practical theology, i.e. the 
base and boundaries on which, and within which, people construct their theology. Individual 
interpretations of altered moods are not formed in a vacuum – the conclusions that individuals 
draw as to the significance, aetiology, and nature of altered moods in large part reflect their 
reactions to the interpretations that they are offered by their communities, networks, and 
wider society. Any health condition can be subject to diverse interpretations (e.g. moralising 
accounts) but the current Western discourse and state of knowledge around altered moods 
seems to particularly support a variety of interpretations. As discussed in the introduction, the 
dominant Western interpretation of altered moods is that they are a type of illness with 
biopsychosocial aspects. However, when medical diagnosis occurs, it is based primarily on self-
reporting against a list of criteria (e.g. having low mood for the past two weeks), and not on 
something perceived to be objective, such as a blood test or scan.  
 
Leavey et al. have described this process occurring in both clinicians and ministers of religion: 
 
In the absence of 'objective' evidence, the clinician 'makes sense' of the 
patient's narrative, attempting a construction of why has this happened, what 
or who is responsible and what needs to happen to make things better? 
(Leavey et al., 2016, p.1608). 
 
It follows that biomedicine occupies a significant part of this ground floor. In relation to 
biomedical interpretations of altered moods, analysis of the data found that:85 
 
85 This taxonomy is intended to be a way of understanding and analysing the different 
accounts provided by participants, not as a way of identifying groups of participants. The 
groups do not have tight boundaries and some participants offered accounts that fitted into 
 




• Accounts can be organised around the central concept of altered moods arising from a 
‘chemical imbalance’.  Participants’ attitudes to this concept fall into three broad 
groups: 
a) Simple acceptance of the concept (biochemical model) (approximately 30% of 
participants predominantly offered these kinds of accounts) 
b) Qualified acceptance (biopsychosocial model) (just over 40% of participants) 
c) Rejection (alternative models) (just under 25% of participants). 
• These models are paralleled by participant responses to the biomedical labelling or 
diagnosis of altered moods – empowered, questioning, rejecting. Those in the 
biochemical/psychosocial groups are more likely to find medical labels 
empowering/liberating.  
 
There is a sense in which all the participants’ interpretations of altered moods can be said to 
be ‘spiritual’ or ‘Christian’, in that all interpretation is informed by their worldview; ‘health’ is 
not in an entirely separate compartment to ‘religion’. However, there was another cluster of 
interpretations which I have called ‘Christian’ or ‘spiritualised’ interpretations because they 
more explicitly reference Christianity or theology. These accounts of altered moods can also be 
found in this ground floor, alongside the biomedical accounts, i.e. they are not in opposition to 
the others kinds of interpretations. These interpretations present altered moods as one or 
more of the following: 
1. evidence of evil spirits  
2. symptomatic of poor spiritual health  
3. a form of spiritual testing  
4. a time of spiritual growth. 
 
Groups 1-3 of these spiritualised interpretations are widely described by participants but 
uniformly rejected as inaccurate interpretations of their own experiences. Participants are 
describing interpretations that form part of the context for their mood experiences but which 
they do not share. Specifically, predictions based on theology (such as that depression is a 
spiritual condition, therefore spiritual practices should solve it), were found to be incongruent 
with participants’ experiences of chronic altered moods. Group 4 can be described as 
 
both categories. For example, Kieran emphasised a biochemical model for those conditions 
that might be diagnosed as severe mental illnesses, and a biopsychosocial model for common 
mental health conditions such as depression.  




potentially transformative (Scrutton, 2015b), i.e. that altered moods, while devastating, may 
nonetheless be times of spiritual change and growth. Potentially transformative 
interpretations were accepted by participants as plausible interpretations of their own altered 
moods. 
 
The detailed qualitative data on participants’ attitudes to biomedical interpretations that is 
presented in this chapter supports and fills out previous quantitative psychological research on 
the topic. Much of the ‘religion and mental health’ literature focuses on exploring statistical 
associations between health outcomes and self-reported religious practices such as attending 
a place of worship, praying or religious coping strategies. For example, a paper by Loewenthal 
et al. (2001) highlights an interesting discrepancy in the perceived efficacy of religious activity 
in coping with depression – UK participants who had ever been depressed were less likely to 
perceive religious activity as effective, and less likely to consider using religious coping 
strategies if they became depressed, than participants who had never experienced depression. 
This echoes the words of participants in the current study, who from experience have found 
religious coping strategies to be considerably less effective than their churches would like to 
believe. This does, however, raise the question of whether good clinical outcomes are 
expected to follow from religious engagement.86 This in turn highlights the ways in which 
theology is intertwined with lived experience; from a practical theological standpoint, the 
question is what salvation looks like (or is expected to look like) in the life of a believer or a 
community.  
 
As a qualitative study the participant sample in the current research is not intended to be 
representative. Nevertheless, the range of accounts of altered moods are broadly in line with 
what might be expected from other studies. For example, Leavey et al. (2016) identified five 
causal models espoused by Christian ministers. The categories were: biomedical, personal life 
events, structural or social stress, modernity, and religious/supernatural. The work of Stanford 
and McAllister (Stanford, 2007; Stanford and McAlister, 2008) gives an indication of the likely 
 
86 Different Christian traditions would likely give a different answer to that question, and the 
official teaching of a denomination might differ from the experience of individuals. The 
prosperity movement, for example, teaches a close and causal association between salvation 
and health (Bowler, 2018). The Catechism of the Catholic Church (CCC, 1997, paras 1503–05) 
offers the image of Christ the physician, whose life-giving presence is especially active through 
the sacraments, but also recognises that “even the most intense prayers do not always obtain 
the healing of all illnesses” (CCC, 1997, para. 1508) and some suffering must simply be 
endured. 




extent of this last category of spiritualised accounts of mental distress. They carried out an 
anonymous online survey of Christians (mainly in the USA) who had approached their local 
church for help with mental distress and found that approximately one third of respondents 
had been told that their distress was due to their personal sin (36%) or demonic involvement 
(34%), or that they should stop taking their medication (28%). Similar proportions had been 
told that they (41%) or their family member (32%) did not really have a mental illness, despite 
receiving a medical diagnosis. (The paper does not report whether there is an association 
between these experiences.) Similarly, roughly one third of participants in the current study 
had been told that their distress was associated with evil spirits (although more were aware 
that such accounts existed), and just over a third had encountered personal sin accounts. It is 
notable that structural, social, and political interpretations of altered moods were very rarely 
mentioned by participants, other than one reference to austerity measures, and perhaps a few 
references to changes in society facilitating wider discussion of mental health and distress than 
in previous generations.  While Leavey et al. found that few ministers referred to biological 
models of mental distress, their description is strikingly similar to that offered by the 
participants: 
 
[T]he role of biology in the development of mental illness tended to be 
offered as unicausal, embedded within a genetically determined disability 
rather than an interplay between nature and environment and often 
described as a 'chemical imbalance' in the body affecting the brain (Leavey et 
al., 2016, p.1611).  
 
Writing about Tallis’ (2016) concept of neuromania, Swinton (2018b) describes a similarly 
unicausal category of pharmacomania – the belief that psychotropic medication is a necessary 
and sufficient response to mental distress. He questions what it means to say that 
psychotropic medication has ‘worked’ when, for example, someone hears voices, rightly 
noting that such an experience is more complex than often allowed; not all voices are 
troublesome, and medication that succeeds in reducing the voices may well come with other, 
hard to manage, side effects: 
 
So, rather than “better” being understood in terms of moving toward 
something—God—“better” is primarily perceived as moving away from 
something: symptoms. The meaning of these symptoms to those individuals 
who bear them in their bodies is not considered to be of primary importance 
if in fact it is taken into consideration at all (Swinton, 2018b, p.308). 
 
This type of complexification is a helpful challenge to dominant narratives when talking 




generally about the experience of mental distress, but the data in this current study highlights 
a difficulty when applying it to individuals. Roughly one third of participants understand their 
own experiences in strongly biomedical terms. The concept of biochemical imbalance is the 
way in which they find it most meaningful to describe their mental distress, considering their 
experiences to be primarily a symptom of a biological process. Looking from the outside, it is 
of course possible to trace the connections between these beliefs and dominant cultural 
narratives about mental distress, and to challenge the reductive nature of the chemical 
imbalance narrative. And yet, I have to return to the data. Or rather, to the real people 
represented by the data. ‘Symptoms of a chemical imbalance’ is the way in which a number of 
participants choose to interpret their own experiences. Am I to offer them an additional 
diagnosis of pharmacomania or neuromania? The process of redescribing altered moods can 
perhaps open up the possibility of alternative, even more helpful, scripts, but it is important to 
see these as in tension with more conventional scripts rather than replacing them. It also 
draws attention to the ways in which biomedical concepts such as ‘a chemical imbalance’ may 
have a symbolic function, attracting a web of meaning and interpretation that goes beyond the 
medical or scientific knowledge. 
 
The spiritualised accounts presented by participants appear to offer alternative scripts. 
However, not all alternative scripts are helpful. Groups 1 and 2 of the spiritualised accounts 
(evil spirits and poor spiritual health) have been addressed in the literature as theologically 
inaccurate and potentially harmful. Mentioned previously in the Introduction, Webb (2017) 
takes a biblical studies approach to discuss negative lay theologies of mental distress that have 
been identified in interviews and Christian self-help literature. These negative lay theologies 
include psychological distress as evidence of lack of faith or selfishness, and psychological 
distress as caused by personal sin or demonic influence. Webb traces the potential biblical 
basis for these theologies, but concludes that they have limited biblical support and may even 
by contradicted by the biblical witness. A report by Ryan (2017) similarly suggests that 
personal expressions of mental distress are the appropriate starting points for a Christian 
theology and language of mental health, rather than the infrequent biblical allusions to mental 
ill-health in others. Psalms of lament or Jesus’ words from the cross would be examples of 
personal expressions of distress, while the ‘madness’ of Nebuchadnezzar or the behaviour of 
the man called ‘Legion’ are examples of the latter. The same report draws attention to the 
potentially harmful effects of exorcism or deliverance ministry. In his theological work based 
on his own experience of depression, Colwell addresses these same kinds of harm: 
 




By far the most problematic of these well-intentioned (but deeply misguided) 
people are those who assume that mental illness (or, at least, this mental 
illness) is demonic… Such people, I am sure, are entirely unaware of the 
unimaginable damage that they can inflict - or at least, this is what I assume: 
if they are aware of the damage they can cause, if they even have an inkling 
of that damage and yet persist in their assumption, then it is they rather than 
I who ought to be locked up (Colwell, 2014, p.27). 
 
Disability theologians also draw attention to a historic association of sin (or poor spiritual 
health) and disability within Christian tradition. Drawing on a small number of biblical 
references,87 some traditions have seen disability or illness as a direct result of individual sin. 
More broadly, disability has been viewed as evidence of the fallenness of the world; not the 
result of specific sin, but a type of brokenness that follows from the existence of sin within 
creation. Disability, perhaps especially that present from birth, has also been viewed as a type 
of virtuous suffering (Lowe, 2012); an opportunity for the goodness of God to be displayed 
either through physical healing (as per John 9) or through an ongoing increase in virtue and 
wholeness for the person or those around them – what might be called the ‘God’s special 
angels’ approach to disability. In all of these approaches the disabled person is a relatively 
passive figure and the individual minimised, the particularity of disabled bodies and 
experiences at risk of being lost as they function as a symbol either of sin or of virtuous 
suffering. Like the medical model, the sin account is a deficit model; the explanation draws 
attention to something that is lacking.  
 
Disabled people have challenged this characterisation of their lives; within both the disability 
rights movement and disability theology these challenges began with physically disabled 
people, followed by those with learning disabilities (or their allies), and latterly neurodiverse 
people. For example, Eiesland, a physically disabled theologian, drew on minority group 
liberation perspectives and the disability rights movement to argue against the conflation of 
sin and disability, ending with her famous description of the Disabled God (1994). In response, 
theologians concerned with learning disability have highlighted the ways in which liberatory 
and rights-based approaches may exclude those with cognitive impairments through an over-
emphasis on autonomy; the result has been a variety of relational theologies that emphasise 
human commonalities or the characteristics of a virtuous community (e.g. Yong, 2007; 
 
87 Particularly: Leviticus 21 which bars disabled people from serving as priests; Psalm 107:17 
“Some were sick through their sinful ways, and because of their iniquities endured affliction”; 
Mark 2:9 and John 5:14 which associate physical healing and the forgiveness of sin. 




Reynolds, 2008; Creamer, 2009; Brock, 2011). As a characteristic example, Reynolds offers a 
theology of vulnerability, saying it is intended to: 
 
[F]orge a path forward by rethinking human community in light of the 
primacy of relation and embodiment, such that the fundamental character of 
human wholeness through vulnerability and interdependence comes to the 
fore (Reynolds, 2008, p.14). 
  
In common with those disability theologians the participants in the current study reject the sin 
or spiritual testing interpretations of their situation. Unlike the liberatory theologians they are 
more likely to accept the characterisation of altered moods as indicative of the brokenness of 
creation (which is not the same as saying they are broken individuals). This is perhaps linked to 
questions of identity (most participants did not explicitly identify themselves as disabled, nor 
talk about a health or mood identity), but also to some of the characteristics of altered moods; 
they are experienced as distressing – as suffering -  in a way that other impairments may not 
be. In that respect the participants may have more in common with those relational 
theologians who have tended to focus on profound learning disabilities.  
 
Participants’ potentially transformative interpretations are particularly interesting when 
considered in relation to wider disability theology and when thinking about redescribing 
altered moods. They have some similarities with the idea of virtuous suffering, and yet the 
participants are not at all passive in these accounts. They wrestle with and lament the reality 
of their distress, but also see purpose and possibility in the experience. There is a distinct 
resonance between these interpretations and relational or contextual forms of disability 
theology, as well as with Scrutton’s (2015b) description of potentially transformative suffering. 
There may also be a further resonance with classic disability theory that distinguishes between 
the functional impairment (with a biological cause) and disability (caused by a discriminatory 
social context). Spiritualised interpretations do not deny the existence of altered moods nor 
mental distress (with a variety of possible causes, including the biological – presumably evil 
spirits could work through neurotransmitters), but the different interpretations reflect 
different kinds of social contexts.  
 
4.2 Description of data 
 
Having explained the purpose of the interview as hearing about their experience of altered 
moods and Christianity, I suggested the same starting point to each participant, a variation on 




“Could you say something about your mood experiences?” I started with mood as it was a 
relatively concrete topic that participants would be expecting to talk about. This starting point 
gave me an indication of the shape of the rest of the interview (e.g. would we be talking about 
high and/or low moods, which language the participant prefers to describe mental distress) 
while allowing the participant to take the lead on how much information they wanted to 
disclose. In many cases this starting point led directly to a discussion about different 
interpretations of altered moods, either by the participant raising it themselves or after a 
question about how they or their church understood the nature of altered moods. Coding 
revealed several distinct data clusters addressing different aspects of the interpretation of 
altered moods. These clusters include: aetiology and nature of altered moods (such as 
describing causes, episode triggers, or explanatory models); distinctively Christian 
interpretations of altered moods (such as demonic influence or reflecting spiritual 
characteristics of the person); and recognising, diagnosing and labelling mood experiences. 20 
participants addressed this topic, with participants offering both their own and others’ 




4.3.1 Aetiology and nature of altered moods 
 
4.3.1.1 Biological accounts: “It’s a chemical imbalance” 
 
The accounts offered by six participants88 fall into the biological ‘chemical imbalance’ group, 
either using the phrase explicitly or talking in closely related terms.  
 
Interviewer: What do you think causes bipolar? 
Chris: Chemical imbalances. It's as simple as that. There is no identifiable 
cause as such, from an external point of view, of bipolar. 
 
Interviewer: What is it you think that depression is? What wh-wh- what 
causes it, or-? 
Orla: I think it's chemical. I think it's all to do with... So I think it is very 
chemically based that, you know, the human body goes through certain 
 
88 Helen (40+/depression-anxiety/Anglican), James (30+/depression/Charismatic Evangelical 
Anglican), Chris (30+/cyclothymia/Pentecostal), Orla (50+/depression/Roman Catholic), 
Quentin (60+/depression/Methodist), Caleb (50+/ bipolar-BPD-PTSD/Charismatic Evangelical). 




things, and so I- I- I don't think it's always bad exp- situations cause you to be 
ill then and there… But I think, it- i-i-i it's that chemical imbalance, which is 
why the drugs work. Because the drugs keep that chemical balance nice and 
flat and even. So I- that's what I think depression is, and I think emotions just 
play a part, because emotions create the chemicals within the body. You can 
tell I didn't do biology at school!  
 
Helen: I think mine's chemical. I do- I do believe that. My Nana, my paternal 
grandma, suffered from it terribly. And I think I have the same condition. 
 
In these accounts participants explain at least some kinds of altered moods (sometimes their 
own, and sometimes ‘depression’ or ‘bipolar’ in general) as being a medical condition, entirely 
akin to conditions that are diagnosed as physical illnesses (such as diabetes) and caused by a 
neurochemical imbalance.89 Altered moods are therefore characterised as a medical problem 
requiring treatment accessed through health care professionals, although not necessarily with 
medication. This group offers a broadly single factor aetiology, with the neurochemical 
imbalance considered to be by far the most salient factor. Other factors (such as trauma or 
adverse childhood experiences) are mentioned as potential causes for the chemical imbalance, 
and there is an acknowledgement that behavioural choices (such as getting enough sleep or 
eating healthily) can contribute to recovery or prevention. The accounts do not explicitly talk 
about constructing categories of wellness and illness, nor the distinction between physical and 
mental health,90 but seem to assume an underlying binary. A person is either (mentally) ill or 
they are not. There is a sense in which this explanation functions as a justification for the 
participants’ ongoing episodes of altered moods and/or use of medication – as long as 
participants follow medical advice, engage in therapy, make healthy choices etc, they are not 
to blame for an objective and involuntary chemical imbalance in their brain. This approach 
describes altered moods as a problem located in the (brain of) the individual, but it is not a 
 
89 It is important to note here that conditions diagnosed as physical illnesses do not necessarily 
have a purely biological basis. They are also, to differing extents, biopsychosocial conditions. 
For example, a range of physical illnesses, including diabetes, are associated with social causes 
such as poverty or inequality in society (see Marmot (2020) for a review of health inequalities 
in England). The difference is in the way in which ‘physical’ and ‘mental’ health problems are 
viewed and diagnosed, rather than there being a clear dividing line between them (see 
‘Introduction’ for more discussion on this point). Similarly, something being considered a 
‘medical’ condition does not necessarily entail biological aetiology, and altered moods being 
considered a medical condition does not necessarily entail a neurochemical origin. 
Nevertheless, participants who spoke about altered moods as being a medical condition did 
tend to talk in terms of biochemical imbalance. 
90 As discussed in the previous footnote and the Introduction, it is not clear exactly whether 
there is such a distinction, or what it consists of, other than the idea of a difference receives 
common cultural validation in Western cultures. 




problem with the individual. James, for example, said: 
 
maybe it's actually just someone that's got a mental illness and- and maybe 
just not that, it's the way their brain works, and it's like well, I couldn't blame 
them for that any more than I could blame them for having cancer, or 
whatever. 
 
This approach makes sense given the wider context of how altered moods are understood; 
many participants had encountered alternative accounts which do imply a problem with the 
person. Some Christian perspectives suggest that altered moods are linked to the individuals’ 
sin, or to demonic involvement, or more generally to a lack of spiritual health. These are 
discussed in the next section. In other cases participants described other, non-biomedical, 
explanatory narratives which include negative interpretations of the person experiencing 
altered moods, such as depression as a character weakness or flaw. For example: 
 
Caleb: And I, and I have struggled with a thought, ‘Am I inherently evil and 
bad?’, rather than 'this is a medical condition that has just proven too 
intractable and difficult to sustain a marriage on'. 
 
Fiona: There's one person here who, who kind of, I don't know, gives the 
message that if you're strong and tough you can cope with anything and if 
you're not coping then it's cause you're not strong and tough enough. 
 
4.3.1.2 Mixed and biopsychosocial accounts: “For some people it’s a chemical 
imbalance, but for most people it’s caused by stress or trauma” 
 
The accounts offered by nine participants91 fit into this second group. Nicholas’ (20+/high-
low/Roman Catholic) account shares characteristics with this and the final group. 
 
These accounts accept the biomedical paradigm as a reasonably accurate and useful way of 
understanding altered moods, but emphasise psychological or social factors in addition to or 
instead of biology. These explanations reference chemical imbalances, but as an 
oversimplification, as having a limited evidence base, or as relevant in some cases but not all. 
‘Mixed’ may refer either to different causes for different people, or that a combination of 
 
91 Amy (30+/depression-anxiety/Anglican), Belinda (50+/depression/Methodist), Fiona 
(30+/depression-anxiety/Anglo-Catholic), Isaac (30+/dysthymia/Charismatic Evangelical), 
Kieran (30+/bipolar/Roman Catholic), Rashmi (20+/schizoaffective disorder/Roman Catholic), 
Sam (50+/depression-anxiety/Anglican) and Steve (20+/depression-anxiety/Roman Catholic). 




factors are present in one person’s experience.  
 
Fiona: It feels like there are two major causes, and one is the kind of, the 
chemical imbalance in the brain, and the other is... just a build up of all sorts 
of shit that people have to deal with. And I think for me it's probably the 
latter more than the former. 
 
Interviewer: How do you explain it now? What do you think causes 
depression? 
Amy: …I'd say the most likely for people'd be some experiences that have 
been negative and have led to negative thoughts.  
 
This is a multifactorial aetiology, where altered moods are described as the result of a 
combination of individual reactions and predispositions, acute or cumulative stress, trauma, or 
childhood experiences. Participants mentioned contributing factors such as poor parenting, 
caring responsibilities, relationship breakdown, bereavement, stress at work, and the 
menopause. While these narratives may accept that altered moods are grounded in neurology, 
and that adverse life circumstances can affect neurotransmitters, a biochemical imbalance is 
not the most significant factor in these accounts.  
 
Sam: Whether it is brain chemicals, I'm not sure. Or a- just a susceptibility to 
it. But- I think it ca- it can be both. You can get a mixture as well. 
 
Participants drew attention to some of the ways in which altered moods are similar to physical 
illnesses (e.g. fatigue, measurable impact on daily living, use of medication), but were also 
attentive to the ways in which they were perceived to be dissimilar (e.g. no diagnostic test, the 
significant role of stress, and the ability to influence mood through individual behaviour). 
There were varied reasons why individual participants were keen to draw attention to these 
dissimilarities, despite their over-all acceptance of the biomedical paradigm. Kieran, for 
example, wanted to avoid being reductively medical, and to draw a distinction between 
bipolar (which he considered to have a biological basis, though triggered by life circumstances) 
and unipolar depression (which he considered a symptom rather than a medical problem).  
 
Kieran: My- my view of depression is it's a symptom rather than a- a- a sort of 
medical level disorder, and there might be several things going on 
biologically, socially, emotionally, whatever, that- that bring this about. 
Bipolar... is much more likely to be grounded medically, and so to be 
grounded in- I guess, neurology.  
 




Some (e.g. Amy, Fiona, Rashmi and Sam) felt that adverse life circumstances had been the 
main reason for their own altered moods, although they accepted that biological factors might 
contribute significantly to the altered moods of others: 
 
Rashmi: Well, there's the whole biochemical kind of theory, as well, which I 
understand is probably true for some people, like it might be a chemical 
imbalance and things like that. I think for me personally, I notice that my 
mood tends to react to life situations, so, so things like stress or certain 
triggers.  
 
Others seemed to have recognised the limitations of ‘chemical imbalance’ as an explanation, 
and wanted to complexify the category. This may have included a degree of anxiety about 
claiming illness status for themselves. 
 
Nicholas: But is not as simple as- I-I-I never, I basically never agree with the 
kind of neat boxes that are defined medically, you know… 
 
Isaac: And this sort of weird thing between... I don't know like if you have a, if 
someone has a chronic disease, like say I had diabetes or something, you kind 
of know that you have it and you can check your sugar levels and you can kind 
of say ok this is something I have. Whereas with something like that, it's 
influenced by so many factors that it's hard to kind of know... 
 
This contrast between physical and mental health is a theme that cuts across the first two 
groups. Two specific physical conditions, a broken leg and diabetes, were most frequently 
compared to mental health, possibly as a result of public health campaigns using these 
examples.  
 
Quentin: I think because mental health comes in that much more woolly area, 
that, you know, if you've got a broken leg a surgeon will mend it. You know. 
And we have this thing now, I mean, people ask me, 'you've been on those 
tablets for 20 years?' I say yes, but I've also been on the hypertension tablets 
for 20 years, you know. If-if-if- if my blood pressure needs that constant, why 
can't the chemical in my brain need that? 
 
At a surface level the comparison with a broken leg is intended to highlight inappropriate 
social reactions to altered moods (e.g. stigma, associations of blame or responsibility) and a 
desire for altered moods to be normalised and treated as equivalent to physical health 
problems, but leaves deeper questions unanswered. For example, are altered moods a type of 
physical illness, or are they just similar to physical illnesses in significant ways? Accounts in the 
first group are more likely to say that mental distress is an illness, whereas the second group is 




more tentative and tends to conclude that mental distress is like an illness.92 
 
Caleb: So all I can do is hope to God that this treatment works and I see it, it's 
a treatment, just like chemotherapy is for people with cancer, or insulin is for 
diabetics. 
 
Isaac: Yeah, I mean I think there's an aspect, so the aspect of sort of 
symptoms in the sense of- So I've had some times in my life where, you know, 
it's really difficult to get out of bed, and I would, you know, call in sick to work 
and sort of not be able- not feel physically able to do anything, and at that 
stage, I mean, that is- to me that's- that's effectively the same as... You know 
it's a- it's a medically- It has a specific kind of physical impact… 
 
4.3.1.3 Alternatives to the biomedical model: “I don’t accept the idea of a chemical 
imbalance” 
 
Notably, not all participants accepted the premises of biomedical accounts of altered moods. 
Five participants (Laurence (50+/high-low/Quaker), Matthias (30+/low/Anglo-Catholic), 
Nicholas (20+/high-low/Roman Catholic), Gail (60+/high-low/former Jehovah’s Witness), Paula 
(20+/anomalous/former Charismatic Evangelical)) fall into this group. Participants in this group 
share some degree of rejection of the biomedical model and, specifically, the concept of a 
chemical imbalance in relation to at least some experiences of altered moods. It is not always 
clear whether participants are referring only to their own experience of altered moods, or to 
altered moods more generally. 
 
Paula: I struggle with the whole chemical idea though, I don't- I don't 
understand whether it- how it could be right. Cause, I mean, obviously all the 
stuff from which they've actually made antipsychotics and antidepressants it's 
all based on hypotheses that can never be proved anyway.  
 
Altered moods are not described as a type of illness or as similar to physical illnesses, with 
distress taken as indicative of something other than a mental illness. For these participants 
mental distress is characterised as a life experience rather than a diagnosis, one that needs to 
be seen in the context of the whole of life, including a person’s spirituality.  
 
Laurence: …what I fundamentally felt was that all of my problems with my 
 
92 The participants are not alone in offering different accounts on this point. See for example a 
recent report by the British Psychological Society on the nature of depression (Bowden et al., 
2020) and a rejoinder by Pies (2020) entitled ‘Is depression a disease?’ 




mood, whether that be high or low, or- or a fluctuation between the two, 
were to do with my beliefs about myself and about the world and my 
relationship to the rest of the world. 
 
There is little further consensus about the nature of altered moods across this group. Matthias 
and Nicholas’ accounts characterise altered moods as an opportunity for spiritual growth, 
Gail’s as a learned behaviour, Paula’s as a form of neurodiversity, and Laurence’s as a spiritual 
crisis. These accounts are not primarily aetiological, instead they are reflections on the 
(potential) meaning of the experience.  
 
Paula: I think with autism often it's like going, yes there can be some issues, 
but I think actually in some ways it's very much just a different way of seeing 
the world… And I think the same about mental health. Is it comes with a lot of 
bad things, or tricky things to manage, but very much gives you a different 
view on how to see the world.  
 
Nicholas: for me the moments in my life which have definit- I can say that- 
that altered mood has been a key part, has been during sort of life changing 
events, or- or- where multiple things come together and they- I have like a 
realisation, sort of epiphany sort of thing.  
 
These participants are not necessarily anti-psychiatry: rejection of the biomedical model was 
sometimes expressed as outright scepticism or rejection, but also as a sense that while the 
biomedical model might have some use (e.g. in describing the underlying biological 
mechanisms, for communicating distress, or accessing support), it is essentially irrelevant to 
the lived experience and nature of altered moods. 
 
Laurence: So I- y'know, I regard my rejection of medical model as liberating. 
At the time I rejected it, I hadn't got a clue about the spirituality stuff. But I do 
feel that, that if I hadn't rejected it, I wouldn't have been able to embrace the 
spirituality which I have come to regard as fundamental to my wellbeing. 
 
Gail: Of course if you're under a lot of stress there is, there must be some 
chemical component to it. The stress must affect chemistry. But I don't think 
that's the main cause, I think it's learned behaviour. The things you see when 
you're young. I saw my mum have nervous breakdowns, and- and be suicidal 
for example.  
 
Matthias: So like, in terms of like, our emotional health, our mental health, 
our spiritual health, and our bodily health are all tied up in really complicated 
ways. And so, it's all- stuff. Do y- I m- I don't wanna think about it just as being 
a chemical imbalance that happened. 
 
Discomfort with the biomedical model extends to treatment: Matthias and Nicholas had not 




sought medical help at all, while Laurence and Paula had initially received psychiatric care, 
including medication, but chose not to continue treatment. Gail strongly contested the 
medicalisation of her distress, but continued to take medication and accepted that her 
diagnosis was the only way to access necessary support.    
 
Some of the participants are familiar with psychiatric research, and their rejection of the 
biomedical model is fuelled by the limitations of studies in this area. Laurence, for example, 
explicitly rejected the medical model after exploring the research literature, framing this in 
terms of a liberation from biomedicine and crediting this choice with creating space for 
spirituality and his full recovery. Two of them (Laurence and Paula) expressed appreciation for 
the good intentions of medical professionals but suspicion about the pharmaceutical industry, 
suggesting that diagnosis and medication are largely driven by the profit motives of the 
industry.   
 
Paula: I mean, the DSM was written basically for drug companies, let's be 
honest about that one, big Pharma got their hands on it. I mean, there's 
random little, stupid ridiculous diagnoses in there, for the only reason that it'll 
sell more Xanax or anything else, that's stupid. 
 
4.3.2 Interpreting altered moods from a Christian perspective 
 
4.3.2.1 Evil spirit accounts: “It’s an attack from the enemy” 
 
One group of distinctively Christian accounts refer to evil or malign spirits (the devil, demons, 
demonic influence more generally) as causal explanations for altered moods.  
 
Two thirds of participants93 mention these kinds of Christian accounts, although with differing 
amounts of detail and experience. Some participants are simply aware that these accounts 
exist, some have encountered them occasionally, and others have belonged to communities 
(predominantly charismatic evangelical or Pentecostal churches) where this is a dominant 
 
93 Amy (30+/depression-anxiety/Anglican), Belinda (50+/depression/Methodist), Caleb (50+/ 
bipolar-BPD-PTSD/Charismatic Evangelical), Chris (30+/cyclothymia/Pentecostal), Emma 
(40+/depression-anxiety/Anglican), Fiona (30+/depression-anxiety/Anglo-Catholic), Isaac 
(30+/dysthymia/Charismatic Evangelical), James (30+/depression/Charismatic Evangelical 
Anglican), Kieran (30+/bipolar/Roman Catholic), Nicholas (20+/high-low/Roman Catholic), 
Quentin (60+/depression/Methodist), Rashmi (20+/schizoaffective disorder/Roman Catholic), 
Sam (50+/depression-anxiety/Anglican) and Steve (20+/depression-anxiety/Roman Catholic)  




narrative for altered moods. Caleb, Chris, Emma, Isaac, and Sam, give the most comprehensive 
accounts of belonging to this kind of community: 
 
Caleb: And while I accepted that there were certain medical conditions and 
mental health could be included, I certainly thought that things like 
depression were attacks from the enemy, you know. 
 
Isaac: Yeah the question about whether it's something external in the sense 
of, like, demonic influence or those kind of things that is- yeah that that does, 
that's a good point, that does come up… I have been, been, involved in 
different churches, some of which are more, more sort of open to the idea of 
healing and demonic influence and that kind- of that kind of thing. [At one 
church people] were really into, like, generational curses and- and this kind of 
idea that, you know, if things are bad have happened to you, it's sort of 
something your parents did, or… there could be some sort of demonic 
influence. 
 
Chris: I've heard multiple explanations. I mean, that's the, that's the most 
common one I get all the time - it's a demon.  
 
The first question to arise is whether there is a difference in these accounts between types of 
spirit that is being invoked – described as either ‘the devil’ or more generally as demons/the 
demonic, or evil spirits (and in one case as being cursed or charmed)? Participants do not seem 
to make a clear-cut distinction between the phrases. The worldview expressed in either phrase 
accepts the existence of good and evil spiritual beings which interact with humans.94 Some 
accounts use both terms fairly interchangeably (Emma, Isaac, Caleb, Steve), while in others the 
devil seems to be the ultimate source of evil (or of altered moods), but it is demons that 
directly affect people. People are usually, but not exclusively, said to be influenced or 
possessed by demons, not by the devil. 
 
Emma: I do believe that there is a devil. Not with horns and a tail. But I do 
believe the devil exists- I mean, not everybody does, y'know. I do, believe… 
do feel that while my mum was very mentally- severely mentally ill I also think 
she was afflicted, spiritually. And have seen that. So I do think people can be 
afflicted by unhelpful spirits. 
 
Rashmi: I do believe the devil can possess people. I think it's very extreme, I 
think it's very rare… I think that's genuine, like, satanic possession.  
 
94 Although good spiritual beings (such as angels) were conspicuously absent from the 
interviews.  This is characteristic of North American third wave Evangelicalism/neo-
Pentecostalism, which since the 1990s has emphasised ‘spiritual warfare’ - human encounters 
with evil spirits – including detailed and complex demonologies (McClymond, 2014, pp.39–43; 
McCloud, 2015).  




There is a difference between accounts which seem to invoke the devil or demons in a 
relatively casual and unnuanced way, and those which have a more developed aetiology and 
explicit theology behind them. The former do invoke the distinctively Christian concepts of the 
devil and the demonic as a cause for altered moods, but almost as a synonym for evil, a 
necessary binary opposition to God or as the source of things that are not ‘of God’ (everything 
“must come either from God, or the devil” – Emma), and often as a negative judgement on the 
person suffering, rather than as a distinctive theological concept. When Belinda is told in 
passing that “the devil always finds the weakness”, it would not seem out of place for the 
person instead to have said “trouble will always find the weak” or some other sentiment. 
Steve reflected this in his description of demons: 
 
I think- it's almost been made so, boring, to some extent- they're not 
pitchforks and horns and things, like they used to be. They're almost 
portrayed as people you don't like. Or people that upset you… They're almost 
presented in this sort of slightly passive, wandering around causing you 
misery and upset-ness, rather than- sort of, sneaking up from hell... 
 
The latter accounts give a more complex description of the ways in which evil spirits interact 
with humanity, reflecting a particular kind of spiritual and supernatural worldview of cosmic 
conflict,95 and in which this narrative is prioritised over other collective narratives. Caleb, 
Chris, Emma and Sam give a clear description of encountering Christian narratives that reject 
the biomedical account of altered moods in favour of an account based on the actions of evil 
spirits, and of what it is like to be embedded in that worldview. These narratives are also more 
likely to be associated with personal experience of exorcism or deliverance ministry. Three 
participants (Caleb, Chris, Sam) report having experienced deliverance ministry as a result of 
their altered moods; none of them report being helped and two report being significantly 
harmed by the experience. In addition, Emma and Rashmi are familiar with deliverance 
ministry but have either refused (Rashmi) or did not say one way or the other (Emma). 
 
Caleb: They'd given up on me, they thought I was a lost cause. They, they'd 
tried to pray for me, to cast demons out of me, because they thought that my 
mental-  I wasn't mentally ill, they thought I was demon possessed. So... 
Interviewer: Ok... And how was that for you?  
Caleb: Terrifying. Absolutely terrifying. I remember being curled up on the 
floor, in the foetal position, wailing like a baby, while they were screaming to, 
for this, some demon or other to be cast out of me. And it was screaming. 
 
95 Spiritual warfare/conflict cosmology is particularly characteristic of Pentecostal traditions 
(Albrecht and Howard, 2014). 




They weren't... praying. In any sense that I saw Jesus pray when he met 
people who were demon possessed. They were literally shaking me and 
screaming at me, you know... 
 
Sam: Yeah, but of course I got introduced to things like deliverance ministry 
which messed up my head a bit. Cause I- I didn't need it, but they seemed to 
think I did need it, so- But yeah, I ended up thinking this was the default 
setting - if I can't conform to this, I'm off to hell, sort of thing. Really quite 
scary.  
 
These types of evil spirit accounts appear to function similarly to the single-factor chemical 
imbalance aetiology, in that one factor (in this case demons) is considered to be by far the 
most salient. They are also both strongly binary. The binary in this case consists of personified 
representations of good (God) and evil (the devil and/or other demons); anything which is not 
good, including mental distress, must ultimately be caused by the devil. Most of these 
accounts see this as a problem with the individual, whose sinful behaviour might have invited 
the demonic attack, as described by Chris: “one of those churches also thinks I was demon 
possessed at a much younger age when I decided to start experimenting with sexuality”. In this 
account altered moods are, however, perceived as caused by something external to the 
person, (rather than inherently part of their genetic inheritance for example). This external 
causation has the potential to be reassuring. Some participants, for example, described mental 
distress as the result of a spiritual attack that was either unrelated to their personal 
characteristics or as signifying something positive about the individual. Mental distress in this 
case may interpreted as a sign that the person is living a faithful Christian life, or just as an 
expected part of living in the kind of world envisioned by this worldview.96   
 
James: But my wife and I are both quite stubborn people, and have that kind 
of view that maybe if things are going wrong it's a spiritual attack, but that 
fundamentally that only happens when you're on the right path. So it tends to 
make us more bloody-minded! And actually is slightly encouraging. 'All this 
stuff's going wrong!' Right! 
 
Chris: I've had people tell me that, ‘Oh it's just the enemy trying to find a way 
in. You're not oppressed, or d- or possessed, or any of the rest, it's just the 
enemy prodding at you - where's your weak point?’  
 
Participants uniformly reject these evil spirit accounts as explanations for their own altered 
 
96 See e.g. Leavey (2010) and Mercer (2013) for a social scientific approach to beliefs in 
supernatural causation of mental health problems. 




moods, although they may have accepted them in the past; but they do not necessarily reject 
the worldview. Chris, Isaac, Emma and Rashmi all accept the existence of evil spirits that can 
influence or oppress people, while Sam accepts the existence of what she refers to as spiritual 
depression. Emma and Rashmi explicitly argue that a minority of cases of mental distress have 
a demonic or spiritual component, and that deliverance ministry is therefore appropriate in 
some cases.  
 
Rashmi: Yeah, so I think most people wouldn't need an exorcism. I do believe 
there are some very extreme cases where someone might. But- but I think 
that's genuine, like, satanic possession. You know, which I personally do 
believe can happen - I've never seen it happen, but I do believe it can happen. 
 
Participants may hold spiritualised and other kinds of aetiologies alongside each other. Chris, 
for example, offers a strongly biochemical account of his bipolar disorder, but also says that his 
mood experiences led to encounters with demonic spirits.  
 
Chris: I understand that there are two sides to the spiritual realm. There's the 
good, and there's the evil. And- a lot of people like to forget about the evil 
part. Try forgetting that when you're living it. And for me, I genuinely believe I 
was living through a living hell. To the extent that, yes, there were demonic 
things attaching around me, here there and everywhere. They had no 
authority over me, they couldn't do anything with me. But- it was there, it 
was around. If I hadn't got bipolar, I don't think they'd have the right to be 
there. 
 
4.3.2.2 Spiritual symptom accounts: “It’s a sign you’re not a good enough Christian” 
 
Another cluster of explanations see altered moods as symptomatic of poor spiritual health.97 
Often this is said to be because joy is characteristic of a healthy Christian life, and altered 
moods are taken to be the antithesis of joy. Altered moods therefore indicate an individual 
spiritual problem, such as a sinful behaviour, lack of faith, inadequate spiritual discipline, poor 
life choices, or a need for emotional healing; these can be addressed through spiritual or 
religious practices such as prayer, ritual, pilgrimage, or Bible reading. This is not necessarily a 
fully spiritualised aetiology, in that altered moods may be considered a type of medical illness 
 
97 Mentioned by: Amy (30+/depression-anxiety/Anglican), Belinda 
(50+/depression/Methodist), Chris (30+/cyclothymia/Pentecostal), Emma (40+/depression-
anxiety/Anglican), Isaac (30+/dysthymia/Charismatic Evangelical), James 
(30+/depression/Charismatic Evangelical Anglican), Paula (20+/anomalous/former Charismatic 
Evangelical), Quentin (60+/depression/Methodist). 




to which the person has become vulnerable due to their spiritual weakness. There are 
interesting similarities between this type of account and the account offered by cognitive 
behavioural therapy (CBT), in that addressing certain kinds of weakness (spiritual or cognitive-
behavioural) becomes the appropriate way to treat altered moods.   
 
Paula: But, I think, now when I look at things, partly because of, partly 
because of my experiences of how my church treated me when I wasn't so 
much in a good place, cause, very much patronising, very much, only let’s 
pray it out of you. Very much a- if you're, you know- ‘if you prayed properly, 
or read the Bible more then you wouldn't have a mental illness’, sort of 
approach. 
 
Emma: I think there really is the thing where- that if there's disorder to that 
degree it must be your fault, it must be sin. And it must be... ‘We'll uh- we'll 
pray for you’.  
 
Participants are clear about the difficulties raised by these kinds of accounts, which are largely 
to do with what happens when altered moods persist despite attempts to remedy the poor 
spiritual health. Sam, for example, speaks about searching in vain for the spiritual root of her 
depression and anxiety, while Amy speaks about feeling guilty for her altered moods because 
Christians are not meant to experience depression. Paula and Emma describe their churches’ 
expectation that praying or reading the Bible will resolve altered moods, and the inadequate 
response when the mood persists. Rashmi talks about being taken to faith healers (who are 
said to be able to discern spiritual problems and prescribe rituals for healing), and dealing with 
her own and her family’s disappointment when miraculous healing does not occur. Chris talks 
about the positive confession movement, and of being told that he is already healed and just 
needs to claim that healing.  
 
Sam: And then I started bumping up against evangelical teaching, which was 
very black and white, and all this stuff about 'oh if you're depressed you 
haven't got enough faith, you're not praying hard enough'. 
 
Chris: Oh you're not healed because you didn't pray right. You know, yes you 
were praying, yes we know you were calling out to God, but you didn't do it in 
the right way.  
 
James: I- you know, at that narrow level I don't necessarily have a problem 
with it, but it's when it starts to be that it's a spiritual thing and that reflects 
on you badly. Then it becomes a- I completely and have always and absolutely 
felt that was wrong (italics for emphasis). 
 
This cluster of explanations unambiguously suggests a problem with the person, for which the 




person may or may not be held responsible. Perceptions of individual responsibility may be 
compounded in situations where remedies (such as Bible reading, ritual, or prayer) do not 
appear to work. If altered moods are symptomatic of poor spiritual health then these remedies 
‘should’ work, and blame for the failure is attached to the person rather than the remedy or 
God.    
 
4.3.2.3 Spiritual testing accounts: “It’s a test from God” 
 
A minority of participants98 raise, but reject, the possibility of altered moods being a spiritual 
test. Such a test may be either sent or allowed by God99 to examine or increase the strength of 
a person’s faith, or be the work of evil spirits. Unlike the previous spiritual accounts, in the 
testing account the person is not held responsible. Instead blame is attributed to God, and 
participants conclude that sending or allowing mental distress as a type of test is inconsistent 
with the character of God. 
             
Chris: I've heard people say, that it is just a test from the Lord - so what you're 
telling me then is that God gave me depression. Which again, in my 
viewpoint, can't be right. Because if God's love, he's not gonna give somebody 
something that's gonna cause them a living hell. 
 
Isaac: There's a section in the book of Daniel where he's having these visions… 
and he gets like really emotionally affected by it and then it's something like 
it's, it's explained that it's like a test. 
 
Orla: You know, this is something that happens, and you get through it, and 
you- you develop skills to get yourself through it, but it's not a test from God. 
Like I say, I don't- I don't believe God is- is manipulative in that way. Well, I 
don't want him to be, I suppose is the answer. I don't want a manipulative 
God. I don't want to be tested. Faith is faith. And, if you test faith, you can 
destroy faith, as much as you can make it stronger. 
 
Some of the Roman or Anglo- Catholic participants100 raise the possibility of altered moods 
 
98 Isaac (30+/dysthymia/Charismatic Evangelical), Chris (30+/cyclothymia/Pentecostal), Orla 
(50+/depression/Roman Catholic), Kieran (30+/bipolar/Roman Catholic). 
99 Biblical accounts of Job, Abraham and Jesus (being tested in the wilderness) appear to raise 
this possibility. 
100 Orla, Rashmi (20+/schizoaffective disorder/Roman Catholic), Steve (20+/depression-
anxiety/Roman Catholic), Sam (50+/depression-anxiety/Anglican). 




being a dark night of the soul.101 This spiritual experience seems to be considered a test to 
increase faith, in which God withholds awareness of God’s presence. It is indicative of a person 
having an unusual depth or strength of faith. Mother Theresa is uniformly mentioned as an 
example of this. 
 
Sam: Yeah it's an interesting one, that. I'm never quite sure how that's 
supposed to feel. Because I've had- certainly with ordinary depression- that 
feeling of, not so much that God doesn't exist, that God's wandered off 
somewhere for a bit, and doesn't seem to want to come back for some 
reason. I'm never quite sure whether- whether that type of depression feels 
like that, or whether it's something else actually.  
 
Orla: Well, it's that challenge isn't it, getting through that, and that definitely 
came up with Mother Theresa. You know, she went through this, and she 
even questioned her faith, and- but she worked through it, and you know, this 
is almost kind of like a test. And I went, ‘This isn't a bloody test. You know, it's 
not an exam I'm taking here. That, you know, proves I'm this what-or the 
other’.  
 
4.3.2.4 Potentially transformative accounts: “It’s a devastating time of spiritual 
change and growth”102 
 
A final cluster of spiritualised accounts see altered moods as being an opportunity for spiritual 
growth. A minority of participants offer what I have therefore described as potentially 
transformative accounts of altered moods. That is, they interpret their own mood experiences 
as having purpose or meaning, such as being an opportunity for spiritual growth.   The 
 
101 The term ‘dark night of the soul’ comes from work by  St. John of the Cross, describing the 
journey of the soul towards union with God (Kavanaugh and Rodgriguez, 1991). The dark night 
as a broader concept of spiritual struggle or absence leading to spiritual growth forms part of 
Catholic spirituality and is a way of speaking about some kinds of mental distress. Work by 
Durà-Vilà and others (Durà-Vilà et al., 2010; Durà-Vilà, 2017) has explored this use of the dark 
night of the soul as a narrative of emotional distress among Roman Catholics. 
102 The term ‘potentially transformative’ is taken from Scrutton’s approach to suffering and 
depression, and is used here to indicate a link between her work and the analysis that 
emerged from this empirical material (Scrutton, 2015b; 2017; 2020). The potentially 
transformative view “can be characterised as a meaning-making approach to mental distress, 
since it tends to view mental distress as symptomatic of more deep-rooted spiritual and 
psychological unfulfillment or dissatisfaction and to view episodes of mental distress as 
opportunities for spiritual growth. It speaks of episodes of mental distress as in some way 
potentially transformative in the sense that, through them, the person’s compassion and 
sensitivity towards others, sense of beauty, and self-awareness can be developed” (Scrutton, 
2015b, p.100). From the empirical material I would add ‘awareness of the spiritual or God’ to 
the characteristics that may be developed. 




emphasis here is on the nature of the experience, rather than aetiology. There is no inherent 
conflict between these accounts and a biomedical aetiology, although participants offering 
potentially transformative accounts tended not to accept a ‘simple chemical imbalance’ 
aetiology.103  Unlike the other kinds of spiritualised accounts, participants offer these as their 
own interpretation of their own altered moods, rather than an interpretation that they have 
rejected. These interpretations have typically arisen from participants trying to make sense of 
their own experiences, rather than being interpretations offered by a church, and so have less 
in common with each other than the previous accounts. There is a clear (but not exact) overlap 
between these accounts and the accounts proposing alternatives to the biomedical model. It is 
important to note that participants who offer these accounts do not argue that mental distress 
is a good thing in itself, nor are they making light of the experience. Rather, these 
interpretations come from participants making meaning of their often devastating experiences 
of altered moods.  
 
Emma (40+/depression-anxiety/Anglican), for example, describes her period of severe low 
mood and recovery as a process of redemption, in which she became more fully the ‘new 
creation in Christ’ that had been promised to her at baptism. The experience of altered moods 
brought parts of her old identity out into the open, allowing God to redeem them. She 
identifies a mismatch between Christian teaching and experience, in that the old identity had 
not disappeared just by virtue of her taking on a new identity as a baptised Christian. She links 
her suffering to aspects of that old, suppressed, identity reasserting themselves; but through 
the suffering unexpectedly experiences God loving the old identity back into life.  
 
Interviewer: Do you feel like your period of depression has meant then that 
you can encounter God? 
Emma: I feel more redeemed!  
Interviewer: You feel more redeemed? 
 
103 It is possible that the interpretations offered by participants are affected by the context, for 
example, participants in the ‘potentially transformative’ group might have been more likely to 
talk about biological aetiology to a medical doctor rather a theological researcher. I did not 
address this directly with participants, although I did explore with some participants whether 
they would speak differently about their moods in medical or church contexts. The answer 
from each participant was no, although the question was interpreted by participants as 
referring to how they would describe their symptoms/feelings, rather than about aetiology. 
For example, Kieran said, “I mean obviously, there are some things that, y- you don't want to 
make other people uncomfortable- But not… just because they're in church. No, absolutely 
not. Indeed I have had conversations with the priest down there, where- You know, I was 
quite, brutally blunt about the nature of what had gone on.” 
  




Emma: Yes! I do, because I feel, I feel that I got more in touch with myself, 
with part of myself that was unredeemed, in a way. I mean I was- I'm not 
saying- no part of anyone is unredeemed. But there was big parts of myself 
completely shut down - corpse. Corpses of myself, you know. Never touched 
the living- never touched the light. For- all for a reason, shut down. And while 
it's been quite horrendous in some ways, seeing those things, and still is 
(laughs). It's- God wants to be there. And that's the kind of wonderful thing. 
So it- it's not a matter of me controlling where God wants to be anymore - I 
don't tell God wh- I can't tell God where, where he can be and can't be. 
 
Laurence (50+/high-low/Quaker), while cautious about describing his experiences as leading to 
any kind of spiritual awakening, retrospectively sees his altered moods as having elements of 
spiritual crisis and spirituality as the key to recovery. He also sees his high or low moods as 
potentially indicative of the need for spiritual change.   
 
Laurence: But it's- it-it-it it's comfortable for me to put that interpretation [of 
spiritual crisis] on it retrospectively… I'm definitely in tune with the idea, now. 
And, I would say, that these days, if I do experience any kind of signs of low or 
high mood I will start to look at my beliefs and how I put them into practice. 
The way my spirituality influences the way I live in the world.  
 
Nicholas (20+/high-low/Roman Catholic) describes intense experiences of high and low moods 
and God-given experiences of life-changing synchronicity, with the synchronicity and related 
euphoria often following a time of low or troubled moods.  
 
Nicholas: To describe it is difficult. It's more that- usually I've been in some 
sort of state of anxiety, or state of trying to understand what's going on, in my 
life, or in- or something which is, which I'm involved in. And then pulling 
through that, has resulted in, you know, realisation moments, or, or- You 
know, that's when I do feel this kind of euphoria, or-or-or- Yeah, things 
clicking into place, that sort of experience. 
 
Matthias (30+/low/Anglo-Catholic) views his experience of altered moods as a source of 
growth, turning things upside down and changing how he thought about faith. He visualises his 
low mood as a necessary chrysalis-like process with God present but invisible throughout. God 
is imagined as behind a wall, with religious practices offering a glimpse of light through cracks 
in the wall.  
 
Matthias: I s’pose I have thought of it, and have discussed it with other 
people as potentially being... Not something that was caused by God, but as 
part of a process that might have needed to happen in order for me to start 
thinking about other things, potentially. Or, to move me on in some way.  





Rashmi (20+/schizoaffective disorder/Roman Catholic) sees an unknown purpose in her 
ongoing altered moods, finding personal and spiritual value in suffering. She believes that God 
could heal her, but since her moods persist she believes God must have a reason for her 
ongoing experiences. She suggests that only God ultimately knows what is happening 
(spiritually) in altered moods, and so it is important to make sense of the experience in a 
positive way.   Making meaning of suffering is one way to live with the mystery.  
 
Rashmi: God wants me to be this way for a certain reason and I might not be 
privy to that reason at the moment or ever, but for some reason this is how 
I'm meant to be. And this is how my life is meant to look. And so I don't think 
it's something- so I'm not- I'm sure God could cure it, or, or heal me if he 
wanted to, but I don't personally feel at this moment that that's what meant 
to be happening.  
 
Steve (20+/depression-anxiety/Roman Catholic) is unable to answer the question of extreme 
suffering, but feels that Catholicism is able to talk positively about suffering, unlike his 
evangelical upbringing where suffering was hidden. Learning from the book of Job, he sees 
pain as a potential source of spiritual growth both for the person in pain and others around 
them. 
 
Steve: So, although I had a horrible time, my depression, my anxiety, my 
anger, my sadness, completely changes the way I understand the world. My 
sexuality changes how I define and see the world. And so I think the church is 
able to talk about suffering in a positive way. Without it brushing it aside.  
 
Caleb (50+/ bipolar-BPD-PTSD/Charismatic Evangelical) also talks in quite some depth about 
having meaning and purpose despite great mental distress, but offers a somewhat different 
perspective. He strongly believes that he has been designed by God for greatness, and that he 
has been given a dream by God which he must pursue. He offers the phrase ‘a can-do life, not 
a make-do life’ to summarise his approach. Caleb intentionally chooses positive labels (such as 
successful or great) to describe himself, even if those things do not seem apparent to him at 
the moment. These positive labels stand in contrast to both the labels he feels internally and 
the labels he has been given by others. From this perspective suffering is rejected as 
meaningful or relevant, except in so far as it is a challenge to overcome. He does, however, 
offer the Hebrew Bible story of Joseph as a model of his approach. Since Joseph had to pass 
through suffering to achieve the greatness promised to him by God, this implies that a kind of 
meaning may be found in suffering, but that it is not seen as the opportunity for spiritual 




growth as in the potentially transformative accounts. Rather, the aim is to endure and 
overcome the suffering in order to reach a place of blessing. As a representative of prosperity 
theology,104 this perspective is in some ways an outlier among the interviews. Yet it still 
follows the same pattern of suffering followed by transformation. 
 
Caleb: You know, that you were designed for purpose. That you were 
designed to be a history maker. That you were designed for seeds of 
greatness, that, God never designed you or gave you breath to live a… make-
do life or a get-by life. He wants you to live a can-do life - I can do this, I can 
do that. I can do all things through Christ who strengthens me. 
 
These various potentially transformative accounts are tied together by the idea of growth and 
resurrection through (or following) suffering. The participants either identify as Christian or are 
working within a Christian worldview, and the accounts they offer are not about spiritual 
growth in the abstract. They are particular to their lived context, drawing on theological 
concepts and themes. Their focus is on the common experience of human suffering, seen in a 
theological context.  
 
4.3.2.5 Rejection of spiritual interpretations 
 
Having outlined a taxonomy of participants’ interpretations of altered moods, it is important to 
note that some participants105 reject all spiritualised accounts. These participants view 
spiritualised interpretations as incorrect, implausible, or incompatible with common sense or 
science. Other participants106 also reject, on the surface, spiritualised interpretations. 
However, what they are rejecting is individualised spiritual interpretations - their objections 
are grounded in a different interpretation of Christian texts and teaching. For example, biblical 
references to the Satan or demons are taken to be symbolic language, a pre-medical way of 
explaining observable altered moods. These participants emphasise the responsible use of 
religious language, rather than creating a kind of spiritualised psychology. 
 
Fiona: …things like the Gerasene demoniac [Mark 5:1-20] and- that kind of 
 
104 Sometimes called ‘health and wealth’ theology, the idea that salvation includes freedom 
from all kinds of poverty (including financial) and sickness (Livingstone, 2014).    
105 Quentin (60+/depression/Methodist), James (30+/depression/Charismatic Evangelical 
Anglican), Orla (50+/depression/Roman Catholic). 
106 Fiona (30+/depression-anxiety/Anglo-Catholic), Kieran (30+/bipolar/Roman Catholic), 
Nicholas (20+/high-low/Roman Catholic). 




stuff, you know, people who are possessed… you know, th- that there was a 
very limited understanding of y'know, medicine, and so therefore anything 
that went wrong was probably down to some kind of demonic possession 
because how else would you explain it?  
 
Isaac: Because they're almo- a lot of them are a bit, almost a bit sort of like a 
pseudo psychology, it's like somebody's read some, some books about mental 
illness and then tried to kind of put a- and-and concepts, like, you know, that 
you can pass down genetic traits and so it's sort of tried to kind of put a 
spiritual sort of spin on it, in that way. 
 
Kieran: No. I mean, I've always had the- been in the kind of way of reading for 
example, the Gospels, that would tend to see the language of the demonic as 
either symbolic, or as a- another way of talking about what we'd call mental 
illness. But not, not invested with any, like, ontological significance.  
 
Rather than treating altered moods as an unusual case indicating an individual problem, these 
participants place altered moods within the broader sweep of creation history. Nicholas 
(20+/high-low/Roman Catholic), for example, describes altered moods as part of sacred life 
and part of God’s creation, while Kieran describes them as part of what’s gone wrong with the 
world and not related to anything about him in particular. 
 
Kieran: But it- it's nothing to do with me as an individual, it's not li- neither a 
punishment, nor a reward, nor a test, nor- it's just one of those things. 
 
4.3.3 Labelling mood experiences 
 
4.3.3.1 Empowered or liberated by labels 
 
In this respect the study participants are representative of the diverse positions people may 
take to the naming of mood experiences. Some participants emphatically rejected medical 
diagnoses, some hesitated to name their own mood experiences in biomedical terms while not 
entirely rejecting the concepts; others described their diagnosis as broadly helpful, some 
found it personally empowering.  
 
Some participants,107 from across the range of Christian traditions, had a broadly positive 
 
107 Amy (30+/depression-anxiety/Anglican), Chris (30+/cyclothymia/Pentecostal), Helen 
(40+/depression-anxiety/Anglican), Kieran (30+/bipolar/Roman Catholic), James 
(30+/depression/Charismatic Evangelical Anglican), Rashmi (20+/schizoaffective 
disorder/Roman Catholic). 




attitude towards mood labels, finding the biomedical diagnosis of their altered moods to be 
empowering or liberating. Labels are considered to give a common language which allows 
people to articulate and share experiences, learn from each other, and also access treatment 
or support. Naming a distressing and often frightening experience of altered moods is seen as 
a way to fit individual experiences into a framework, which reduces fear of the unknown and 
helps people to articulate and understand their experiences. This is a kind of process of 
validation which gives meaning and shape to their experiences and restores a sense of control 
as people realise it’s not ‘just them’. Helen, for example, describes the process as empowering, 
suggesting that labelling the experience allows her to own it, and owning a problem helps to 
solve it, while Chris calls diagnosis a ‘light-bulb moment’. Labels are also a way of externalising 
the experience – the altered moods are not an inherent part of the person.  
 
Helen:  I do think this term [depression] is quite new, but it's a very 
empowering term, it's, it- you know, why sh- why should we not put a label 
on it. Y'know, you can't put a label on everything but sometimes it can be 
quite empowering, to say actually, this is how I'm feeling.  
 
Rashmi: So for me, having a medical context to it has been super helpful. 
Really liberating, and really empowering. Just having that knowledge of 
what's going on, and what might be happening to me, 
 
Participants in this group also identify potential dangers with the use of labels, such as losing 
sight of the individuality of people’s experiences, the potential for stigma, the power 
imbalance between medical professionals and service users, and the fact that some labels do 
not lead to effective treatment.  
 
4.3.3.2 Questioning the label 
 
Some participants108 accept biomedical labels as useful and reasonably accurate descriptions 
of their experience, but have concerns about what it means to receive these labels and 
whether the label can adequately capture the complexity of altered moods. Participants do 
not reject the labels, but find it hard to label their own experiences or perceive that other 
people find the labels more helpful than they do. They also worry about the interaction 
between the label and the person’s identity, feeling that labels may harm the person by 
 
108 Belinda (50+/depression/Methodist), Isaac (30+/dysthymia/Charismatic Evangelical), 
Nicholas (20+/high-low/Roman Catholic), Quentin (60+/depression/Methodist), Steve 
(20+/depression-anxiety/Roman Catholic). 




attracting stigma, denying the possibility of growth and change, or being valued 
inappropriately. For example, Isaac acknowledges that the biomedical label seems to fit his 
experience, although he questions the lack of objective diagnostic tests. At the same time he 
feels defined by the label and sees it as a potentially unchangeable statement about who he is.  
 
Isaac: So yeah, it was kind of like a lot of the things about it seemed to make 
sense, but then also I didn't like the idea that that was some sort of condition 
that meant like that's who I- you know, that's just kind of who I was. 
 
Nicholas: I don't really have strong objections [to medical labels]. Other than 
that labels can- it can be bad in the end like- cause I believe that everyone is- 
you know, like human life is you know really-it's just sacred and valuable and 
sometimes when the label that you are a certain, you know you've got some 
sort of mental illness, or a syndrome or something of that-you know usually 
it's helpful, but occasionally it-it can be quite damning I guess, or it kind of 
sticks with-with someone. 
 
Using Nicholas’ language, it is likely that some labels are more sticky than others, based on 
different perceptions of those labels. For example, a label of schizophrenia is more stigmatised 
than a label of depression (Mann and Himelein, 2004), and the stigma associated with 
different diagnoses may be driven by different underlying perceptions (Krendl and Freeman, 
2019).109  
 
4.3.3.3 Resisting or rejecting the label 
 
Some participants110 contest the usefulness of biomedical labels, arguing against reducing 
complex and diverse clusters of symptoms to a single diagnosis. Labels are seen as inadequate 
and restrictive descriptions of complex experiences, which might be a valid reaction to difficult 
circumstances.  These participants have not found biomedical labels useful in dealing with 
their distress and have experienced stigma associated with certain labels, including within the 
medical profession. Most are uncomfortable with the culturally dominant emphasis on the 
biomedical model to describe mood experiences, and, as might be expected, there is 
 
109 Krendl and Freeman (2019) found that different mental health diagnoses differed in 
relation to social desirability and perceived controllability, i.e. the stigma associated with some 
conditions was related to a lack of social desirability, including the extent to which a diagnosis 
was perceived as threatening. In others it was related to perceptions that the experience is 
within the control of the individual. 
110 Gail (60+/high-low/former Jehovah’s Witness), Laurence (50+/high-low/Quaker), Orla 
(50+/depression/Roman Catholic), Paula (20+/anomalous/former Charismatic Evangelical). 




significant overlap with participants who also reject biomedical accounts. Orla is an exception 
to this – she accepts the biomedical model but has experienced medical labels as limitations 
and restrictions, describing them as becoming like millstones dragging people down. Caleb 
(50+/ bipolar-BPD-PTSD/Charismatic Evangelical) also appears to accept medical labels 
relatively uncritically, but speaks about claiming positive spiritual labels for himself, by 
choosing to believe that his life has meaning and that he is a success.  
 
Gail: it doesn't mean that the behaviours or symptoms you have aren't 
difficult or, you know- but particularly difficult at the time and that you 
become vulnerable because of them, but I contest any use of any label for 
those kind of incidents.  
 
Laurence: I personally reject all diagnostic labels, I, I am a public health 
postgraduate, I know about social determinants of health theory, I've looked 
into stigma, the more you label people, the more damage you seem to do. 
 
Participants who otherwise resist diagnostic labels may still recognise that diagnoses can have 
practical benefits, such as facilitating communication, accessing treatment and other kinds of 
support (including financial). They also recognise that other people have a different reaction to 
the labels. Paula, for example, found diagnosis helpful at the beginning for the same kinds of 
reasons outlined above, but not in the long-term. Despite unease with the biomedical 
framework Paula also succinctly highlighted a need for some kind of shared framework or 
language to describe altered moods:  
 
You can always go, “Oh yes but what is normal?”, and have that really crass 
cliched debate…but I think there's very much a point in which you know that 
you don't react to things the same way that other people do. 
 
4.4 Summary: Interpreting Altered Moods 
 
This chapter drew on participant’s responses to questions such as ‘could you say something 
about your mood experiences?’, ‘what did you think was going on?’, or ‘has that diagnosis 
been helpful to you?’ to develop an analysis of participants’ interpretations of altered moods. 
It primarily addressed the first research question: How do people with lived experience of 
Christianity interpret their experiences of altered moods? There is no single answer to that 
question; participants offered a range of interpretations and individual participants might hold 
more than one interpretation at the same time. However, the analysis identified three major 
clusters of concepts:  




• interpretations of altered moods arising from a chemical imbalance  
• medical labelling/diagnosis of mood experiences  
• and individual spiritualised interpretations.  
 
Participants took different positions in relation to each of those concepts, ranging from very 
positive/unqualified acceptance to very negative/rejection. The analysis also continued to 
highlight three themes that were identified in the previous chapter: a potential disconnect 
between lived experience and theory, identity-talk, and the concept of suffering.  
 
The potential disconnect may be between the lived experience of altered moods and Christian 
teaching or theology, but can also be the relationship between a lived diagnosis and a medical 
label or diagnosis. In particular, it raises the question of how to make sense of individual 
experiences when those experiences conflict with a sense of how the world ‘should’ be, i.e. 
the implicit or explicit theology of individuals and churches. For example, Isaac 
(30+/dysthymia/Charismatic Evangelical) describes the need to balance the idealised 
description of Christian life found in the popular book A Purpose-Driven Life, and the realities 
of people’s lived experiences: 
 
Isaac: And that somehow- yeah, that somehow there's a- there's a kind of a 
balancing factor between what, you know, what pe- what our purpose is and- 
in the sort of quite formulaic way… [the book] describes it, and what people's 
actual lived experience is. And somehow, how do those things, how are those 
things bridged?  
 
The qualitative design of this research does not, (and was not intended to), allow firm 
conclusions to be drawn about associations between demographic characteristics, Christian 
tradition, and experience. However, it seems that participants111 are slightly more likely to 
describe a disconnection between experience and theology when they are talking about 
Evangelical, Charismatic, or Pentecostal traditions.112 If ‘Christian’ is an important part of your 
identity, and what you understand of Christianity is at odds with your lived experience, there is 
 
111 Participants who referred to this kind of disconnect with theology are Belinda, Caleb, Chris, 
Emma, Gail, Isaac, Kieran, Orla, Paula, Quentin, Rashmi, Sam, Steve. In some cases they are 
talking about their own current or former Christian tradition, in other cases they encountered 
this disconnection more indirectly e.g. through a passing comment or knowing about someone 
else’s experiences. 
112 Although not exclusively. Orla and Quentin, for example, talks about a disconnect that they 
perceive between Catholic views of depression and suffering and their own experiences.  




a need to bridge that gap. Participants have done this in different ways – some by embracing a 
very biomedical approach to their moods, some by finding spiritual purpose in their mood 
experiences, and some by turning to a different expression of Christianity or spirituality. 
Notably, none of them have done so by embracing individualised spiritual accounts that view 
altered moods as related to evil spirits, poor spiritual health, or as a test from God. Regardless 
of tradition, participants rejected those spiritual explanations for their own altered moods, 
while sometimes accepting an individualised spiritual aspect to altered moods in certain 
circumstances. 113 There did, however, seem to be less of an individual spiritualised 
aetiological emphasis among the Roman Catholic participants, who offered instead spiritual 
accounts of altered moods as part of living in a fallen world. 
 
The participants’ rejection of spiritualised accounts are likely to be related to two particularly 
problematic aspects of those accounts – the blame (often but not necessarily) imputed to the 
person experiencing altered moods, and the ways in which communities or ministers of 
religion suggest that such situations can be resolved (e.g. deliverance ministry or more 
frequent/diligent religious practices).  It is hard not to conclude that evil spirit and spiritual 
symptom accounts, at least in the form in which they have been presented to or understood 
by participants, carry a real risk of harm. This is due to the outcomes of these accounts rather 
than the spiritual interpretations themselves. None of the participants accept these accounts 
as relevant to their own altered moods, none report finding them helpful when dealing with 
distress, and a number report being harmed by the ways in which the accounts are translated 
into practice. For those who do accept these accounts, (mainly those from a charismatic 
evangelical tradition who accept the reality of spiritual attack), perhaps a more pastorally 
responsible approach is suggested by Emma (40+/depression-anxiety/Anglican): 
 
Emma: I do actually believe in deliverance, and deliverance ministries… In 
connection with certain kind of afflictions. I don't believe that they have to 
necessarily be dramatically cast out in a kind of shake- shake it out of you 
session… Some people become very seriously mentally ill and it probably- I 
think it probably is appropriate to pray, pray for deliverance. Not necessarily 
in a sort of Pentecostal-charismatic… shouty sort of way.  
 
Identity-talk is most evident in the labelling section, with participants concerned about the 
effect that stigmatised medical labels might have on a person’s identity. Positive effects are 
 
113 This is in line with findings in Muslim communities (Dein and Illaiee, 2013). 




noted (e.g. feeling relief that I am ill not bad), but also potential harm associated with 
integrating a (negative) label into one’s self-identity. This is in line with social scientific 
research into labelling and identity theory, in which both perceived social stigma (what I think 
people think about me) and self-stigma (what I think about myself) are broadly associated with 
reduced mental wellbeing (Corrigan and Watson, 2002; Marcussen et al., 2019).114 It is also 
helpful to note here that some participants with what might be diagnosed as severe and 
enduring mental health problems – those with the ‘stickiest’ (most stigmatised) labels, did 
indicate that their diagnosis was a challenge to their identity. Caleb, for example, said that 
receiving a personality disorder diagnosis had been devastating, like gaining “a complete new 
identity” (quoted in full in section 3.3). 
 
The concept of suffering runs as a thread throughout the thesis, but surfacing more explicitly 
at certain points. It can be seen to surface to some extent in all the spiritualised 
interpretations, but especially in the potentially transformative interpretations. These 
interpretations, which consider that the suffering of mental distress could potentially serve as 
an opportunity for spiritual growth, are linked to broader questions such as the role of 
suffering in life and theodicy. These questions are further discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
Finally, it is striking that most, although not all, of the data considered in this chapter is highly 
individualistic. Altered moods are said to arise from the individual, not from society. Even in 
multifactorial accounts, non-biological factors are mentioned primarily in the context of the 
individual life course. Similarly, the spiritual accounts focus primarily on characteristics of the 
individual. For example, when sin is mentioned it is exclusively personal sin, not structural or 
corporate sin – the emphasis is on the individual sinning, not having been sinned against. It is 
possible that this individualistic focus results from the interview situation – an individual has 
been invited to give an account of their individual experiences. There is some inconsistent 
research evidence about the willingness of people to acknowledge structural determinants of 
health in a research situation; people may tend to emphasise narrative about individual agency 
and healthy lifestyle choices in an interview situation (Davidson et al., 2006; Putland et al., 
2011). It may also reflect the lack of ethnic diversity among the participants, since some 
research indicates that people from different ethnic backgrounds may interpret mental 
 
114 N.B. These studies typically report correlation not causation, that is, they are unable to 
conclude whether internalised stigma leads to poorer mental health, or if poorer mental 
health leads to increased perceptions of stigma. 




distress differently (Leavey et al., 2016).  
 
If, as Eiesland contends, “the act of naming someone or something grants the namer power 
over the named” (1994, p.25), then this chapter aimed to continue the redescription of altered 
moods by allowing participants to name their own experiences. In doing so it addressed the 
question of how participants interpret altered moods, highlighted the ways in which these 
interpretations contribute to some of the major themes that emerged throughout the 
research, and set the context for the more explicitly theological material that follows in later 
chapters. I turn now to that material, and to the second research question, ‘does the 














First floor: Imaging God 
5.1 Introduction to theme 
 
This chapter continues the redescription of the experience of altered moods by presenting the 
first part of the more explicitly115 theological material, specifically, the ways in which 
participants image God, and the relationship participants identify between those images and 
their mood experiences. In the previous chapter I discussed participants’ responses to the 
question “what are altered moods?”. Participants offered a range of interpretations for their 
altered mood experiences, focusing on the aetiology and nature of altered moods, Christian 
(spiritualised) interpretations of altered moods, and the process of naming experiences. Key 
variables that emerged through the discussion were attitudes towards the idea of a ‘chemical 
imbalance’, attitudes to spiritualised accounts of altered moods, and attitudes towards the 
medical labelling of experiences. In these accounts participants documented ways in which 
their mood experiences and their theology and Christian tradition had intersected. These 
individual and communal interpretations of altered moods provide a basis for the next two 
chapters, in which I turn to discussing the ways in which participants speak theologically about 
their own mood experiences. These experiences and the ways in which they are interpreted 
form the ground floor of the participants’ theological projects, providing a base layer and, to 
some extent, outer limits of what can be constructed theologically. If, for the sake of 
argument, altered moods were commonly interpreted as evidence of alien abduction resulting 
from the alien desire to examine the exemplary moral character of the abductee, then that 
would significantly alter the emphasis and parameters of the resulting theological reflection, 
compared to an interpretation in which mental distress results solely from a genetic mutation 
or an interpretation which views mental distress as a form of neurodiversity, or one in which 
 
115 I use the term ‘explicitly’ here, firstly because I consider the grounded theology 
methodology to be a theological methodology, and secondly because of my conviction, 
derived from the sociology of lived religion and practical/contextual theology, that theology 
cannot be strictly compartmentalised from others aspects of life. As discussed in section 
2.1.1.2, this kind of “worldly theology” (Scharen and Vigen, 2011, p.67) is not without 
controversy. However, I take the perspective that the use of qualitative methods within 
theology is a way of making “the bold claim that what non-academics think, live, know, 
practice, do, and experience matters in a fundamental (not merely illustrative) way” (Scharen 
and Vigen, 2011, p.67). 




mental distress is a reasonable response to an unreasonable society. More prosaically, the 
meanings that people attribute to their experiences, including the ways in which they reflect 
theologically about those experiences, are shaped by the interpretive tools and concepts to 
which they have access.  
 
The concept of epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007) can shed some light on the ways in which 
different interpretations of altered moods may interact. Epistemic injustice occurs when a 
member of a marginalised group is harmed in their capacity as a ‘knower’. In Fricker’s original 
concept, epistemic injustice may take the form of testimonial or hermeneutical injustice. 
Testimonial injustice occurs when someone’s testimony is discounted because of prejudice 
based on their identification with a stigmatised, marginalised, or non-dominant group. For 
example, in Western societies, someone’s account and interpretation of their depressed mood 
may be dismissed as implausible because they are a woman, because they are a person of 
colour, or because they are Muslim. In this particular case, their testimony about their mood 
experiences may even be dismissed as implausible precisely because of their mood 
experiences and/or diagnosis – i.e. the testimony of people who experience mental distress 
may be considered unreliable because of generalised stigma directed at those with mental 
health problems, or because of assumptions about the effects of mental distress (e.g. that it 
harms a person’s cognitive abilities). Hermeneutical injustice occurs when a gap in the 
collective interpretive resources used to understand certain experiences puts some people at a 
disadvantage. Fricker offers the example of women who experienced unwelcome sexual 
advances before the concept of sexual harassment was widespread. Those women may have 
lacked either the interpretive resources to understand their own experiences at all, or they 
may have been unable to communicate those experiences to others because of the lack of 
widespread knowledge of the concept of sexual harassment. Other authors, and later work by 
Fricker herself (2017),  have further clarified the concept and parameters of hermeneutical 
injustice in other situations, including those where there is hermeneutical dissent – i.e. when 
necessary hermeneutical interpretive resources are not entirely absent but are not available in 
the collective pool of shared concepts. For example, Goetze (2018) has discussed 6 forms of 
hermeneutical injustice, which vary depending on who (out of the subject, the subject’s own 
social group, other social groups, or the collective) has access to the relevant interpretive 
resources. These forms range from effacement, where no-one has the relevant resources, to 
obstruction, where everyone except the collective has the relevant resources.  
   
As I discussed in section 1.4 in relation to the experience of mental distress as a shared context 




for theological reflection, it is not straightforward to describe those who experience altered 
moods as a marginalised group. The diversity of experiences and lack of a shared identity 
makes it difficult to speak about collective or corporate interpretive resources, just as it is 
difficult to speak about the shared context that might give rise to a contextual theology of 
altered moods. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify situations where at least some of 
Goetze’s forms of hermeneutical injustice might potentially be experienced by participants. 
These injustices arise from their specific situation and interactions between the religious social 
group, the wider society, and their mood experiences. At the very least, the discussions of 
different types of injustice can help illuminate the complexities of hermeneutical negotiations 
that occur when people are part of a social group that has different interpretive resources to 
the collective group. For example, people’s testimony about God may be discounted by their 
church because they are known to have a diagnosed mental health problem. They may also 
find that they lack adequate interpretive resources to understand their experiences, if their 
faith community group holds to one fairly limited interpretation of mental distress. They may 
also find it difficult to communicate their experiences effectively if different groups hold 
significantly different interpretations of distress. Goetze, for example, outlines ‘exportation’ as 
a type of injustice that occurs when “the subject acquires interpretive tools from a social group 
other than any of her own, and attempts to communicate with people in her own social group 
who have not acquired those tools” (2018, p.83). In this case, Goetze suggests that the likely 
result is that the person leaves their own social group for a more supportive one; this well 
reflects participants’ reports of their reaction to groups that insist on demonic or sin 
interpretations of mental distress.   
 
Building on Chapter 4, (which analysed some of the interpretations of altered moods that 
participants had encountered), Chapters 5 and 6 examine theological interpretive resources 
which appear to be held in common by participants and which form the basis of the theology 
of altered moods outlined in the final chapter. Not all participants had reflected theologically 
on the interaction between their mood experiences and spiritual life, but those who offered 
reflections consistently highlighted two areas: the images or representations which people 
hold of God (and how those representations are linked to their mood experiences), and 
Christology, especially the suffering of Jesus. These two areas are closely intertwined and 
should be read as companion chapters. Reflecting this intertwined nature, in Chapter 7 the 
analysis from both chapters is brought into dialogue with disability theology. Chapters 3-6 
present data from participants who represent a wide range of Christian traditions. Presenting 
the dialogue separately in Chapter 7 aims to maintain a narrative focus in the two analysis 




chapters; acknowledging differences without attempting to account for, or dialogue with, 
every possible theological tradition represented by participants. Chapter 8 continues this 
process by engaging with theology that arises from specific Christian traditions (e.g. Lutheran); 
the intention is that it is my analysis which is brought into dialogue with the theology, rather 
than attempting to bring the interview data directly into dialogue with traditions that may not 
represent the participants’ own traditions. It should be noted, however, that the lived 
experience of religion is unlikely to be as clearly demarcated as the different theological 
traditions might imply; lived religion and ordinary theology is not static and people may 
‘borrow’ concepts and ideas they encounter from different traditions.116  
 
In this current chapter I discuss participants’ images of God. In section 3.3.2 I discussed my 
early observation that participants tended to describe God in ways that suggested stability and 
solidity in the face of the biographical disruption that can result from altered moods. For 
example, God was described as an anchor, or as a rock. In that context, the language used to 
describe God seems to be less about the conceptualisation of God per se, and more about the 
ways in which faith, and God, have functioned in the person’s over all biography. In other 
words, the emphasis is not so much on the ways in which God is a stabiliser, but rather on the 
stability which God has brought to that person’s identity and biography; the emphasis is on the 
effect on the person and the ways in which they have experienced the stability offered by God. 
This chapter switches the perspective to focus more specifically on the ways in which 
participants conceptualise God in Godself; the images that they hold of God.117  
 
Specifically, I argue that: 
 
• There is an interaction between participants’ images of God and their mood 
experiences, and that the experience of altered moods is perceived by participants 
as changing their predominant images of God 
• Participants image God as personal, present and pervasive, stressing “the nearer 
side of God” (Macquarrie, 1975, p.131). 
 
116 Literature from the sociology of lived religion suggests that people ‘merge horizons’ in their 
everyday religious thought (McGuire, 2008): “plurality and impurity do not lead to religious 
demise” (Ammerman, 2007, p.6). 
117 Unless otherwise specified, ‘image of God’ throughout this chapter should be taken as 
referring to the images that people hold of God, rather than the theological doctrine of imago 
Dei (although it may be related – see discussion in section 7.1).  




As this is qualitative research the claim is not that this is characteristic of every person who 
experiences altered moods, or even every participant in this research. Nevertheless, this 
analysis represents consistent trends in the data, which emerged spontaneously in early 
interviews and which can be observed in interviews with people from different Christian 
traditions and with different mood and life experiences.   
 
Representations of Jesus also emerged as significant to some participants, and these are 
discussed along with Christology and suffering in the next chapter. Although some participants 
linked their image of God with their image of Jesus, it proved helpful to separate them for 
analysis. This separation helped to steer the analysis and dialogue away from the complex 
theological area of divine im/passibility, and the question of whether God can be said to suffer 
in Godself.118 The reason for steering the analysis away from this significant question is simply 
that it is not one that participants raised during their interviews. Participants agreed that Jesus 
suffered, especially at the end of his earthly life. Many, although not all, participants found this 
suffering had meaning for their own experiences, while others took inspiration from 
alternative aspects of the life of Jesus. A number of participants suggested that Jesus’ 
experience of suffering meant that God understood human suffering ‘from the inside’. Some of 
those participants also offered confessional statements about Jesus being both God and 
human. It is, however, not possible to say from the data whether participants understood God 
in Godself to have suffered, and so the analysis of suffering that arises from this data is linked 
with the analysis of imaging Jesus, rather than imaging God.  
 
5.2 Description of data 
 
The first indication that images of God were significant to participants asked to narrate their 
lived experiences of altered moods arose in early interviews, during which a number of 
participants described God using metaphors related to stability and solidity and related those 
to their mood experiences. Participants also reported that their experience of altered moods 
had led to change in the images, language and metaphors that they found most meaningful as 
representations of God. These changes were perceived as part of the spiritual disruption 
 
118 Scrutton (2013) notes that contemporary Christian theology typically approaches the 
concept of divine passibility through the question “Can God suffer in Godself?”, which 
contrasts with the broader approach typical of philosophy of religion: “Is God subject to 
emotions?”  




described in Chapter 3 and therefore tended to be presented by participants as good 
outcomes from their mental distress.  
 
I therefore raised the theme of images of God in later interviews, by asking participants about 
their idea or image of God, how they would describe God, or what the word God means to 
them. I also asked whether they felt their mood experiences interacted with the ways in which 
they thought about faith or God. The data presented below is based primarily on 15 
interviews119 in which the representation of God was either discussed explicitly or can be 
gathered from answers to other questions, and to a lesser extent on three interviews120 in 




5.3.1 Interactions between image of God and mood experiences 
 
Participants from across the theological spectrum recognise relationships between their 
representations or images of God and their life experiences. This is not a case of the research 
process revealing something that had been hidden from view to the participants. Participants 
are self-reflective and readily identify factors (such as relationship with parents, theological 
education, temperament, or the experience of altered moods) that are in some way related to 
their images of God.  
 
Caleb (50+/ bipolar-BPD-PTSD/Charismatic Evangelical), for example, describes a complicated 
interplay between his significant relationships (with his father, his spouses, and his churches), 
his altered moods, and his image of God. He says his previous image was of a distant and aloof 
God, but he has worked hard to change that image to a God who is kind and loving. 
 
119 Belinda (50+/depression/Methodist), Caleb (50+/ bipolar-BPD-PTSD/Charismatic 
Evangelical), Chris (30+/cyclothymia/Pentecostal), Emma (40+/depression-anxiety/Anglican), 
Fiona (30+/depression-anxiety/Anglo-Catholic), Gail (60+/high-low/former Jehovah’s Witness), 
Helen (40+/depression-anxiety/Anglican), Isaac (30+/dysthymia/Charismatic Evangelical), 
James (30+/depression/Charismatic Evangelical Anglican), Kieran (30+/bipolar/Roman 
Catholic), Laurence (50+/high-low/Quaker), Nicholas (20+/high-low/Roman Catholic), Orla 
(50+/depression/Roman Catholic), Quentin (60+/depression/Methodist), Rashmi 
(20+/schizoaffective disorder/Roman Catholic). 
120 Amy (30+/depression-anxiety/Anglican), Diane (60+/depression-anxiety/Anglican) and 
Steve (20+/depression-anxiety/Roman Catholic). 




Nevertheless he finds it hard to maintain that image of God throughout his altered moods, 
being unable to understand why God appears to allow this ongoing trauma and mental 
distress. He also links his current feelings about God (such as fearing rejection or feeling 
abandoned) with his past history, particularly his abusive relationship with his father.  
 
Interviewer: At those times when you're having those feelings of despair, do 
you know how you feel about God at that point? 
 
Caleb: I used to feel very abandoned. Rejected. My biggest fear is that I will 
always be rejected. I was rejected as a child, as a baby by my father…. So, 
when people, ministers in church would preach and say God is our heavenly 
father and he loves us, then I would, that would be something I just fail to 
relate to…. 
I think, my idea of God has changed. And that I once saw him as aloof, 
dictatorial, uninvolved, distant. But now I don't think he's that, any of those 
things. Now I believe he's merciful, I believe he's kind, loving, patient. 
 
Similarly, Isaac (30+/dysthymia/Charismatic Evangelical) describes his image of God as having 
dual aspects – positive and negative – which are strongly related to his mood experiences. The 
negative image is stronger when his mood is low, and vice versa. Isaac highlights the emotional 
aspect to God images – he intellectually believes in the positive image of God but the negative 
image is sustained by his altered moods and early experiences of high expectations. Isaac has 
to manage these differences in his feelings and intellectual beliefs about reality and God.  
 
Isaac: So- if I feel quite negative about, sort of the world, and my life and 
things around me then I think it does have an impact on how I- how I see 
God… And because I think it's almost like this sort of duelling concept of God 
in my mind… the- maybe more negative ideas of God seem more true, even 
though intellectually I could know that they're not… 
 
Participants do not simply describe the ways in which their mood experiences and God images 
are associated with each other (such as both being related to early traumatic experiences, or 
finding images of stability reassuring when life feels insecure). Some, although not all, of these 
participants explicitly acknowledge ways in which their mood experiences have led to changes 
in their God images, with the lived experience becoming a resource for theological reflection. 
 
Belinda (50+/depression/Methodist), for example, links her experience of depression to 
developments in her image of God, explicitly saying that her view of God has been changed by 
her life experiences.  





Emma reflects that a challenge to her image of God was a significant feature of her severe 
depression, and that the ‘breaking down’ she experienced was paralleled by a breaking down 
of her image of God. In response to the question, “Could you describe your image of God now? 
Is it changed?”, she said: 
 
Emma: God's a creator for me… That's the most helpful thing for me. Because 
creation involves destruction as well. And I think that makes a lot of sense in 
my own life, in terms of what has broken down. I think before, God was about 
sanity and holding it all together, and that would be me holding it all 
together… I'd always had to hold myself together. That, I'd never had anyone 
to help me, I never had the support… For me the big thing has been that I 
don't have to contain myself and I don't have to contain God either. So I don't 
have to hold myself together. I don't have to be held together, in the same 
way that I had to hold myself together. So I can be broken, and God can be 
broken too. 
 
Sam (50+/depression-anxiety/Anglican) also talks explicitly about changing – deconstructing – 
her previous damaging image of God, saying it is a slow and arduous process, like turning an oil 
tanker. She describes the process as demolishing an image of God as an angry and rejecting 
tyrant, and reconstructing an image of God as a loving presence, who is ‘in the pit’ alongside 
her. Her original God image came from a particular evangelical church tradition and to some 
extent her family relationships; her new God image was prompted by involvement in a 
different, Anglo Catholic, church tradition. While she sees the new image as healthier and 
more mature, she has had to negotiate what she sees as a contradiction between the holiness 
and love of God. She also finds that the image of God as presence leaves her wishing for some 
more action from God, rather than just a sense of accompaniment. 
 
Sam: But, you know, I- I had to demolish all this stuff about God being a 
tyrant, and what have you. Cos- This clergyman, I'm still in contact with him 
now, he's retired but- And he said, ‘oh no, God is love’, you know, and- You 
could see it in him. If you know what I mean. What- what that meant. So, I've 
been trying to concentrate more on that. But it's rather like turning an oil 
tanker round!  
 
Laurence (50+/high-low/Quaker) asserts that his current image of God is very different to the 
Christian image that he was educated to believe as a child and which he rejected along with 
Christianity as a whole. Laurence associates his old, Christian, image of God with the beginning 
of his mental distress; he developed this new image of God as part of the process of re-
examining his beliefs and spirituality, initially through attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous 




meetings, where a concept of spirituality was assumed in the 12 steps. Exploring spirituality 
allowed him to address the root cause of his mental distress, which was to do with a lack of 
confidence and being uncertain about his place in the world.  
 
Laurence: But- but, to me, I mean in some ways I kind of regret the fact that 
some of my early experiences with Christianity led me to rejecting it. But I 
have to be very grateful for the fact that my later experiences have led me to 
examine it in what I have to regard as a much more practical way, for me, of 
coming to terms with who I am and my place in the world, and my 
relationship with- with others… 
But I-I always try and make it very plain when I discuss God that God is not- 
my concept of God is not the concept that I was educated to believe… You 
know, this is not the concept that I was brought up with in childhood. 
 
Interviewer: …have [your mood experiences and spirituality] changed each 
other? Has one had an effect on the other? 
Laurence: I would hope so, yeah. Cos-Cos I- I do believe that, that starting to 
address this whole spirituality to me was, was key to being able to live my life 
the way I wanted to. And living the life the way I want to is without high or 
low moods. 
 
Like Laurence, Quentin (60+/depression/Methodist) also describes a change in his image of 
God, which he too sees as a shift away from traditional Christian ways of characterising God, 
although it is notable that his description bears a striking similarity to Kieran’s 
(30+/bipolar/Roman Catholic) and traditional Thomist accounts. He describes this shift as a 
type of coping mechanism, with the new characterisation arising as a way through his altered 
moods, which are related to a sense of discomfort and conflict with much of Christianity. 
 
Quentin: What God means to me is, is being. Not a being. It is being, it is that 
which was at the heart of creation. That which gave us- that which gave us life 
and created us… It took me a long time to get there [to this understanding of 
God]. And I- and I- And it's relating that to, it's relating that to where God is 
in, in the church and things. That becomes the- that tension, the elastic's 
getting very tight… 
 
Interviewer: Do you feel as though your mood experiences have contributed 
to this new characterisation of God?  
 
Quentin: … [I]f I think about it logically, the way I feel, and the way I think has 
led me to find a way which I can- a way that works for me. It's not as simple 
as being a coping mechanism, but it-it's- it comes out of that sort of thing... So 
I think… I think if I thought about it long enough, the answer would be clear, 
“Yes”. 
 




5.3.2 Images of God: Personal, present and pervasive 
 
Participants offer a range of images of God with differing levels of detail. Some offer visual 
images, while others suggest characteristics of God, or theological categories. In response to a 
question such as, “If you had to describe God then/now, what would you say? What does the 
word God mean to you?”, participants gave answers such as: 
 
Amy: God is very much love and it's about those relationships. And grace and 
mercy. So second chances. 
 
Gail: [My image used to be]…an all-powerful being… all-loving… there's that 
thing, you know, you go to bed, you lie down, and that you're in someone's 
care. 
 
Helen: Comforting. Comfortable... Warm. There…. Present. 
 
Kieran: The- the reason why there is something rather nothing at all… You 
know, that which underlies and gives- gives being to the whole world. 
 
Rashmi: I think my overwhelming sense of God is that he is love, and that he 
has a sense of humour that isn't compatible with mine, that's my 
overwhelming sense of him… 
 
Some participants offered longer descriptions of their image of God. Emma (40+/depression-
anxiety/Anglican), for example, colourfully describes her former image of God as an ‘angry, 
violent, and unpredictable paranoid schizophrenic maniac’ – and likens this image to certain 
aspects of her parents. Through the spiritual growth that was prompted by, or interwoven 
with, her altered moods, her current image of God is quite different. She says that her image 
of God now embraces not understanding, that she does not feel the need to contain God, and 
that she sees God as ‘beyond gender’, ‘loving’, ‘a creator’ (with creation incorporating 
destruction). 
 
Isaac (30+/dysthymia/Charismatic Evangelical) described having two competing images of God 
– God who is nurturing, but also God who is an angry sports coach.  
 
Isaac: So yes, so the- the positive ones would be that sort of, sort of like 
compassionate loving affirming. Kind of like a nur- nurturing sort of, you 
know, like that sort of- that sort of side. And the negative side would be kind 
of angry, like kind of like a taskmaster, like a- but in a- in a, extremely like a- 
you know, like a really angry coach who like, he- you can't ever do enough 
you know you do like 50 push-ups, you gotta do another hundred, you know 




that sort of thing. And- and almost, yeah sort of like looking on people with 
with a kind of, like a, like disfavour? 
 
Rashmi (20+/schizoaffective disorder/Roman Catholic) offers a number of images of God, both 
personified and more diffuse, saying that it is hard to conceptualise God because God is 
outside time and space. She says that God is a loving father, a practical joker with a sense of 
humour that is not entirely compatible with hers. She also describes God as a numinous 
presence, as incomprehensible love in itself. These images are closely interwoven with her 
mood experiences. For example, the practical joker image relates to her sense that God knows 
things about her life that she does not know, such as the reason for her continued altered 
moods. The ways in which she understands God are also affected by powerful mystical 
experiences – she describes them as a ‘blossoming of understanding of the divine’ - in which 
some of her questions about God are answered. For example, she had been anxious about the 
second coming of Jesus, concerned that she would not be able to recognise him if it happened 
in her lifetime. Spiritual experiences reassured her that she would be able to recognise and 
follow Jesus. 
 
Rashmi: At the moment I'm inclined to think [heaven is] a place where there's 
no one else, just you and God. And you're just basking in each other's 
presence. And that presence is a kind of numinous light. It's not a physical 
presence of someone, it's not a person… I think- there's a lot of unknown 
things about God, because I think he's just so- because he's beyond this 
universe, like, he's- he exists outside time and space, so- I think it's so hard to 
conceptualise God… But yeah, I think my overwhelming sense of God is that 
he is love, and that he has a sense of humour that isn't compatible with mine 
 
Along with Kieran (30+/bipolar/Roman Catholic), Nicholas (20+/high-low/Roman Catholic) 
seems to have a stronger sense than some other participants that God images are 
metaphorical images rather than factual descriptions. He says he finds it hard to describe God, 
saying that he does not have a clear image of God. His description is of a pervasive presence, 
saying that God is in everything, in people, and in relationships and love. He suggests that the 
diverse images of God presented in biblical parables are profound ways to understand what 
God is like. He also talks about his image of God shifting depending on his own needs and 
experiences. For example, as a child he aligned himself with the suffering Christ, as a younger 
adult his image of God reflected a need for synchronicity when life felt chaotic, and his current 
image of God reflects a need to be connected to himself and the world around him.  
 
Nicholas: …my image of God actually has been shifting depending on what I 




most need to align myself with, if you know what I mean. So when I was 
younger… I was kind of aligning myself to the suffering of Christ. I kind of 
needed that at that time I guess, I kind of had that sort of need for that. Then, 
when those crazy kind of synchronicity sort of things happened, it was 
because I was letting things get out of hand, and it was kind of-that was kind 
of getting too- I was weighing myself too much on a certain way of life I guess, 
a way of living, and a kind of way of viewing things so that pulled me out of 
that. Now, I feel as if I-I-my image-my feeling of God, and thinking of my 
spirituality is more about- I have to kind of be more connected to myself and, 
to be able to do something more in the long term rather than kind of fleeting 
sort of moments. So that means sort of- a daily sort of- I don't know actually, 
because I'm probably still working it out! 
 
Participants also identified a potential disconnect between people’s lived experiences and the 
classical Christian images of God; this was particularly in relation to God being described as a 
Father. Participants questioned how that image can be understood by people who have had 
difficult or absent relationships with male parental figures, and were divided as to whether the 
image or the person needed to change. For example, Belinda (50+/depression/Methodist) and 
Emma described developing new images of God, Steve (20+/depression-anxiety/Roman 
Catholic) values the parental image he found in Mary and Joseph as well as God, while Caleb 
(50+/ bipolar-BPD-PTSD/Charismatic Evangelical) accepted ‘Father God’ as a fundamental 
image that he needed to accept through continuously working to overcome the effects of a 
traumatic relationship with his biological father.  
 
Related to this disconnect, some participants recognise the diversity of God images that might 
be held even within one religious community. Quentin (60+/depression/Methodist) speaks 
about the difference he feels there is between his image of God and that which he observes in 
the church: 
 
Because you've got- yes you can have an abstract- it depends how you view 
your God. I mean some people will have God very close to them, you know, 
and have God there walking beside them every day. I've got it internalised in 
Christ within me. 
 
Orla’s (50+/depression/Roman Catholic) description of her image of God makes considerable 
reference to what she describes as mainstream or traditional Roman Catholic God images, but 
she presents her own concept of God as having been formed in opposition to what she 
believes to be traditional Catholic teaching. For example, she says that she challenges the idea 




of God as parent, or of having gender.121 This aspect of Orla’s account highlights the ways in 
which these narratives are subjective accounts of a lived experience, and the ways in which 
tradition may be received and interpreted by individuals or communities. Orla’s way of 
expressing this is, “And I guess I'm a hypocrite, cos in the things that it doesn't suit me like 
abortion, like same-sex relationships, I've just gone, do you know what? I don't agree with 
that, I'm just- ‘That's it’.” It also highlights the need to research ordinary theology, rather than 
solely the inherited or academic theological tradition, since these things may well differ and 
people’s views on what the inherited tradition teaches may not fully match the ‘official’ 
version. For example, although the Catechism of the Catholic Church does use male pronouns 
for God and refers to God as Father, it also says that “[God] is neither man nor woman: he is 
God” (CCC, 1997, para. 239). At the same time as feeling herself in opposition to Catholic 
teaching Orla also describes God as the reason the Universe exists, and refers to more 
traditional images of God, for example noting that she uses male pronouns for God and that 
she finds comfort from God and wishes God would explain things.  
 
Orla also highlights the similarities she sees between different religions, and considers that 
God might be an internal sense of connection or belief that is held in common with others, 
rather than a separate or objective entity.  
 
Orla: So it's that acceptance, even with a h- Humanists. It's that- they have 
removed the title God, but their beliefs are internal, are the same as a Jew or 
a Christian or a Muslim, or a Sikh or whatever. It's about doing good. And God 
is good, and God is love, and so when we have goodness and love, that 
therefore we have God. Whether God really exists, or is something internal. 
It's God. 
 
Orla’s emphasis here on the similarities between different faiths and worldviews further brings 
out both the potential differences between lived religion and a church’s theological tradition, 
and the ways in which lived experience may affect a person’s theology. Orla discusses 
elsewhere the fact that her spouse is Muslim and her reflections on the commonalities 
between faiths may not find expression in the official Catechism of the Church but have clearly 
developed through her relationships and close personal contact with another faith community.    
 
121 This discrepancy between a participant’s view of the orthodoxy of their beliefs and what 
theological tradition might consider orthodox occurs in other interviews too, notably Quentin’s 
representation of God which he sees as quite different to mainstream or orthodox Christianity 
but which bears similarity to Thomism. 





Looking across the interviews as a whole, participants emphasise the personal, present, and 
accessible nature of God, while also acknowledging that it is hard to conceptualise God in 
Godself. It is hard to summarise this in a single phrase, but Macquarrie’s idea of “the nearer 
side of God” comes close, i.e. “immanence, humility, accessibility, openness and love” 
(Macquarrie, 1975, p.131). It is not possible to say within the boundaries of this qualitative 
research whether this tendency is more characteristic of those who experience altered moods 
when compared with those without such experiences. However, as detailed above, 
participants themselves do identify changes in their images of God, and associate those 
changes with their mood experiences. For example, Fiona (30+/depression-anxiety/Anglo-
Catholic) says that she finds more meaning, theologically, in the incarnation rather than the 
resurrection, identifying with the fragility of God incarnate rather than the triumphal 
resurrection. She images God as compassionate, and as both mother and father. She is 
uncertain to what extent this is related to her altered moods or if it just reflects her 
temperament, natural development, and theological education. 
 
As noted before, traditional theological categories may not adequately reflect the ordinary 
theology present in the interviews. For example, Christian theology traditionally speaks of God 
as omnipresent and omnipotent. Many of the images offered by participants emphasise the 
omnipresence of God, while few emphasise omnipotence, with most participants avoiding 
reference to the power of God. God who is present even in extreme distress takes precedence 
over God who is outside human experience. 
 
While most images emphasise the immanent characteristics of God (‘God with us’), some offer 
an image in which God is still accessible but which emphasises the ‘more-than-ness’ of God – 
these images hold together both the immanent and transcendent aspects of God. For 
example, when asked to describe God, Chris (30+/cyclothymia/Pentecostal) says that God 
defies definition; God is ‘literally everything’, present in all things and able to be experienced 
in all circumstances. When pushed for a description, Chris describes God as love, saying that 
God is fully love, and that anything else would not be God. Similarly, James’ 
(30+/depression/Charismatic Evangelical Anglican) God image is of a personal presence who is 
universal, amazing, caring, and ‘huge’ – in other words, superlative. “And he [God] was 
cleverer than me, as well as being everything elser than me.” For James, God is objectively 
present, regardless of human feelings or beliefs about God. 
 




Kieran (30+/bipolar/Roman Catholic), Laurence (50+/high-low/Quaker) and Quentin 
(60+/depression/Methodist) are exceptions to this trend for describing God as personal, 
present and pervasive.122 Kieran himself suggests that he has a Thomist understanding – that 
all human language, thought, and pictures are wholly inadequate when it comes to describing 
God. Kieran has a high level of theological and philosophical education. This is reflected in his 
described image of God; he says the word ‘God’ referring to that which means there is 
something rather than nothing, that which underlies and gives being to the whole world. This 
image can be a powerful one at times when he would prefer not to be alive, because God is 
underlying and holding up even him. Kieran himself suggests that this is a fairly transcendent 
view of God, and if he wants to picture God, it would be God incarnate as Jesus – God’s picture 
in God’s self. 
 
Kieran: You know, that which underlies and gives- gives being to the whole 
world, that- An-And therefore, to me, even when I least feel like it. Which I- 
Actually, I mean, I- Times when you'd rather not be alive, is actually quite a- 
quite a sort of, strong! You know, that God is holding everything up. But God 
is- for this sort o- God, as God, as opposed to God incarnate as Jesus, is, is 
beyond our ability to think, to picture - all our pictures are just that, and 
inadequate. But that, again, you know, God doesn't actually depend on my 
ability to feel something about God. God doesn't depend on... it- anything to 
do with me, God transcends me and my states.  
 
Laurence is currently a Quaker, but does not necessarily identify as Christian. While he is not 
sure of the existence of a deity or a higher power, he holds to certain spiritual principles (such 
as the AA tenet that 'a power greater than myself can restore me to sanity') and believes that 
something holds the universe together. He is willing to refer to this power as a deity or God for 
the purposes of conversation, but for himself is unsure what that means. He finds the idea that 
nature and God are indivisible (saying that in Quaker terms there is something of God in 
everyone) a useful concept for imaging God. 
 
Laurence: That there is something which holds the universe together, but I 
don't know what it is, and why would I? I am as a speck of dust in comparison 
with the rest of it. But I think one thing that I do take from maybe more, some 
of the more Christian way of understanding things is- and certainly from the 
Quaker way, is that even now, I am this kind of almost infinitesimally small 
part of, of an infinitely huge universe, in the eyes of whatever that deity is - 
and I suspect it doesn't have eyes, as such - I'm still important.  
 
122 Quentin’s image of God was discussed earlier in this chapter. 




5.4 Summary: Imaging God 
 
This chapter addressed the research question ‘Does the experience of altered moods change 
people’s theology?’ Drawing on interview data relating to participants’ images of God, it 
presents the case that participants’ God images interact with their mood experiences, and that 
in some cases the experience of altered moods is perceived by participants as changing their 
predominant images of God. Taken together, the analysis suggests that participants 
predominantly image God as personal, present and pervasive, stressing “the nearer side of 
God” (Macquarrie, 1975, p.131). 
 
Some participants offered alternative images. For these participants the most significant 
aspect of their God images did not seem to be that their own images had changed through 
interaction with lived mood experiences. Instead they emphasised the ways in which their own 
God images differed from the images that they took to be mainstream or traditional. This may 
be related to participants holding relatively stereotyped views of tradition, but also to 
participants wanting to resist what they perceive as the status quo and to their self-image. For 
Orla (50+/depression/Roman Catholic), Laurence (50+/high-low/Quaker) and Quentin 
(60+/depression/Methodist) this resistance to tradition seemed to be an important part of 
their narrative. They defined themselves, partially, in opposition to what they perceived as 
tradition. This is discussed again in Chapter 6 in relation to Christology, where Jesus is imaged 
as a rebel, as someone who stood against religious tradition, and as an example to follow. 
 
The analysis therefore highlights again a potential disconnect, certain kinds of identity-talk, 
and something of the complexity of those concepts. The disconnect this time is between 
participants’ lived experience (of both mood and religion) and Christian tradition as it relates 
to images of God.123 Certain images of God – God as Father, God as victorious or all powerful – 
are mentioned as problematic, or are de-emphasised. This analysis of God images and their 
relationship to altered moods is discussed further and brought into dialogue with insights from 
disability theology in Chapter 7.  That dialogue chapter is presented as a ‘mezzanine floor’ 
which links or sits in between Chapters 5 and 6. This imagery of the mezzanine is intended to 
convey the idea that the analysis and theological reflection of these two chapters are closely 
 
123 More precisely, tradition as it has been understood by participants. As discussed in relation 
to Orla, their understanding and experience may not be as nuanced as the tradition.  




related. The themes of these three chapters – imaging God, Christology, and the dialogue - are 
then carried forward into the chapter on mad theology. 





Second floor: Christology 
6.1 Introduction to theme 
 
In this chapter, (which should be read as a companion chapter to the previous one), I explore 
the second cluster of theological themes which emerged as important resources for 
participants seeking to reflect theologically on their experiences. The first cluster related to 
God in Godself, the second to God in the person of Jesus. The analysis explores this theme of 
Christology from two directions; images of Jesus and divine solidarity in suffering. Images of 
God in Godself and images of Jesus are therefore analysed and presented separately in this 
thesis, due to differences in the way that they were approached by participants. This 
separation should not be taken to imply anything about the participants’ trinitarian theology, 
since those participants who spoke about Christology seemed to accept the mainstream 
creedal and doctrinal formulation that Jesus was both fully God and fully human. However, the 
language of the interview was informal, and participants likely understood the word ‘God’ to 
refer to God in Godself, as distinct from God in the person of Jesus.   
 
Those participants who both identified as Christian at the time of the interview and discussed 
Jesus did not necessarily offer an explicit statement about the divinity of Jesus, but that 
traditional Christological position did seem to form the backdrop to their discussions (for 
example, participants spontaneously spoke about Jesus when asked a question about God). 
Traditional confessional statements about the nature of Jesus suggest that what we can say 
about Jesus we can also say about God, but without ‘confusion of [divine and human] 
natures’.124 So an emphasis on the (human) suffering of Jesus does not say anything about 
participants’ views on whether God (in Godself) suffers, and in fact participants do not discuss 
this question. The direction for the analysis is thus supported by both the data and theological 
tradition. Just as grounding the analysis in the data led the previous chapter away from 
engaging directly with theological debates about passibilism, in this chapter it also leads away 
from theological debates about atonement and soteriology. Participants find meaning in the 
suffering of Jesus and relate that to their own experiences, but that meaning is focused around 
 
124 From the Chalcedonian Formulation (451) which says the two natures are “without 
confusion, change, division, or separation” (Price and Gaddis, 2007, p.204). 




Jesus of Nazareth, who participants believe to also be Jesus the Christ, ‘suffering with’ rather 
than ‘suffering for’ them.125 These kinds of reflections on the suffering of Jesus are therefore 
Christological in nature, and touch on questions of theodicy - the problem of accounting for 
the existence of evil (and perhaps the particular form of suffering which we have labelled as 
mental distress), within a Christian tradition which assumes an omnipotent and 
omnibenevolent God.   
 
The ’problem of evil’ is a philosophical and theological question (see e.g. Tooley, 2019). 
Philosophically, it can be formulated as a logical problem (i.e. the existence of (some kinds of) 
evil means it is logically impossible for (some kinds) of God to exist), or as an evidential one 
(i.e. the existence of (some kinds of) evil makes it less likely that God exists). This is necessarily 
an extremely simplified summary of a long-standing and complex debate in philosophy. My 
rationale for providing such a limited discussion of the philosophical aspects of the problem of 
evil is that none of the participants formulated their own ‘problem of evil’ in this way. Rather, 
they assumed the existence of an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God, and the problem was 
formulated as a pastoral one – how to maintain one’s belief in God in the face of trauma – or 
acknowledged but reframed in terms of the presence of God in the midst of suffering. The 
modern conception of theodicy arose during the Enlightenment period,126 originally in the 
sense of justifying or defending God (whose existence was assumed), given the evidence of 
undeserved evil in the world. Over time both the emphasis and reach of Christian theodicies 
has changed. The problem of evil is no longer only discussed by academic philosophers and 
theologians, and the emphasis is not on justifying God but rather justifying having faith or 
belief in God. In a review of the history of Christian theodicies, Long suggests that: 
 
More recently, though, theodicy has come to have a somewhat different 
meaning, one that is less about putting God on trial and more about putting 
our faith to the test. In this newer sense… theodicy is about how believers can 
hold together important faith claims that seem, on the surface anyway, to be 
incompatible: that there is a God, that God is loving and just, that God is 
powerful, and that there is undeserved suffering in the world. Understood 
this way, theodicy is not about coming up with excuses for God's behavior in a 
world of evil but about how faith in a loving God is plausible, given what we 
 
125 This distinction between Jesus of Nazareth (the physical, earthly, Jesus) and Jesus the Christ 
(the eternal Jesus, as developed in later Christian thought) is consistent with academic 
theology but perhaps not common usage (Fredriksen, 2000; Bohache, 2008). 
126 The term itself was coined by the philosopher Leibniz (2005). 




know and experience about suffering (Long, 2014, Preface, para. 6).127 
 
It is in this latter sense that these interviews touch on questions of theodicy – with suffering 
(either related to mood experiences, or in general) identified as a challenge to faith or belief in 
God.   
 
Raising the question of theodicy also raises the related question of the relationship between 
suffering, pain, and evil. Conceptually, these three things are not quite the same, although 
colloquially they may be used more or less interchangeably. For example, Stump (2010, p.5) 
highlights certain situations where suffering occurs without pain (such as unexpected 
instantaneous death)128 and that some kinds of pain (e.g. chosen natural childbirth or athletics 
training) are usually considered to be suffering but not evil. Stump further argues that 
suffering is not evil in itself, because the process of suffering can lead to good outcomes, 
specifically, closer relationships with God and other people. She does note, however, that 
these good outcomes do not make suffering in itself any less horrific (she likens suffering to 
chemotherapy drugs) or imply that people should not seek to alleviate suffering wherever 
possible. Identifying broadly with a Thomist tradition, Stump suggests that suffering arises 
when human flourishing is frustrated (Stump, 2010; Stump, 2019). Swinton (2018c) similarly 
distinguishes between evil and suffering, suggesting that suffering is always tragic but not 
always evil. His definition of what makes suffering evil begins with some similarity to Stump’s, 
saying that, “It is forms of suffering that specifically impede the purpose of God for human 
beings that are truly evil… Evil is present in experiences of suffering, misery, and death that 
strip a person of the possibility of finding meaning and hope” (Swinton, 2018c, pp.55, 58). 
However, for Swinton, ‘purposes of God’ seem to have a narrower meaning than the human 
flourishing suggested by Stump.  While he acknowledges that events such as the Holocaust are 
evil in the sense that they are “a clear violation of human beings who are made in the image of 
God”, he emphasises that suffering, including that of genocides such as the Holocaust, is evil 
“because it draws people away from God” (Swinton, 2018c, pp.55–6). 
 
Some authors (e.g. Hall, 1986; Creamer, 2009; Vacek, 2015) take a different angle and suggest 
 
127 Exact page citation not possible due to lack of pagination in the e-book edition. This citation 
format follows the Leeds Harvard guidelines for this situation. 
128 Her examples here are not entirely convincing since psychological pain might well occur to 
other people as a result of the ‘pain-free’ death. Nevertheless, I take the point that it is 
possible to imagine situations where suffering, pain and evil are uncoupled.  




that some kinds of suffering,129 or at least vulnerability to suffering, are inherently part of 
creation, and therefore cannot be evil: 
 
[Although] Christians profess the presence and name creation as good, 
creation is not perfect, and suffering is to be expected. This "shadow side" of 
creation includes the "finite, limited, and vulnerable" realities of human life 
and assumes that "challenge, risk, and growth are part of creaturely existence 
as intended by God." Inherently, even if paradoxically, creation, including 
human existence, is simultaneously good yet imperfect and finite (Vacek, 
2015, p.163). 
 
In relation to this thesis, I do not think that participants used the terms suffering and evil in a 
precise theological or philosophical way. Participants are clear that altered moods are 
associated with suffering, and that the suffering of altered moods is bad, but the question of 
whether all suffering is a kind of evil is outside the scope of the material. In relation to 
theodicy, James (30+/depression/Charismatic Evangelical Anglican) makes this same point, 
saying, “that's a depth of theology that I don't try and wrestle with the tiny points of.” The 
theodicy concerns of participants are to do with suffering, not evil. They suggest that God 
allows suffering, but do not particularly offer explanations as to why. Seven participants do 
refer to ‘evil’ in their interviews, but the language of evil is primarily reserved for discussion of 
spirits, in relation to abuse or other kinds of intentional action, or without precision (e.g. 
something is the lesser of two evils). This use of language is in line with Swinton’s intuition that 
people more easily speak about moral evil rather than natural evil. Following Stump and 
Swinton’s usage, I therefore would hesitate to describe all suffering as evil, but have no 
hesitation in describing all suffering as undesirable. This includes suffering that arises from 
altered moods.  
 
The history of disability studies and disability theology, tied as it was to the disability rights 
movement, has tended to downplay the existence of suffering associated with impairment and 
disability. In reaction to the characterisation of disabled existence as full of suffering and to be 
pitied, authors have rightly pointed out that impairments are not inherently a source of 
suffering, and that much of the suffering that does occur has a social cause such as stigma or 
inaccessible environments. Nevertheless, later authors have also acknowledged a degree of 
suffering (such as chronic pain, conditions managed with invasive medical procedures, or 
deteriorating abilities) arising from physical impairment which has not always been recognised 
 
129 Including the suffering associated with disability and mental distress. 




by the social model and which cannot be alleviated by social changes (Newell, 2010; Fast, 
2016).130  
 
There is a potential disjunction here between the experience of a physical or learning disability 
and that of altered moods; certainly there is likely to be a disjunction between this experience 
of ‘mere difference’ (Barnes, 2016) and the current research participants, by virtue of the 
recruitment process which required participants to acknowledge disruption to their everyday 
life. Experiences that biomedicine might diagnose as mood disorders are, almost by definition, 
associated with mental distress and suffering. 131 Even the experience of being unusually high 
in mood does not, despite common expectations, always involve euphoria, and often has a 
serious impact on daily life, including employment, relationships, and finances.132 Given this 
background, it is perhaps not surprising that, unlike the broader field of disability theology, 
interviews that focused on participants’ mood experiences led to reflections on suffering. A 
further potential disjunction is related to the definition of disability. Can (or should) altered 
moods be classed as a disability? The legal answer (in the UK) is yes, if they have a substantial 
and long-term impact on activities of daily life, even if that impact fluctuates. It is likely, 
however, that at least some of the participants in this study would not meet the legal criteria. 
Although I did not ask specifically, it is also likely that some, or even most, of the participants 
would not consider themselves to be disabled and would see their experiences as much more 
closely aligned with the concept of illness rather than disability. For these reasons the 
participants’ experiences have more in common with chronic physical pain than stable mobility 
or sensory impairments. Vacek, for example, says this about the suffering associated with poor 
mental health: 
 
130 Endress also notes this conflict between the social model of disability and chronic pain: 
“..what if the redefinition of one's body as a "holy space" is not enough for those who have 
bodies in pain? What if, when the institutions and barriers which construct social disabilities 
pass away, the body still hurts?” (Endress, 2019, p.12). 
131 With the caveat that people, including one participant, who describe their mood 
experiences as a type of diversity might resist this characterisation. Even so, ‘mad positive’ 
accounts tend to retain suffering as a part of the experience. However in this case the suffering 
may not be viewed as an inherent part of the diversity, or may be thought to be outweighed 
by positive elements of the experience. 
132 The website of the UK charity Mind, for example, lists being irritable, agitated, unable to 
concentrate, and feeling out of control as potential feelings during high episodes, and provides 
the following (unattributed) illustrative quotation: “Everything is extremely bright and loud 
and everything inside my head is moving extremely fast. I'm irritated with everyone because 
no-one talks or does things as fast as I do. It's amazing but horrible at the same time...” (Mind, 
2021). Published memoirs also confirm this characterisation of bipolar (e.g. Jamison, 2015; 
Coleman, 2016). 





Suffering, though, proves deeper than frightening symptoms and diagnostic 
complexity. Because treatments are not always available or utilized, and 
because in many cases cures prove elusive, many who suffer face chronic 
distress… Suffering, including mental illness, disrupts a sense of the rightness 
of the created order and one's place within it; much suffering seems 
inexplicable. Mental illness can cast adrift those who suffer, in visible and 
invisible ways (Vacek, 2015, p.162). 
 
It is important to note at the outset of this chapter that participants offered diverse images of 
Jesus, responses to his suffering, and especially diverse accounts of the role of suffering in life.  
The temptation when writing a chapter such as this is to smooth out the differences, with the 
aim of creating what might feel to the author to be a stronger and more coherent line of 
argument. However, I believe that would have been a mistake in this case. At the simplest 
level, the commitment to grounding the analysis in the data requires an acknowledgement of 
diversity. But more than that, the diverse and scattered nature of the data has resonance with 
the experience of suffering itself, which does not feel coherent and is often not amenable to 
logic. It seems right that the experience of distress associated with altered moods should not 
be reduced to a single theoretical argument and this chapter therefore aims to identify trends 
in the data while also acknowledging areas of difference. Some of these differences may be 
related to denomination/tradition. For example, I, a central Anglican, had never encountered 
the idea of ‘offering up’ suffering (either generally or to reduce the suffering of souls in 
purgatory), which is mentioned by three of the Catholic participants.133 Similarly, Caleb’s (50+/ 
bipolar-BPD-PTSD/Charismatic Evangelical) perspective - suffering is something that is to be 
endured until the person achieves the blessings that God has promised to them – clearly has 
roots in prosperity theology (Livingstone, 2014; Bowler, 2018). 
 
The concept of suffering begins to come much more explicitly into view in Chapters 6-8. It is 
also important to note at the outset that discussions of the role of suffering in life, including 
those that see potential purpose and meaning in suffering, should not be read as implying that 
suffering is good in itself. Neither I nor the participants take this position. None of them, for 
example, suggested that they might stop medication or therapy in order to experience more 
 
133 Pope John Paul II wrote about this concept of redemptive suffering: “And so there should 
come together in spirit beneath the Cross on Calvary all suffering people who believe in Christ, 
and particularly those who suffer because of their faith in him who is the Crucified and Risen 
One, so that the offering of their sufferings may hasten the fulfilment of the prayer of the 
Saviour himself that all may be one” (John Paul II, 1984, para. 31). 




distress, because the distress in itself is a good thing (e.g. because the experience of distress 
expresses closeness to God or solidarity with Jesus’ suffering). The closest approach to this 
position occurs in the discussion about potentially transformative views of the role of suffering 
in life, where some participants consider whether their experience of altered moods might 
have been a type of spiritual awakening which could have been interrupted by the use of 
medication or therapy. Nevertheless, their perspectives seem to be that their experiences of 
suffering were potentially transformative (Scrutton, 2015b), rather than, for example, willed 
by God.  
 
6.2 Description of data 
 
During the initial stages of interview and data analysis I anticipated that one chapter on 
‘Imaging God’ would incorporate all of the participants’ images of the divine, regardless of 
which aspects of ‘the divine’ were discussed by participants. Early interviewees spontaneously 
discussed both God in Godself and Jesus in response to questions about their image of God, 
while no participants spoke at length about the Holy Spirit, Wisdom or other potential aspects 
of the divine. In later interviews I therefore asked specifically about both God in Godself and 
Jesus. It became apparent that participants had significantly different things to say about their 
images of God and Jesus and that these two concepts were embedded in different webs of 
meaning and led to different areas of theological reflection. Questions such as ‘how would you 
describe X?’ or ‘what does X mean to you?’ produced quite different answers, depending on 
whether X was replaced with God or Jesus. I therefore present the analysis of participants’ 
reflections on God in Godself and Jesus separately; God in Godself in Chapter 5 and Christology 
here.  
 
Fewer participants offer an image of Jesus than of God.134 This should not be taken as an 
indication of the relative importance of God/Jesus images to the participants in general, since 
the constant-comparative and semi-structured nature of the interview methodology meant 
that I only asked specifically about Jesus in later interviews. The fact that participants 
 
134 The participants who offer an image of Jesus are Belinda (50+/depression/Methodist), Chris 
(30+/cyclothymia/Pentecostal), Emma (40+/depression-anxiety/Anglican), James 
(30+/depression/Charismatic Evangelical Anglican), Kieran (30+/bipolar/Roman Catholic), Orla 
(50+/depression/Roman Catholic), and Rashmi (20+/schizoaffective disorder/Roman Catholic), 
and to a lesser extent Laurence (50+/high-low/Quaker) and Quentin 
(60+/depression/Methodist).  




spontaneously discussed Jesus when asked about their image of God might suggest that their 
Jesus image is more important to them, or just easier to articulate, while, alternatively, Helen 
(40+/depression-anxiety/Anglican) said that she rarely thought of Jesus. It might also have 
been related to other factors, such as the limitations of the one-off interview format. 
Participants might have talked more about God in Godself at another time, or if the question 
was phrased slightly differently. It is not possible to draw firm conclusions on this based on the 
data.  
 
Using the constant-comparative method meant I could ask specifically about these emerging 
areas of interest in later interviews; I also purposively sampled potential participants to 
increase the number of Roman Catholic interviewees, since participants from this tradition 
more frequently offered reflections on the role of suffering in life. The sections on finding 
solidarity in Jesus’ suffering therefore draws primarily on the subset of interviews in which 
participants offered reflections on this topic, and therefore also primarily (but not exclusively) 
on the interviews with Roman or Anglo- Catholic participants.135 In earlier interviews the topic 
was spontaneously introduced by participants, often in relation to answering the ‘problem of 
suffering’. In later interviews I introduced the topic myself, asking a question similar to “Some 
faith communities speak a lot about suffering. Have you got any thoughts about the role of 




6.3.1 Images of Jesus: understanding human vulnerability from the inside 
 
There are diverse links between the images of God and image of Jesus offered by participants 
– speaking theologically, between participants’ implicit doctrine of God and Christology. Some 
participants – Chris (30+/cyclothymia/Pentecostal), James (30+/depression/Charismatic 
Evangelical Anglican), Rashmi (20+/schizoaffective disorder/Roman Catholic), Kieran 
(30+/bipolar/Roman Catholic)  - offer or strongly imply the confessional statement that Jesus 
was both fully God and fully human. Jesus, however, is said to understand human experience 
 
135 The participants included in this are Caleb (Charismatic Evangelical), Emma (Anglican), 
Fiona (Anglo-Catholic), Matthias (Anglo-Catholic), Nicholas (Roman Catholic), Orla (Roman 
Catholic), Quentin (Methodist, formerly Roman Catholic), Rashmi (Roman Catholic) and Steve 
(Roman Catholic); some material is also drawn from the interviews with Chris (Pentecostal), 
Diane (Anglican), Helen (Anglican) and Gail (former Jehovah's Witness). 




‘from the inside’,136 meaning that these participants feel assured that God understands their 
mental distress.  For example, Chris describes Jesus as being uniquely able to understand 
human experiences. He also describes Jesus as different, being God as well as human: “[Jesus] 
was human, so he gets it. He understands. But what made him different, he was also God.”  
 
When asked about their image of God, some participants automatically speak about Jesus as 
well. Others do not offer an image of Jesus until asked specifically. The image of Jesus, 
however, is noticeably easier for participants to verbalise than the image of God. No one offers 
an image of the Holy Spirit and only Rashmi refers directly to the concept of the Trinity. Only 
Kieran refers to a non-adult image of Jesus: “Jesus as the child in his mother's arms is quite an 
important image actually, so vulnerable, dependent.” Three more of the Catholic participants 
(Fiona, Rashmi, Steve) refer to Mary/Our Lady as a very significant figure and important 
resource within their faith and experience. Steve, for example, links his experience of Mary to 
a religious experience he had at a time when he was intending suicide, while Rashmi’s spiritual 
experiences included hearing Mary: 
 
Steve: The reality means that there's someone there… Our Lady being 
fantastic. So I had a suicidal- twice, actually, but I had a religious experience 
just as I was about to commit suicide. First time. I don't really like to call it a 
miraculous intervention, th- the sort of critical part of my brain goes, ‘Don't 
be silly’.  I have a very ornate sort of olive wood rosary that just stays by my 
bed, in its little box. That's where it stays. Unless I'm using it. That's it. I was 
on the bridge, going to do what I was going to do, and for some reason I 
wanted to check my pocket, and my rosary was in my pocket. I can't explain 
why it's there. I don't want to say it magically appeared. Naturally I go, ‘Oh a 
bit much’. There will be some psychological explanation, about why I picked it 
up to feel comfortable, could be wrong - I'm open to being wrong. But that- 
the rosary suddenly clicked me into commonsense. Going, ‘What on earth you 
doing? This is silly’. I wasn't too far from the hospital, so I just- I was 
competent enough to get to hospital, where I just sat and prayed the rosary 
for an hour, sort of brought myself back down to- reality as it were.  
 
While participants describe Jesus in different ways, there is a trend towards offering the 
suffering and crucified Jesus as the most meaningful image, rather than, for example, images 
of the resurrected Jesus or ascended and victorious Christ. Some participants – Belinda 
(50+/depression/Methodist), Kieran (Roman Catholic), Emma (40+/depression-
anxiety/Anglican) - identify this trend as resulting directly from their mood experiences. Very 
 
136 Both while on earth and as the risen/ascended Jesus today. 




few participants spoke at all about the transcendence or triumphant power of God. Two of the 
participants who are Christian ministers explicitly indicated their preference for incarnational 
theology and human images of Christ, rather than triumphalist ones. 
 
Belinda, for example, identifies with, and relates to, the vulnerability and suffering of Christ on 
the cross and resists the idea of a ‘nice’ or ‘comfy comfy Jesus’. She says that her image of 
Jesus is built on her life experiences.  
 
Belinda: I think, I don't think I'd be alone in saying that having depression 
does make you very vulnerable and you very much relate to a vulnerable 
Christ. You know, so you relate to the cross really. Very much so… And see the 
power in vulnerability and the strength, you know, when we, when that really 
hits home, when you read in the Passion stories, who Jesus came to be and 
who he wasn't for some people. Very much so. 
 
For Emma (40+/depression-anxiety/Anglican) it felt imperative, during her severe depression, 
to know whether Jesus had felt emotion, i.e. had he felt fear and really suffered on the cross. 
She found herself strongly identifying with these experiences of Jesus, and perhaps the 
identification would have been lessened if he had not fully experienced those human 
emotions. Concluding that he had felt fear and suffered meant that she experienced a degree 
of comfort and solidarity – Jesus understood and was able to be with her in her suffering. 
 
Emma: I thought quite a lot about Jesus on the cross, actually. Because, and I 
remember, you know research is a terrible- it's a great thing, it's a terrible 
thing as well, you sort of go internet hunting, you know, this, that and the 
other- you know, to look, think and consider things, but-… I remember 
thinking, ‘Did Christ- was he terrified, did he feel fear? Did he doubt?’ And 
that whole thing, about Christ's doubt and did he, was he terrified. Cause I, I 
think fear and doubt were the two things that I could really identify with, 
more than anything else! (Laughs). So it became quite important that, if I was 
identifying myself with Christ, that I could actually know.  
 
Kieran (30+/bipolar/Roman Catholic) says that, visually, he finds the standard imagery of Jesus 
helpful, except for those presenting him as white.137 The images he suggests are the 
crucifixion, Jesus glorified but still with wounds, and Jesus as a child with his mother. He says 
that the point of these images is that Jesus was as we are (or will be), emphasising a solidarity 
 
137 With the implication that this is not an accurate representation of the ethnicity or skin tone 
of the historical Jesus. 




between our own lives and that of Jesus. He draws a link between his mood experiences and 
the way he understands the suffering and crucifixion of Jesus; having previously seen these 
kinds of images as associated with a particular understanding of salvation, the aspect of 
empathetic solidarity has become more significant. He speaks about it as shifting from being a 
‘Christmas Christian’ to valuing the imagery and spirituality of Holy Week and Easter. 
 
Laurence (50+/high-low/Quaker) is critical of what he considers to be traditional Christian 
beliefs about Jesus, but he too can identify with the suffering of Jesus. His image of God is 
influenced by the resonance he sees between Sufism, philosophy, Buddhism, Taoism, and the 
Quaker approach to Christianity, for example in relation to suffering in life. 
 
Laurence: We can't be happy all the time, but I think to me… part of that 
spirituality, and here I-I kind of borrow from some of the Eastern traditions – 
[is] acceptance… [M]y reading of- of the life and teachings of Jesus is that 
that's also a part of that, within that. There is pain in life. You know, to me 
the- the crucifixion, the suffering of Jesus, is very symbolic of that. And even 
though I struggle t-to take it in the way that the Bible literally describes it, I 
can take the symbolism to mean that there is- you know, some suffering is 
inevitable in life. 
 
Rashmi (20+/schizoaffective disorder/Roman Catholic) also says that she is drawn to Jesus’ 
Passion, but she also refers to the Trinity when describing God, suggesting that it can be 
helpful to think of different aspects of God. Speaking of Jesus, she is fascinated by his 
character, debating whether being fully God means that he was a fully perfect human. Similar 
to her image of God as a practical joker she highlights Jesus’ sense of humour and refers to him 
as ‘winding people up’ e.g. when telling parables and refusing to explain them.  
 
Rashmi… But I have found myself increasingly drawn to the idea of God- of 
Jesus in the garden of Gethsemane. Before he- before his crucifixion… 
…I think Jesus also has a good sense of humour. I think he likes winding 
people up… Like, you know, ‘Oh you'll understand this one day. But not now, 
I'm not gonna tell you now, I'm not gonna tell you now. You'll understand it 
one day’, kind of thing. But I think he's very down to earth, he is very- I think 
he's very forward-looking, for his time. 
 
Three participants offer images of Jesus that do not emphasise his suffering. Although coming 
from different Christian traditions, (charismatic evangelical Anglican and Roman Catholic, 
respectively), James and Orla offer a different type of characterisation of Jesus as a political 
revolutionary and hero who ultimately suffers the consequences of that way of living. James 




(30+/depression/Charismatic Evangelical Anglican) has a stronger image of Jesus than of God, 
finding him easier to visualise in a concrete way, and speaking at quite some length about the 
attractiveness of Jesus’ character and his almost physical presence. Jesus is described as a 
heroic figure who is on the side of the little guy - he is uncompromising and unconventional, 
noble and good, sometimes blunt or intentionally offensive but also gentle and 
compassionate. As well as speaking about Jesus being crucified ‘for being outrageous’, James 
offers the story of Jesus turning over the money lenders’ tables as an example of the kind of 
character he is. Jesus is described as everything James has always admired and aspired to be, 
as well as being loved by his non-religious family members for his human commitment to 
social justice and for his perceived embodiment of the ideals of socialism and anarchism.   
 
James: And he could be quite abrupt at times, and he wasn't always tactful. 
You know sometimes in his- when he was blunt he was extremely blunt. 
When he wanted to be offensive he was maximally offensive.… Y'know, they 
didn't kill him because he was nice to people, they killed him because he was 
absolutely outrageous. And, in a sense, if it weren't for who he actually was, 
he was incredibly arrogant. I mean, he wasn't, because he was God, but- You 
know, some of the things he says, they kind of ripped their clothes. It's just 
like, you're claiming to be God. He's like, ‘Yea, yep!’… And I always liked that. 
It's honesty, isn't it? 
 
Orla (50+/depression/Roman Catholic) starts her description of Jesus with the existence of the 
historical Jesus. She describes an alternative ‘religious right’ image of Jesus, with which she 
disagrees. Rather than discussing a change in her own image of God, she sees a conflict 
between her own image and what she perceives to be the dominant images around her. 
 
Orla: So, as- as I get older I get a bit conflicted about the use of the term 
Jesus. Because to me, what he meant growing up, and what other people 
want him to mean now, are at odds. They are talking about a different guy…. 
So, I think - long answer short - Christ is what you want him to be. You know, 
or what you're prepared to make him, but to me, to be a Christian is to be full 
of love. 
 
The image of Jesus that she grew up with was a revolutionary, political Jesus, one that led 
people to work for social justice.  
 
Orla: It was political Christianity, and, you know this is unfair and unjust, and 
you- ‘What you gonna do about it?’, kind of thing. So, Jesus to me was-was- 
resistance and rebellion. And about love, and making things right with the 
world, equalising it. 





Quentin (60+/depression/Methodist) also offers the idea of Jesus as a troublemaker. 
 
Interviewer: You don't feel any particular connection with it [Jesus’ suffering]? 
Quentin: …But- And tha- yes, I can see it's part of the humanity, because 
troublemakers- that's what happens to troublemakers, and all the rest of it.  
 
6.3.2 The Passion of Jesus: Solidarity in suffering 
 
The humanity and vulnerability of Jesus, especially in the events of the Passion, therefore 
emerges as a theme in these interviews. Participants look to the suffering Jesus and find there 
solidarity and a ‘friend for the journey’ of their own suffering.  
 
Emma (40+/depression-anxiety/Anglican) speaks imaginatively about experiencing spiritual 
distress and disruption as a result of her altered moods. She contrasts the theology that she 
had previously received from her church with the reality of her experiences, and finds the 
theology lacking in its response to suffering and lacking space for doubt, suggesting that 
Christian faith has been used to try and suppress reality. Through her theological wrestling she 
comes to a new place of stability, in which she is liberated from having to hold it all together, 
and finds life and holiness in her own brokenness. Much of her theological wrestling is centred 
around the question of whether God, in Christ, really suffered on the cross; her conclusion that 
Christ did suffer means she feels God genuinely understands her experiences. Moving away 
from the idea that God is responsible for everything, she brings together what she 
understands of Christian and Buddhist concepts of salvation and enlightenment to emphasise 
what she sees as a need for both in the experience of altered moods.  
 
Emma:  …it is that sort of thing about enlightenment and the kind of work 
that one does in that, and salvation y'kn- the idea of God kind of reaching 
down and rescuing us. Both of which are true, I mean I definitely would never 
throw out God reaching down and pulling us up from the pit, sort of thing. 
But I think with extreme depression or anxiety, I think that question becomes 
very pertinent because there's a lot of enlightenment that needs to happen. 
Not just the salvation bit! 138 
 
138 This view that the Christian concept of salvation does not incorporate what Emma 
understands by enlightenment could be challenged. For example, the Bible contains the 
Pauline injunction to “work out your own salvation with fear and trembling” (Philippians 2:12), 
which sounds similar to Emma’s description of enlightenment. 





Matthias (30+/low/Anglo-Catholic) describes his low mood changing how he thinks about 
suffering and the meaning of the crucifixion. There is a sense of solidarity with Christ who also 
suffered, and a new understanding of salvation and resurrection as coming back from 
absolutely nothing (as exemplified by the concept of the harrowing of hell). He highlights what 
it means ‘to take up your cross’ in Christian discipleship, and the Catholic idea of ‘offering up’ 
one’s suffering. In this sense, Matthias’ theology shifts to be centred around a new 
appreciation for the Christian doctrine of incarnation. 
 
Matthias: And that sense of being massively down, made me- It changed the 
way I thought about suffering and Christianity. And it really turned on my 
head my understanding of crucifixion, and- So, my, my dad is Irish… So, I had 
quite a big family background of Irish pious Roman Catholicism, and, quote, 
‘offering it up’. Which, I have always thought of as being a really horrible and 
weird thing to do. ‘Cause it's like saying, if you're suffering, [Irish accent] 'Ah, 
united with the offering of our Lord'! (Laughs) Thinking- That strikes me as a 
bit odd. But- And I still think it's slightly odd, in some ways. But, it changed my 
understanding of... what it would mean to take up your cross. 
 
Over his life Nicholas’ (20+/high-low/Roman Catholic) attitude to the role of suffering has 
changed. In childhood he felt an emotional connection with Christ’s suffering, and had a strong 
awareness of Christ suffering for him. He says that he understands that some strands of 
Roman Catholicism advocate suffering as a way to connect with Christ, but as an adult he has 
come to believe that this attitude is unhelpful. Instead he links the suffering of Christ with 
resurrection. Christ’s example is seen as a light at the end of the tunnel, an example in how to 
deal with terrible human suffering and an example of suffering leading to transformation.  
 
Nicholas: So, I've kind of moved away from that and-and more seen it as- that 
people who can go through- who do go through suffering in their lives, can 
see in that that Christ has gone through that as well. But that there is sort of 
light at the end of the tunnel, and that you know Christ went through you 
know resurrection, and, and it-and a great, you know positive outcome 
happened, you know out of all this… And, then I kind of, I definitely think that 
the- the archetype is there of-of-so it's kind of a Karl Jungian sort of style of 
thinking, where, where you can see in various traditions across the world and 
in various beliefs and various, you know, human experience basically, that 
going through a stage of suffering you can-you can pull through and, you 
become transformed. 
 
Rashmi (20+/schizoaffective disorder/Roman Catholic) suggests that suffering may be 
redemptive and also finds meaning in the idea of offering up her suffering for the souls in 




purgatory. She finds her experience of suffering validated in Catholicism and in the life of 
Jesus, which reassures her that God understands her suffering. Rashmi has a strong reaction to 
the Passion of Christ, being both fascinated and traumatised by it. The suffering of Christ gives 
her freedom from the expectation of happiness, and Jesus being unable to carry his cross gives 
her permission to be unable to cope. She is drawn to the image of Jesus in Gethsemane, and 
has asked God to allow her to be there with Jesus so that he would not be alone. She believes 
that some of her mental distress is associated with, in a spiritual way, accompanying Jesus in 
Gethsemane. The ways in which she understands God and Jesus are also affected by powerful 
spiritual experiences which she thinks may or may not be psychotic experiences – she 
describes them as a ‘blossoming of understanding of the divine’ - in which some of her 
questions about God are answered.  
 
Rashmi: I said to God- I said, ‘I want to- I feel really bad that Jesus is alone in 
the garden of Gethsemane and the disciples aren't watching. And that they're 
sleeping, and I feel really bad for Jesus’. So I said to God, ‘I want to be with 
Jesus, and I want him to know he's not alone this Lent. I want him to know 
he's not alone’. And I've kind of paid the price for that, in terms of my mood 
disorder. Because every Lent, I do tend to get very ill.  
 
Rashmi expresses her sense that Jesus is in solidarity with her suffering, but also a sense of the 
solidarity working in the opposite direction – she is in solidarity with Jesus in his suffering. This 
is, perhaps, reflective of Catholic devotional theology, which encourages not only solidarity 
with the suffering of Jesus but also with the lives (and suffering) of the saints. There is a 
sharing in the suffering (and merit) of the saints that encompasses the whole Church 
(Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments, 2001; United States 
Conference of Catholic Bishops, 2003). It also implies a sense in which her religion is both 
contributing, and giving sense, to her altered moods. 
 
Along with Rashmi, religious themes are a significant part of Gail’s (60+/high-low/former 
Jehovah’s Witness) altered mood experiences. At times she believed that she had religious 
powers and could use them to protect people. She also conflated the events of 9-11 with the 
Armageddon – end of the world – that her church had taught her to expect. At that time she 
identified with Jesus ‘tasting death’ (Hebrews 2:9) and felt ready to die - she was not upset by 
Armageddon or afraid of death. 
 
Gail: What I was thinking, you know, I was thinking of that scripture - Jesus 
tasted death for every man. And I was thinking, 'Yeah that's what I'm doing. 




I'm tasting death, now I'm ready to die. That's fine.' And I was calm. 
 
As an alternative perspective, two of the participants react strongly against any suggestion 
that they might connect with the suffering of Jesus. Orla (50+/depression/Roman Catholic) 
rejects the valorisation of self-sacrifice that she says she has observed within Irish 
Catholicism.139 She sees this tradition as placing an unhelpful emphasis on self-punishment 
and unnecessary sacrifice, thus increasing the amount of suffering in the world.  When asked 
about the role of suffering in life and any connection with God, she says that making a link 
between human suffering and that of Christ would be egotistical. Mental distress is simply 
something to be endured, and not something to be theologised. Quentin 
(60+/depression/Methodist) has a similar view of what he perceives to be Catholic tradition, 
i.e. punishing yourself or intentionally seeking suffering. He rejects the idea that suffering is 
good, although suffering can be the consequence of goodness. He can make no sense of 
Christ’s suffering, questioning the need for it and declaring himself revolted by the crucifixion. 
For Quentin, the crucified Christ is not a source of solidarity or comfort.  
 
Orla: No. I'm not, I'm not egotistical to that- (laughs). He suffered on the 
cross, and I've got depression! No, I don't. But I know from my background 
that's a big deal. It's a big deal politically, Irish politics is all about the 
sacrifice…. [There’s a group] I think it's called the Opus Dei, and… they are 
into kind of that self-flagellation. And they see that very much we must suffer 
to connect ourselves to Christ. No! Be a good person, that connects you to 
Christ, not inflicting physical pain on yourself. 
 
Quentin: The suffering of Christ. I- I have a great problem with the whole 
thing about Christ. You know, I just cannot- I just cannot find any sense, I- I 
can understand why he had to be this sort of sacrifice and salvation and all 
the rest of it, but why Christ had to go through that, why God the Father 
wanted God the son to do that it- I just cannot make any sense of it 
whatsoever. I find it- I find that very difficult theologically. It- you know. 
 
In these accounts participants express a particular resonance between their own mental 
 
139 Matthias, Nicholas, Orla and Quentin said that they had observed what they considered to 
be an unhealthy attitude towards suffering and self-sacrifice from Roman Catholics in previous 
generations – an attitude that they did not themselves share or fully understand. They 
referred to this as ‘advocating’ suffering (Nicholas), as sacrifice being a ‘really big deal’ (Orla), 
and as the idea that ‘suffering is good’ (Quentin). In the case of Irish Catholicism, (Matthias, 
Orla and Quentin had Irish heritage), the strength of these kinds of ideas (and stereotypes) 
may be related to the particular history of Irish Catholics, including colonialism, 
migration/diaspora and anti-Irish prejudice/discrimination, and the institutional church (and 
abuses) (Ó Corráin, 2018).  




distress and the suffering of Christ. In the suffering of mental distress, the humanity and 
vulnerability of the earthly Jesus becomes important in a new way. His suffering and crucifixion 
is important to participants not in the sense of atonement or salvation, but as evidence that 
God understands human distress. For some of the participants Christianity is encountered at 
an experiential and even visceral level as they struggle to make sense of their distress in the 
light of Christian theology.  
 
Although participants did not, in the main, discuss atonement or soteriology in relation to 
Jesus’ suffering and crucifixion, they did raise questions of theodicy. Traditional formulations 
of Christian theodicies are intended to address an assumed conflict between the existence of 
evil (often in the guise of innocent suffering) and an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God. 
When given the open opportunity to discuss their view of the role of suffering in life, some 
participants do raise this question. Their answers indicate an appreciation of the difficulty 
people may have in reconciling suffering and belief in God, and also a desire not to assign 
blame to God. Responsibility for suffering is assigned elsewhere, and the emphasis is on God 
or Jesus being present in the suffering. 
 
Diane (60+/depression-anxiety/Anglican), for example, suggests that human choices are 
responsible for most suffering, and does not feel the need to blame God for her own suffering. 
Helen (40+/depression-anxiety/Anglican) similarly absolves God from responsibility and sees 
God present in, rather than to blame for, tragedy. Chris (30+/cyclothymia/Pentecostal) reports 
that he is frequently asked how he can believe in God despite the traumatic experiences of his 
life, but that he does not blame God for those events and instead imagines Jesus sitting beside 
people. James (30+/depression/Charismatic Evangelical Anglican) distinguishes God allowing 
suffering from God causing suffering, and trusts in the logic of God even if he himself is unable 
to make rational sense of the universe. Rashmi (20+/schizoaffective disorder/Roman Catholic) 
says that the suffering that she has personally experienced is due to other people, and that a 
lot of the suffering in the world can be traced back to people’s actions. She does, however, 
struggle with the idea of natural disasters, and wonders how to account for that kind of 
suffering. 
 
Helen: E-Even when there's horrible things go on in the world an-and you 
hear people saying, 'How can God let this happen?' my instant reaction is, ‘It's 
not God that makes it happen, it's some other force’. And actually God's 
there, putting it all back together and putting out th- You know, I just have 
this vision of God rallying round making sure everybody's OK, you know you 




see these, you know, wherever there's a disaster there's people helping. 
That's God at work, not th-the force of evil.   
 
James: I think one key thing that I learnt when I was at University, I'd been 
having a discussion with someone, or thinking about the whole question of 
why is the world bad when God is good, and how does that work together, is 
that a logical problem. And I came to a realisation then… God is clever and I'm 
not! And- that is ridiculously arrogant to not just realise, but you know, when 
you're doing Maths at a University, and stuff like this, you kind of think that 
you can figure stuff out. And I realised that actually, even if I couldn't figure it 
out, even if it looked to me like there was a contradiction, there can't be, 
because God understands this stuff and he knows the answer to this.140  
 
Rashmi: Well, I think, the suffering I've gone through personally, is a result of 
other people. So, other people's sins or mistakes, or whatever. In terms of- I 
find myself [inaudible] because there's things like landslides and volcanoes 
and stuff like that, that's not really the result of anyone else's sin. So that, I 
have no answer for. 
 
The question of theodicy also links back to the potentially transformative accounts discussed in 
‘Interpreting altered moods’. Those accounts view the suffering of altered moods as a 
potential opportunity for spiritual growth, and seem to be one way in which participants 
address the theodicy question for themselves, and in relation to their own suffering. It is a 
contextual interpretation of mental distress. They do not generalise their account to all 
circumstances and to all kinds of suffering. 
 
In all these cases, the resolution offered by participants is not a philosophical or logical answer 
to the unanswered problem of theodicy; for example, the participants who offer a potentially 
transformative account are not arguing that God causes their suffering so that they will grow 
spiritually. Instead resolution comes in the form of belief and trust - that God is present, that 
Jesus understands their suffering, or that good may come from the experience. Abbott (2019) 
observes a similar process in Christian survivors of meteorological catastrophes (e.g. the 2010 
Haiti earthquake). Abbott notes that they held strong beliefs in divine sovereignty and 
providence, but that, far from raising questions of theodicy, these beliefs brought them 
comfort: “From a few hundred participants, less than a handful raised any desire to 
interrogate God or to hold God to account in a negative way for their plight” (Abbott, 2019, 
p.213). 
 
140 James’ position here is in line with the philosophical position of skeptical theism 
(Dougherty, 2016). 




6.4 Summary: Christology 
 
This chapter addressed the project’s third research question: ‘how might the experience of 
altered moods inform or challenge wider Christian theology?’ Analysis of participant interviews 
highlighted two particular areas of Christian theology that might be informed or challenged by 
their moods experiences: the doctrine of God (addressed in Chapter 5) and Christology 
(addressed in this chapter). Both of these theological themes are brought into dialogue with 
disability theology in Chapter 7.   
 
The analysis in this chapter explored participants’ Christological reflection from two angles: 
images of Jesus, and divine solidarity in suffering. In relation to images of Jesus, participants 
almost exclusively offer images drawn from his adult earthly life. The majority of those images 
relate to the Passion and suffering of Jesus, with some participants linking these images 
directly to their own experience of suffering associated with altered moods. The idea of 
suffering, both the suffering of Jesus and the role of human suffering in life, leads to the 
second area of analysis, that of encountering the solidarity of God through Jesus’ suffering. 
Participants’ experiences of altered moods draw them to the idea of Jesus’ suffering, and then 
to a sense of divine solidarity with their own suffering. None of these accounts intentionally 
valorise suffering, and although participants do raise questions of theodicy, they do not, 
mostly, resolve them through logical or academic arguments. Instead they appeal to the 
personal and pervasive presence of God in the suffering, or to Jesus’ solidarity in suffering, or 
to the spiritual growth they have observed in themselves. Suffering is seen as an undesirable 
but inevitable part of being human in the kind of world in which we live. As Hall observes, 
Jesus is not “the answer” to the suffering associated with altered moods. Rather, the suffering 
Jesus is identified as the “Answerer” (Hall, 1987, p.94). 
 
Those participants who offer images of Jesus but do not mention his suffering are James 
(30+/depression/Charismatic Evangelical Anglican), Orla (50+/depression/Roman Catholic), 
and Quentin (60+/depression/Methodist). Orla and Quentin are also the two participants who 
very strongly resist the idea that they might find meaning or solidarity in his suffering. The 
images that they offer are of a political, troublemaker Jesus, who is on the side of the 
marginalised. It is interesting to note that a different kind of solidarity that comes into view in 
these images, focused on the life and ministry of Jesus, rather than his suffering. He is, 
however, still in solidarity with those who are suffering, for example from the effects of racism 




or powerlessness.  
 
The concept of suffering, which has run as a thread throughout the earlier chapters therefore 
comes clearly into view in this chapter and continues to be in view throughout Chapters 7 and 
8. The ways in which the themes that arise from this and the previous chapter inform and 
challenge wider Christian theology are related and intertwined, and so the next chapter 
considers them both together in relation to disability theology.   





Mezzanine floor: Imaging God and Jesus in 
dialogue with disability theology 
The previous two chapters introduced the theological reflections of participants and the two 
areas of theology (Images of God and Christology) that emerged as most informed and 
challenged by the experience of altered moods. This chapter continues the theological 
redescription project by drawing together the analysis from the previous two chapters and 
setting it into dialogue with disability theology. In doing so, it addresses the fourth research 
question: How congruent is wider Christian theology with the lived experience of altered 
moods? As discussed in the introduction, the literature of disability theology is the wider 
disciplinary context which most closely aligns with this project, notwithstanding the open 
question of whether altered moods are always or only sometimes a form of disability. This 
chapter is described as a mezzanine floor to indicate that it sits in between, or links, Chapters 5 
and 6, and is a smaller floor than the others. This is because it takes forward the analysis in the 
previous chapters, rather than introducing new empirical material. The dialogue also, 
therefore, looks forward into the next chapter, which draws together themes from across the 
thesis to develop possible directions for a contextual theology of altered moods. 
 
7.1 Imaging God 
 
At first glance the question ‘who is the God we worship?’ seems to be quite 
straight forward. We worship the God revealed to us in Scripture through the 
life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. That of course is the case. 
However, the rich, diverse and often contradictory understandings of God 
available within the Christian tradition tempts us to ask: whose God is the 
God we worship and whose Jesus do we follow? (Swinton, 2011, p.276, italics 
in original). 
 
Swinton’s questions offer an apt introduction to this chapter: in the context of altered moods, 
whose is the God we worship, and whose Jesus do we follow? Such questions sit squarely in 
the territory of contextual and practical theology. The answers are not simply academic, but 
have ‘real-world’ impact, since the way in which we view God has implications for how we 
view ourselves and others. Writing specifically in the context of disability, Creamer notes that: 
 




[C]ertain models of God as Father have been used to contribute to the 
characterization of people with disabilities as children in a way that is 
different than the characterization of people/children of God who are seen as 
normal. It is a different image of Father, highlighting different aspects of 
child-like… The divine Father and child model, like the medical model, when 
taken to its conventional end, negates individual and corporate agency and 
denies the person-ness of the person with the disability (Creamer, 2006, 
p.78). 
 
Creamer notwithstanding, practical and contextual theological work on imaging the divine has 
taken place primarily within feminist, womanist or black theology, and thus has focused mainly 
on the interactions between gender, race and images of God. For example, drawing on 
psychological theories relating to imaging the divine, Knight (2011) highlights the relative 
absence of empirical research in this area, and the often turbulent processes of ongoing 
spiritual growth leading to changes in individual images of the divine: 
 
Each person is continually forming and re-forming her internal imagery as she 
interacts with representations of, and as she experiences relationships with, 
the divine and other people. Therefore, while a shared cultural and religious 
background can cause significant similarities to the imaginations of others, a 
particular person’s internal configuration of significant representations and 
relationships is unique at any particular time (Knight, 2011, p.3). 
 
The narrative analysis presented by Knight highlights connections and disconnections, (within 
the North American culture in which she is working), between classical images of God and the 
lived experience of individuals who interact with these shared or ‘official’ God images from 
their own perspective. This perspective is informed by gender and race, especially as these are 
experienced in human relationships, and most particularly within parental or family 
relationships. Classically derived images of God (as white and male) learned in childhood 
become infused with the emotions associated with human relationships, especially childhood 
family relationships. God images are thus more than cognitive; they have an affective aspect as 
well. In the narratives discussed by Knight, the participants’ images of God gradually shift from 
being classically derived white, male, representations to alternative images with gender and 
racial diversity. This shift is prompted by their lived experiences of gender and race and 
recognition of the limitations of classically derived images. Participants report that this too is 
more than a cognitive process; they need to engage emotionally and spiritually with the 
images in order for them to become meaningful and enduring. 
 




In a similar vein, writing about liberatory images of God, Stone (2004) observes that changes in 
God images should be recognised by psychotherapists as a potentially important part of 
spiritual growth for people who hold a conscious image of God. As with the participants in this 
study, such changes are usually associated with a state of disequilibrium and to previous 
images being acknowledged as inadequate:  
 
Spiritual and psychological growth always involves necessary losses. Clients 
usually present at a time of disequilibrium, sometimes longing to restore a 
previous state of well-being or in a state of pain and confusion because the 
previous situation, relationship, job, understanding, image of God is now 
revealed to be inadequate (Stone, 2004, p.17). 
 
Turning to specifically Christian images of God, it is necessary to first acknowledge the more 
common use of the phrase “image of God” or imago Dei. This phrase has occupied a central 
position in Christian theological anthropology (McFadyen, 2012; Jones and Barbeau, 2016). In 
Genesis humans are said to be made in the image and likeness of God:  
 
Then God said, ‘Let us make humankind in our image, according to our 
likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the 
birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the wild animals of the 
earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth.’ 
So God created humankind in his image, 
in the image of God he created them;  
male and female he created them (Genesis 1:26-27). 
 
Historically, there have been three main strands of thought about the imago Dei, and in 
particular what it means for humanity to be made in the image and likeness of God (and to be 
differentiated from non-human creatures). The substantialist perspective views the image of 
God as being a characteristic of humanity (such as reason or language). A functional 
perspective views the image of God as the function that humans are meant to fulfil within 
creation (often as representatives of the authority of God, i.e. having dominion over nature). A 
relational perspective sees the imago Dei as consisting of the relationships between God and 
humans, or humans and humans (Jones and Barbeau, 2016, p.13).  
  
It is possible to discern two major, but non-exclusive, trends in the ways in which imago Dei is 
conceptualised in contemporary theology. The first views the imago Dei as the basis for 
individual human dignity and worth; having been made in the image of God is a characteristic 
of being human that is shared equally by every person. This view has historically characterised 




Catholic theological perspectives: "The definition of imago Dei… [consists] of simply having 
been created by God and therefore having inherent value, intrinsic worth…" (Hedges-Goettl, 
2002, p.21). The second trend views the imago Dei as being constituted by the human 
relationship to God, and has been typical of Reformed theology. This relationship is damaged 
after the Fall, meaning that the imago Dei is lost, or at least damaged, until it is restored 
through redemption in Christ, who is the full image of God. Robinson (2010) has described 
these two aspects as ‘ascendant’ and ‘descendant’, with the ascendant stressing human 
orientation towards God, while the descendant stresses God coming towards humanity (in 
Christ). 
 
There is not space in this thesis to do justice to the extensive theological tradition around the 
doctrine of imago Dei. Nor does a discussion of the doctrine, as traditionally expounded, 
directly arise from the data or analysis – participants do not speak about humans being made 
in the image of God, although it is possible to see a connection with, for example, the idea that 
all people have worth or are loved by God regardless of their experience of mental distress. 
There is also a potential connection to contextual theology, analogous to the way in which the 
idea that all are made in the image of God can be a building block for a Queer Theology, for 
example (van Klinken and Phiri, 2015). Paula (20+/anomalous/former Charismatic Evangelical) 
perhaps comes closest to this in her development of the idea that experiencing mental distress 
is just part of the diversity of humanity, like autism or other kinds of neurodiversity. 
Nonetheless, the doctrine of imago Dei is linked to the data in a different way. Imago Dei, as 
part of theological anthropology, focuses on the image of God as seen or expressed in 
humanity. It asks questions about the human implications of being made in the image of God. 
However, looked at from the other side of the equation, imago Dei also has implications for 
our image of God. Our view of ourselves is not independent of the way in which we image 
God. There is a close link between our image of God and our communal image of self, because 
our concepts of deity express something of our ultimate values and virtues. This connection 
remains regardless of whether the image of humanity or image of God comes first; whether 
we make God in our own image (as psychologists of religion might argue), or if human image is 
a reflection of the divine (as theologians might argue) (see e.g. Hall, 1986 for a discussion of 
this in relation to environmental stewardship). Thomas (2012) has similarly drawn attention to 
the ways in which the trends in interpretation of imago Dei have been affected as least as 
much by culture as by exegesis. The supposed quality of individual humans that makes up the 
image has varied depending what was valued by the wider culture at that time. So, for 
example, the early Church writers who identified imago Dei with human reason were writing 




at a time when rationality was highly valued and salvation seen in terms of illumination of the 
mind (Thomas, 2012, pp.135–6). Speaking specifically of disability theology, Cooper makes this 
point in relation to images of God as disabled. The normative nature of ableness means that 
the connection between human abilities and images of God is easily overlooked. The startling 
nature of God imaged as disabled is a reminder that God in Godself does not ‘really’ walk, or 
speak, or have strong arms: 
 
There is nothing wrong with using metaphors to allow us to speak about God. 
Quite the opposite: It is important to speak about God and, therefore, we 
must use metaphors. Problems arise only when we forget: (1) that our 
language about God is metaphorical language and (2) that there is a relation 
between the particularity of the "me," who creates the metaphors and 
images of God, and the character of those metaphors and images (Cooper, 
1992, p.174). 
 
All images that Christians might use of God in Godself are metaphorical. Individuals and 
communities engage in a process of finding "the best images available to us in order to say 
something about the divine" (McFague, 1982, cited in Creamer, 2006, p.77). Whilst 
metaphorical, images of God can be powerful. As Goldberg phrases it, "Images of God dictate 
who will feel worthy in society and who will feel inferior, who will be respected and who will 
be despised, who will get easy access to the literal material goods of culture and who will have 
to fight for those same goods” (Goldenberg, 1979, p.126). The way in which communities and 
individuals name and depict God shapes their experiences and understanding of God, in the 
same way that naming any experience affects the understanding of that experience. Naming a 
mood experience as ‘depressive illness’ or ‘spiritual awakening’ affected participants’ 
experiences (although not all were affected in the same way – see Chapter 4 for a discussion 
on participants’ perspectives on labelling altered moods); naming God in different ways 
affected their experiences as well. Metaphorical does not mean arbitrary, however. Christian 
tradition also suggests a tension between the idea that God in Godself is unknowable (in the 
sense that God transcends human capacities), but God is not unknown (McFarland, 2005, 
p.19).  
 
There are two significant areas in which imago Dei intersects with disability theology. The first 
is a critique of perspectives that locate the imago Dei in a characteristic of individual persons 
(whether that characteristic is a substance, function, or relationship). Disability theology 
highlights the ways in which such theology risks implying that some disabled people are less 
than human, if, for example, their intellectual impairment means that they might be judged 




unable to embody that characteristic. This concern is not without precedent; Western history 
provides a number of examples of groups of people (among them women, children, Jews and 
people of colour) being judged as scoring lower on the ‘imaging God’ scale and therefore being 
deemed less worthy of respect or protection (Kilner, 2015, pp.20–21). The danger is not that 
such theology intentionally characterises some people as less than human, but that its 
anthropology is (unintentionally or unconsciously) ableist.  This is similar to the criticism of 
liberatory disability theology based on the social model and on assumptions of independence 
and autonomy.  Creamer outlines this criticism as follows: 
 
Reflection on intellectual disability in particular not only raised a challenge 
against anthropocentric models of God (i.e., that imagining God as a person 
may have creative potential but also carries significant dangers and 
limitations) but also highlighted some of the problematic assumptions of the 
social model, particularly the implied claim that people with disabilities are 
"just as good" as the non-disabled, where "good" actually meant competent, 
smart, capable, and so on (Creamer, 2012, p.343). 
 
The second area of intersection builds on this insight, and consists of the construction of 
images in which God is imaged as disabled. 
 
Although a smaller field than other contextual theologies, contextual disability theology has 
given significant attention to the imaging of God. As previously discussed, God is imaged as 
disabled in various ways, with disability theologians arguing from the lived experience of 
disability to the metaphorical imaging of God. Attention is drawn to the fact that human 
abilities are often taken as the starting point for imaging God, and to what can be learnt by 
starting from human disability instead. Cooper provides an example of this position: 
 
Our tendency is to think of divine power in the same terms as our power, 
except to extend God’s power unlimitedly. That is, there are limits to our 
power; there are no limits to God’s power. If we can do some things, God is 
able to do anything. Thus, human ’ableness’ provides us with the image to 
think about God’s power… As feminists argue, despite all the male images of 
God, men do not, by virtue of their maleness, more closely represent the 
image of God than do women. So it is true that the able-bodied do not, by 
virtue of their able-bodiedness, more closely represent the image of God than 
do the disabled. God does not see with eyes nor hear with ears nor move with 
legs, and so forth (Cooper, 1992, pp.173–4). 
 
Imaging God as disabled is about more than viewing God as simply present to disabled people. 
Rather, disability is metaphorically brought into the nature of God, it is made the centre point 




of theological reflection (Swinton, 2012). These current interviews reveal a process similar to 
that identified in relation to gender, race and disability. Participants report that their images of 
God have shifted over time, often in response to their mood experiences. For some 
participants this is a highly emotive process, with participants describing strong emotional 
resonance between their moods and their God images, or a strong emotional aspect to the 
images. Rather than focusing on race and gender (i.e. rejecting the image of God as white and 
male), this shift is closer to that described in disability theology when God is imaged as 
disabled. Participants do not, however, image God in Godself as disabled, instead they image 
God as present, personal and pervasive.   
 
A different approach is suggested by Witham (2010). Documenting the Western ‘biography’ of 
God, Witham suggests that Christian theologians from Augustine until after the Reformation 
held in tension two aspects of God’s character: God as person, and God as cosmic being 
(Witham, 2010, pp.3–4). These aspects can indeed both be observed in the images offered by 
participants, a tension I described as God being accessible but also ‘more-than’. Witham is 
charting theological developments leading to open theism and process theology, but offers an 
image that also illuminates the transitions in individuals’ God images at a time of 
disequilibrium or turmoil. Witham suggests that biographies of God are similar to a woven 
garment, with the characteristics of God represented by threads that are woven tightly 
together into one. Pulling on one thread – Witham suggests omniscience, or immutability – 
loosens other threads, so that eventually they become loose enough to be woven into a new 
garment. The experience of altered moods seems to function like pulling at one thread in their 
image of God – perhaps the thread of the idea that God has a perfect plan for your life, or that 
mental distress is the result of sin – some participants can continue to comfortably live with 
this loose thread in their original garment, while for others the whole thing unravels and is 
later knit back together into a different form with the experience of altered moods woven 
throughout. 
 
Jesus is described in the Bible as the “image of the invisible God” (Colossians 1:15). Following 
Cooper (1992, quoted above), it is not however, the contingencies of Jesus’ body (e.g. that it 
was male) that tell us something about God in Godself. Disability theology does not 
predominantly rely on the idea that Jesus experienced something akin to disability at the end 
of his life. Instead it draws on concepts of incarnation, kenosis, and trinity to emphasise the 
dependency and vulnerability of Jesus; that Jesus experienced human limitations, finitude, and 
vulnerability. This is explored in the next section, in which the participants’ images of Jesus (as 




one who understands ‘from the inside’ and who offers solidarity in suffering) are brought into 
the dialogue. 
 
7.2 Imaging Jesus 
 
The image of Jesus as vulnerable and suffering emerged as significant in the analysis. Many, 
although by no means all, participants found that his suffering provided a sense of solidarity, 
consolation and companionship in their own experiences; Jesus’ experience of suffering is 
taken to mean that God understands human suffering. For those participants who did not find 
solidarity in his suffering, a different location for solidarity emerged – in Jesus’ life and 
ministry. While participants do raise questions of theodicy, this does not emerge as their main 
emphasis. This is consistent with the conclusions of those who write about theologies of 
suffering (e.g. Weaver (2013), Peterman and Schmutzer (2016), Beach (2018)). For example, 
Beach suggests that: 
 
Perhaps in suffering the demand for companions is greater than the demand 
for theories of possible meaning or attempts to answer the perennial lament, 
"Why?" (Beach, 2018, p.252). 
 
Contextual Christologies – theological interpretations of Christ written from various 
contemporary social contexts – such as black, womanist, or queer Christologies seek to 
articulate the ways in which Christ can be said to be black, a woman, or queer.141 Disability 
theologians have similarly imaged God as physically or intellectually disabled (e.g. Hauerwas, 
1986; Eiesland, 1994; Morris, 2008; Lewis, 2013). There have been relatively few accounts of 
God imaged as experiencing poor mental health, although there is a small cluster of self-
described ‘playful’ and psychologically inspired works in which God or Jesus are diagnosed as 
melancholic, having bipolar disorder or a personality disorder, or as potentially diagnosable 
with one of a number of conditions in the DSM-IV (Ellens, 2007; Carlin, 2009; Helsel, 2009; 
Capps, 2010). Unlike the contextual theologies, however, these diagnoses are not being 
(re)claimed as positive identities/characteristics or as reflective of shared human 
characteristics (such as vulnerability or limitedness) which are more usually overlooked or seen 
as only characteristic of disabled people. Instead these works ‘read back’ various kinds of 
psychopathology into biblical or theological resources. For example, Carlin’s argument, based 
on Capps’ psychobiography of Jesus, that God the Father can be described as melancholic 
 
141 See Karkkainen (2016) for an overview of contemporary Christologies. 




concludes with the line: 
 
[F]athers and sons indeed have a great many issues to work out—many 
internalized black eyes and plastic bats to come to terms with— and, at the 
root of these issues, more often than not, is the missing mother, whom they 
both love (Carlin, 2009, p.220). 
 
Similarly, Helsel’s description of God’s characteristics and behaviours as meeting the clinical 
criteria for a diagnosis of bipolar disorder is intended to name “some of the fearful and 
terrifying aspects of the tradition clearly”(Helsel, 2009, p.189) by suggesting that God’s 
relationship to creation (as related in Jewish and Christian scriptures) has been “characterized 
by the terrifying flux of a mood disorder such as Bipolar I” (Helsel, 2009, p.190). 
 
The participants in this study are not claiming that Jesus experienced altered moods either in 
the pattern of contextual theologians or the pastoral psychologists quoted above. They are, 
like the contextual theologians, theologising from their own context and finding resonance 
with Jesus’ experiences, but they are not claiming that Christ has, either metaphorically or 
literally, mental health challenges. Rather, they are finding solidarity in his experience of 
suffering; seeing their own experience of distress reflected in his suffering. 
 
For participants from across the Christian traditions the most salient feature of Jesus’ suffering 
is a sense of solidarity, identification and recognition. Participants are not looking to the cross 
for atonement for sin, but rather for a sense of meaning in suffering.  
 
7.3 Summary: Imaging of God and Jesus in dialogue with disability 
theology 
 
This mezzanine chapter brought the analysis of the previous two chapters into dialogue with 
disability theology. In doing so, it identified a number of commonalities and some 
disagreement. The changes in participants’ God images in relation to their altered moods, the 
close connection between representations of God and representations of humans that flows 
from the doctrine of imago Dei, and the tension between God as unknowable but not 
unknown are all points of commonality and connection. 
 




The most significant area of disagreement is related to the idea that God may be imaged as 
disabled, an idea which occupies a significant place within disability theology. This does not 
emerge from the empirical material of this project. God is not imaged as disabled (or as 
experiencing altered moods). Rather than offering new images of God as psychotic, depressed, 
or having extreme mood swings, this theology gives a central place to the image of the 
suffering and crucified Jesus. This traditional image is reinterpreted and experienced as an 
image of extreme mental distress, so that, as with the images of God as disabled offered by 
contextual disability theology, altered moods are brought into the nature of God (Swinton, 
2011; 2012). The emphasis is on the experience of suffering, not a shared identity. This 
conclusion echoes the discussion about identity in section 1.3 of the introduction, where, 
based on the literature, I drew a distinction between disability (identity-first) and mental 
health (person-first) language. It also points forward to the theology of mental health being a 
theology of experience, rather than a theology of identity. 
  
These insights are therefore taken forward and developed further in the next chapter. This 
final substantive chapter continues to address the fourth research question: how congruent is 
wider Christian theology with the lived experience of altered moods? It also addresses the final 
research question: What theological themes might provide the contours of a contextual 
theology of mental health?   





Penthouse: Mad Theology 
In this chapter I draw together the directions and threads that have emerged from the 
preceding chapters and outline one possible shape for a contextual theology of altered moods. 
This section rests on the foundation of the previous chapters, especially the insights and 
thoughts shared by participants, but the building materials and final design reflect my own 
perspective and theological commitments to a greater extent than the other chapters. In 
Chapter 2 I suggested that an explicit acknowledgement of the researcher’s voice was missing 
from the original model of mutual critical correlation. This chapter therefore more explicitly 
introduces the researcher’s voice to the dialogue. I acknowledge that not every participant’s 
perspective will be captured by this section. One of the strengths of grounded theory 
alongside maximum variation and theoretical sampling is the heterogeneity of data that is 
produced. The aim in grounded theory is to construct a theory that is robust enough to survive 
that heterogeneity and which takes account of variations in experience, interpretation, or 
behaviour (Charmaz, 2014, p.109). In the data analysis in the preceding chapters I have sought 
to do justice to the variations in participants’ perspectives and experiences, without 
‘smoothing out’ differences.  However, as discussed in Chapter 2, the aim of this thesis is not 
to produce a classical grounded theory. It is, instead, a work of practical theology which utilises 
grounded theory as a robust method of data collection and analysis which centres the voices 
and experiences of participants. Differences between Christian theological traditions are 
considerable, notwithstanding the fact that the lived experience of Christianity in the UK is 
unlikely to be representative of one ‘pure’ theological or ecclesiastical tradition. Alongside 
that, practical theology has sometimes been criticised for concentrating on the practical and 
minimising the theological.142 This final chapter is therefore a theological reflection on 
theology of altered moods, written from my own context as a British, UK-based, ordained 
member of the Church of England who identifies with those strands of theology and 
ecclesiology often referred to as the central tradition (Atherstone, 2016), and writing at the 
time of the Covid-19 global pandemic. This particular perspective is reflected in the choice of 
main conversation partners: particularly the reformed theology of the cross represented by 
 
142 See Miller-McLemore for a refutation of the (mis)characterisation of practical theology as 
“descriptive, empirical, interpretative, and not normative, theological, and... Christian” (2012a, 
p.5) or Root (2014, p.19ff) for a summary of this criticism.  




Luther143 and Hall which has resonance with my own theological tradition, and trauma theory 
and theology which has come to prominence as a result of the pandemic. To continue the 
woven garment image from the previous section, this chapter gathers up threads from the 
participants stories and weaves them into a different garment – one that reflects my own 
perspective and that I would feel able to own and wear. This is not intended to be a one-size 
fits all garment, but instead is a response to the need identified by Cooper-White: the need for 
‘thick theology’ – theology which is “multilayered, complex, and open to multifariousness and 
modes of symbolization in both our psychological and anthropological conceptualizations of 
persons, conflict, trauma, pathology, health, and wellness; as well as in our understanding of 
the transcendent, of God" (Cooper-White, 2011, p.5).144  
 
I have entitled this chapter ‘mad theology’ to evoke comparisons between the theology of 
altered moods and other kinds of contextual theology, rather than to align this chapter with 
Mad Pride or mad positive activism.145 With the exception of Paula (20+/anomalous/former 
Charismatic Evangelical), who discussed her mood experiences as something akin to 
neurodivergence, participants did not use the language of madness nor of Mad Pride.146  
 
This chapter therefore intentionally goes beyond the words of the participants but is grounded 
in them and in my experience of being immersed in the participants’ words over the last four 
years. Mindful of the virtue of humility when working with other people’s stories and the 
significant diversity among the participants, I hope that this closing reflection is sufficiently 
well in line with the spirit of their reflections that participants would recognise my respect for 
their experiences and that at least some of the participants would also be able to recognise 
 
143 Tracing Luther’s legacy within contemporary Anglicanism, and the Church of England 
specifically, is complex due to the particular history of the English Reformation (Ryrie, 2016). 
Space does not permit discussion of that legacy here, however, the resonance I perceive 
between the theology of the cross and the central Anglican tradition may be partially 
explained by Richardson’s characterisation of  Luther as “too Catholic for the reformed 
Evangelical, and too Protestant for the Anglo-Catholic” (Richardson, 1996, para. 5); precisely 
the positioning of central Anglicanism. 
144 Drawing on the idea of “thick description” in ethnography, originally in Geertz (2008). 
145 Rashed (2019, p.151) defines Mad Pride as: “a movement and discourse that pose a direct 
and radical challenge to the social norms and values underpinning views on “mental illness.” 
[It] rejects the language of “illness” and “disorder,” reclaims the term “mad,” and replaces its 
negative connotations with more positive understandings. It reverses the customary 
understanding of madness as illness in favor of the view that madness can be grounds for 
identity and culture”. 
146 That is, non-dominant positive narratives of altered moods or a sense that altered moods 
formed part of their identity. 




their own experiences in it. This intentional ‘going beyond’ also allows me to utilise aspects of 
Christian tradition that most likely would not only be unfamiliar to some participants but 
would conflict with their own tradition. Specifically, I draw on Luther’s theology of the cross, 
despite drawing reflections on suffering that arose from interviews with a number of Roman 
Catholic participants.   
 
This chapter addresses the fifth research question: ‘What theological themes might provide 
the contours of a contextual theology of mental health?’. It draws together and expands the 
overarching themes that emerged throughout the project and thesis. Specifically, these 
themes are: identity, disconnections between experience and theology, interpretations of 
altered moods, images of God, Christology, and the theology of experience. As with previous 
chapters, there are different conversation partners in this chapter. These are:  psychological 
trauma theory, the work of Serene Jones and Shelley Rambo on the theology of trauma, 
contextual Christologies, and the theology of the cross. In different ways, each of these offer a 
theological perspective on the suffering of Jesus and, taken together, illuminate the analysis 
that has been presented in the earlier chapters. In particular, these conversation partners 
attend to the reality of ongoing suffering and shared experience rather than shared identity, 
which have emerged as characteristic of theology of altered moods. The chapter therefore 
closes by noting potential points of connection between them and the experience of altered 
moods. These points of connection are offered as potential directions for a mad theology and 
are: wounds that remain, realism about experience, encountering the solidarity of God 
through the suffering of Jesus, and the abiding nature of God’s love. These connections 
highlight mad theology as one that bears witness to the fact that God can be glimpsed and 
encountered even in mental distress. 
 
The first dialogue partner consists of material from trauma studies and trauma theology. This 
material deals head-on with the reality of ongoing suffering. As with disability studies and 
theology, trauma is used in these disciplines as a hermeneutical lens, and Jesus is identified as 
a victim/survivor of trauma. Unlike disability theology, however, trauma is not treated as a 
shared social identity. Dialogue with trauma theology therefore has the potential to illuminate 
themes that have emerged throughout this thesis but have been identified as points of 
disconnection between theologies of altered moods and disability theology or the sociology of 
illness; specifically, the significance of suffering, identity, and the theology of experience. 
   






Trauma is an ongoing psychological and physiological ‘wound’ arising from exposure to a 
threatening or harmful event that overwhelms the usual ability to cope or respond to danger, 
and which cannot be averted by the action of the person or community. As reported in section 
2.3.3, a number of participants in this research disclosed additional ‘real world’ traumatic 
events, ‘adverse childhood experiences’,147 or actual/potential diagnoses of post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD). The interviews were not focused on these events; participants 
disclosed them in reflecting on their mood experiences. There are complex relationships 
between mental distress, altered moods, and trauma. Trauma is strongly associated with the 
later development of altered moods such as those diagnosed as depression or anxiety and 
other kinds of mental health challenges, may worsen pre-existing poor mental health, or lead 
to particular forms of mental distress such as those diagnosed as PTSD or complex post-
traumatic stress disorder (cPTSD)148 (SAMHSA, 2014a; Sweeney et al., 2016; Torjesen, 2019).  
However, there are additional similarities between the situation of experiencing trauma and 
experiencing altered moods, particularly when considering the ways in which altered moods 
shape theology. Trauma is a similarly biopsychosocial phenomenon, albeit with more clearly 
identified ‘biological’ bases than altered moods. As with altered moods, trauma can in some 
ways be considered a non-traditional shared context, which trauma theologians have 
identified as shaping theology in certain ways (Rambo, 2010; Rambo, 2017; Jones, 2019). 
There are also phenomenological parallels between trauma and altered moods. 
 
To begin to explore the ways in which trauma theology may illuminate not just the analysis 
already presented in this thesis but also the potential contours of a mad theology, I turn first 
 
147 The concept of ‘Adverse Childhood Experiences’ (ACEs) and their association with poorer 
adult health outcomes first emerged in the late 1990s in a largescale survey of patients 
receiving treatment from the US health provider Kaiser-Permanente. ACEs take place before 
the age of 18 and include abuse, neglect, and challenging household circumstances. Adults 
who report more ACEs are at greater risk of developing cancer, heart disease, diabetes and 
mental health problems (Boullier and Blair, 2018).   
148 Complex PTSD is a diagnostic category in ICD-11 and includes symptoms of PTSD as well as 
additional difficulties with regulating mood and interpersonal relationships; it is thought to be 
associated with chronic, severe, or childhood trauma (Williamson and Greenberg, 2019). There 
is an ongoing debate about the relationship between cPTSD and borderline personality 
disorder (BPD), which often co-occur. Some scholars suggest that BPD should be reclassified as 
a trauma spectrum disorder, due to the strong association between developmental trauma 
and later BPD diagnoses (e.g. Kulkarni, 2017).  




to definitions of trauma. Drawing together definitions from a number of fields, SAMHSA 
suggests that trauma “results from an event, series of events, or set of circumstances that is 
experienced by an individual as physically or emotionally harmful or life threatening and that 
has lasting adverse effects on the individual’s functioning and mental, physical, social, 
emotional, or spiritual well-being” (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration, 2014b, p.7). Such adverse effects may or may not be formally diagnosed as 
PTSD, which requires specific diagnostic criteria to be met.149, 150 
 
Trauma may be caused by a one-off event or repeated over time and can relate to events that 
are experienced directly, witnessed, that happen to someone we are close to, or through 
exposure to the aftermath of an event (such as first responders). This includes social trauma 
(such as marginalisation, poverty or systemic racism) and historical trauma (the legacy of 
violence committed against a community) as well as those things more usually or easily 
identified as traumatic – including, but not limited to, one-off or repeated interpersonal 
violence (e.g. sexual assault), community violence (e.g. war), crime, abuse, childhood neglect, 
serious accident or illness, and natural disasters (Sweeney et al., 2016). Trauma is ‘dose-
dependent’, that is, the more severe the stressor (in terms of harm, numbers involved, or 
duration), the more likely it is that it will result in trauma. Recovery from trauma is certainly 
possible but often slow and difficult, and involves three stages: (re)establishing a sense of 
safety and trust in the world, reconstructing or re-narrating the trauma, and restored social or 
relational connections (Herman, 2015). Trauma is not linear but tends to be cyclical; people re-
 
149 E.g. ICD-10 says that PTSD “may develop following exposure to an extremely threatening or 
horrific event or series of events. It is characterised by all of the following: 1) re-experiencing 
the traumatic event or events in the present in the form of vivid intrusive memories, 
flashbacks, or nightmares… 2) avoidance of thoughts and memories of the event or events, or 
avoidance of activities, situations, or people reminiscent of the event(s); and 3) persistent 
perceptions of heightened current threat, for example as indicated by hypervigilance or an 
enhanced startle reaction to stimuli such as unexpected noises” (World Health Organization, 
2019, 6B40). DSM-5 lists multiple criteria that must be met, including a stressor that involves 
“ actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual violence”, plus a combination of various 
kinds of symptoms including intrusive memories, avoidance of memories or reminders of the 
event, negative changes to cognition or mood, and increased arousal or reactivity (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013).  
150 There are various debates around the diagnostic criteria for traumatic and stressor-related 
conditions such as PTSD. In particular, there has been debate about ‘Criterion A’ – exposure to 
a stressor – and which types of stressor and exposure should be included (Weathers and 
Keane, 2007). As with the questions around labelling and the medicalisation of altered moods 
(see Chapter 4), the concept of a medical condition called PTSD may be criticised on the 
grounds of inappropriate generalisation from Western experiences and a lack of diagnostic 
precision. 




experience the original trauma through flashbacks and may unconsciously and involuntarily 
repeat their trauma in other aspects of their lives. Recovery involves interrupting these cycles, 
allowing the trauma to be processed.  
 
What the different definitions share in common is the idea that trauma involves a stressor 
(such as abuse or witnessing a terror incident), significant psychological or physical harm or 
threat associated with that stressor, and ongoing effects associated with the stressor. Drawing 
together definitions for use from a theological perspective, Jones offers the following broad 
definition of trauma: “A traumatic event is one in which a person or persons perceives 
themselves or others as threatened by an external force that seeks to annihilate them and 
against which they are unable to resist and which overwhelms their capacity to cope” (Jones, 
2019, p.37).151 Definitions of trauma generally assume that this wound arises from a ‘real 
world’ circumstance that can be identified, even if memories of the event are partial or 
unstable – it is an ‘external force’. As such, the kinds of mood experiences that are the focus of 
this thesis would not typically be considered traumatic and I am not trying to make a case that 
they should be. Specific physiological mechanisms relating to the processing of memories are 
involved in trauma and traumatic stress reactions, and there is no necessary parallel with 
altered moods which are not associated with specific traumatic experiences that need to be 
remembered and processed.  
 
Having made that distinction, one characteristic of altered moods is certainly that the intensity 
of feelings may be unavoidable and overwhelm the ability of the individual to cope. They may 
also be experienced by the person as life-threatening or as threatening annihilation – most 
obviously in the case of altered moods with psychosis (e.g. paranoia or hearing threatening 
voices),152 but also in cases where, for example, the person feels driven to suicide by their 
altered moods, or it may be a more existential sense of annihilation – their altered moods are 
too intense for their self to withstand them. This is not to claim that every experience of 
altered moods is traumatic, nor that the physiological mechanisms are necessarily similar, but 
simply to note that some characteristics of traumatic events may also be familiar to those 
experiencing altered moods, even if altered moods are not included in traditional definitions of 
 
151 Jones describes this definition as a quotation from the work of van der Kolk and Herman, 
but does not give a precise citation. 
152 First episode psychosis, both the psychosis itself and the treatment patients may receive 
from health care systems, has been identified as a potential trauma which could lead to the 
development of post-traumatic stress (Mueser and Rosenberg, 2003) 




experiences likely to result in trauma.  Given this, the definitions discussed above, and the fact 
that historical and chronic social stressors are also associated with the development of both 
trauma and altered moods, trauma theology emerges as a relevant conversation partner when 
considering the less developed field of mad theology. It is therefore to the theology of trauma 
that I now turn.   
 
Trauma theory is increasingly being employed in diverse disciplines, including the different 
branches of theology. Here it has been used, for example, as a theoretical lens for interpreting 
exilic biblical narratives (Garber, 2015), as a hermeneutical lens for reading the Gospels and 
accounts of the early church (McGrath, 2006; Rambo, 2010; Reinhartz, 2015; Rambo, 2017) or 
for reinterpreting Christian doctrines and theological concepts,153 in liturgical studies 
(O’Donnell, 2015) and in pastoral and practical theology (Warner et al., 2020). Trauma is 
therefore a significant area of recent theological study:  
 
In particular, the impact of traumatic experience, upon both readers and 
authors/editors, has attracted the interest of biblical scholars in recent years. 
A rapid explosion in the incorporation of trauma theory, itself developing at a 
great rate, by scholars from an extremely wide range of disciplines, has 
helped to stimulate this interest. It might perhaps be not inappropriate to 
describe the application of trauma theory to biblical exegesis as one of the 
'hottest' areas of biblical scholarship at present (Warner, 2020, p.227). 
 
Christian theologians writing on trauma have identified the Passion of Jesus as a trauma 
narrative. The question they pose is how, or whether, it is possible to understand the 
crucifixion and suffering of Jesus without glorifying violence in itself – and relatedly, how to 
interpret the Passion in a way that does not retraumatise survivors of violence.  Brock and 
Parker, writing about theories of atonement, resist the idea that any violence, even that done 
to Jesus, can be redemptive. They conclude that, in Western Christianity’s claim that humanity 
is saved through the violence of the cross, Jesus “has been betrayed by his own tradition… His 
life and work were not furthered by his death” (2002, p.249). Instead, they argue that Jesus’ 
followers, despite that community being traumatised and scarred by his death, discovered that 
“the presence of God endures through violence” (Brock and Parker, 2002, p.250). In their view, 
the resurrection of Jesus should not be viewed as a triumph over death, because speaking in 
 
153 E.g. there are strong parallels between the psychological description of recovery from 
trauma and the Christian narrative of God’s grace breaking into a world trapped in cycles of 
violence. 




terms of triumph potentially negates the rejection of Jesus’ suffering and death as the locus of 
redemption. They strongly reject the idea that any good can come out of trauma, instead the 
resurrection is a symbol of the power of life and survival. Brock and Parker follow in a long 
tradition of feminist authors who critique traditional Western atonement theories. Particularly 
troublesome are penal-substitutionary atonement theory, in which God willingly sacrifices his 
son for the salvation of the world, and the idea that suffering should be embraced because it 
brings closeness to Jesus who also suffered, because of their potential to implicitly sanction 
human violence and abuse. Such views are often held alongside patriarchal social structures in 
which acts of self-sacrifice are particularly demanded or encouraged from women. 
 
While acknowledging these concerns, Jones offers a different perspective. She describes the 
response that some members of a women’s self-defence class had to a Maundy Thursday 
service in her church: 
 
After the service, Mari spoke to me first, rubbing the knuckle she had bruised 
in class: “This cross story, . . . it’s the only part of this Christian thing I like. I 
get it. And, it’s like he gets me. He knows.”… Shanika left next, saying 
something about Jesus standing between her and her ex-partner, taking 
blows meant for her, keeping her safe…  As a feminist theologian, my first 
reaction was to worry that somehow they had been inadvertently harmed by 
being there. I worried that as they sat there, they were once again being 
emotionally battered by bad theology…  Yet I knew from our class that none 
of these women valorized or romanticized the violence done to them or to 
others. After all, they were learning to fight back against violence and in 
rather ardent ways, no less. Furthermore, they had as much as told me that 
the service was empowering to them, not devastating, and I had to believe 
that they meant what they said, that they could be trusted arbiters of their 
own sentiments…154 And as their departing words to me conveyed, that 
nourishment flowed from a strong, positive connection they felt with Jesus in 
the midst of his passion (Jones, 2019, p.87). 
 
 
154 There is pastoral wisdom in the idea that people should be treated as ‘trusted arbiters of 
their own sentiments’. This leaves open the questions of whether people’s accounts should 
always be taken at face value, and whether people can be wrong about what they think about 
themselves. Addressing these questions are beyond the scope of this thesis. However, the idea 
that interviews may produce unreliable accounts is discussed in section 2.3.2. Following 
Silverman (2007) I have taken the approach of acknowledging these issues but pragmatically 
accepting that the usual way to understand someone’s experiences is to ask them. I have 
therefore taken participants’ accounts more or less at face value, but have attempted to make 
it clear in the text where participants’ accounts appear to contain contradictions. For example, 
if a participant gives an account of their church’s doctrine which does not appear to match the 
published doctrinal formulations, or if a participant says that they reject a particular concept 
but then go on to talk in terms of that concept. 




Jones goes on to develop what she describes as a Christology of mirroring. That is, in Mari’s 
statement, Jones hears echoes of other Christian interpretations of the cross that emphasise 
“the believer’s experience of solidarity between themselves and Christ as the source of 
redemption” (Jones, 2019, p.88). In a Christology of mirroring, we see our own stories of 
suffering and trauma mirrored back to us in the trauma of the cross. This is not, however, to 
be understood as an uncomplicated act of reflection. While Jones highlights a number of 
similarities between trauma theory and the Passion narrative, she also cautions against 
obscuring very real contextual differences in the ways that people (are able to) respond to 
violence. Both trauma narrative and interpretations of the cross are multivalent. Jones 
concludes that there is no one Christology that will adequately speak to or encompass every 
experience of trauma, but suggests that, in the Passion story, traumatised people will find 
“…no divine justification for suffering, but… [an] outstretched gesture of understanding, of 
solidarity, and of welcoming embrace” (Jones, 2019, p.105).  
 
8.2 Contextual Christologies 
 
Jones’ Christology of mirroring, with Christ and the cross viewed through the lens of trauma, is 
reminiscent of other Christologies of liberation and of the Christology in Chapters 6 and 7, 
which concluded with the insight that solidarity is found through imaging Jesus as someone 
who has experienced the realities of mental distress. Bohache has described Christologies of 
liberation as being about ‘a Saviour just like me’ (Bohache, 2008, p.67ff): 
 
But the Christness of Jesus is what transcends his historicity and makes 
solidarity possible. As Christ, Jesus does not remain a Jew or an Anglo-Saxon, 
but can be Indian, Indonesian, Chinese, Filipino or Thai… [W]hat links the 
Christologies of Asians, Africans, and African-Americans: each of these 
peoples images Christ as one of them, through whom they are able to relate 
to God so that God becomes tangible for them… Christ… delivers them 
through his ability to be one with them in their circumstances – ‘a Savior just 
like me’ (Bohache, 2008, p.80).155  
 
 
155 It should be noted here that it is not necessarily the case that everyone wants (or believes 
themselves to want) a ‘Saviour just like me’ – Orla, for example, strongly resisted any 
suggestion of solidarity or likeness between her experiences and Jesus. However, participants 
who rejected the idea of solidarity in suffering nevertheless did speak about solidarity 
obliquely. Jesus was described as embodying the fight against oppressions (e.g. racism) that 
participants had encountered in their lives (although not necessarily directed at them 
personally), and in solidarity with the powerless and marginalised.   




These Christologies are relevant to the experience of altered moods not because ‘altered 
moods’ is necessarily a shared context (or that people with those experiences are oppressed 
and needing liberation in the traditional sense), but because these Christologies by definition 
emerge from contexts of suffering, just as the Christology outlined in Chapter 6 has emerged 
from the suffering associated with altered moods. I am reminded too of womanist 
Christologies, which tend to be less concerned than feminist theologies with the maleness of 
Jesus (Bohache, 2008, p.133). The humanity, not the maleness of Jesus, is the central point – a 
humanity which demonstrates his solidarity with black women. In this encounter with Jesus 
who is in solidarity with them, women gain a sense of ‘somebodiness’ – a sense that they have 
worth, and are somebody who matters; this often stands in stark contrast to their everyday 
experiences of racism and sexism. In this theology of altered moods, this sense of 
‘somebodiness’ is gained in a different way, through solidarity in experience rather than 
similarity of identity. God is not imagined as experiencing altered moods. Instead, the 
traditional image of Jesus suffering on the cross is adopted and transformed to incorporate the 
suffering associated with altered moods.  
 
The question of whether people will still have impairments in God’s coming kingdom (also 
phrased as ‘the afterlife’, ‘general resurrection of the dead’, or ‘heaven’) is linked to these 
contextual Christologies and also to the theme of identity-talk identified throughout this 
project. It is an ongoing debate within disability theology. Eiesland’s original image of the 
Disabled God was prompted by the realisation that Jesus, in the Gospels, is described as 
retaining wounds on his hands and side in his resurrection body (John 20:27). Disability 
theologians disagree as to whether this means that the resurrection bodies of disabled people 
will retain their disabilities. Yong, for example, has argued that there will be a continuity of 
identity between pre- and post-resurrection bodies such that people with Down’s Syndrome 
will retain the phenotype of trisomy 21 in their resurrection bodies. Acknowledging that this is 
‘speculative’ eschatology, Yong suggests that, in the eschaton, “disability will be transformed 
even if its particular scars and marks will be redeemed, not eliminated” (2007, p.281). While 
Yong’s theology may be criticised for imprecision or inconsistency around the questions of 
whether all impairments will be visible in the resurrection body or how he distinguishes 
illnesses from disability, and whether God can or cannot heal disabilities (rather than illness) 
(Mullins, 2011), the core of his argument seems to centre on identity. He argues that certain 
disabilities maybe so central to the identity of the person that removing the disability would 
leave the person unrecognisable to others or themselves. Taking a slightly different view, 
Timpe (2019; 2020) points out that, since many disabilities are acquired without challenging a 




person’s identity, there is no reason to think that disability is always essential to identity and 
that its removal would necessarily be damaging in the way described by Yong. However, Timpe 
also suggests that removal (in the afterlife) of even incidental or contingent aspects of identity 
(such as being a parent) can convincingly be thought to be damaging to a person’s self-
identity, and that the same might apply for some disabilities: 
 
On the view I've developed, there may be some disabilities that can be 
retained in the afterlife in a way that doesn't impair the beatific vision, even if 
there are others that may not have a place in our eschatology because they 
detract from a person's flourishing (Timpe, 2019, p.245). 
 
These kind of discussions again highlight the difference between disability theology and 
theology of altered moods. Participants did not seem to consider that their altered moods 
were either a challenge to their identity or that they would continue in the afterlife. In relation 
to trauma, however, Rambo (2017) takes the theological imagination in a slightly different and 
more helpful direction. In this work, Jesus’ continuing, post-resurrection, wounds are taken as 
symbols of trauma rather than disability. The question is not whether physical marks of trauma 
will be present in the afterlife, but what those marks symbolise for the living. This is a helpful 
direction when considering altered moods and contextual Christologies. As I concluded at the 
end of the previous chapter, the participants in this study did not describe Jesus as a saviour 
exactly like them. That is, none of them described Jesus as experiencing the kind of altered 
moods that might have been diagnosed as depression, bipolar disorder, or cPTSD. They did not 
image those experiences as having a place in the eschaton, either in relation to themselves or 
Jesus.  Some participants did, however, highlight their experience of solidarity with Jesus, 
especially in his Passion – of seeing their own suffering mirrored in the cross. Jesus is a saviour 
like them because he too experienced the extremes of mental suffering. Some participants 
also indicated that there were valued outcomes (e.g. increased empathy) arising from their 
mood experiences; these had been incorporated into their self-identity and so it would not be 
surprising if they imagined that these outcomes persisted in the resurrection. 
Diagnoses/symptoms/suffering are not imagined to be taken forward into the afterlife 
(unsurprisingly, since by definition they detract from human flourishing) but the outcomes 
associated with those experiences might be.  
 
It is probably not surprising that no participants described Jesus as experiencing altered 
moods, even though they were very willing to admit that he really did suffer – and even 
though the reality of that suffering was important to them as they sought to interpret their 




own experiences. The imagery associated with contextual Christologies – Jesus as black, Asian, 
disabled etc – is nowhere near as widely acknowledged as the imagery associated with 
traditional Western Christologies. The idea that disability may be a mere difference (rather 
than a bad difference) and that disability may continue into the afterlife is still controversial. If 
an image of Jesus as physically or cognitively disabled is startling, there are perhaps even 
stronger cultural reasons for resisting the idea that Jesus could appropriately be described as 
experiencing altered moods, as mentally ill, or as mad. Writing about CS Lewis’ influential 
saying that Jesus was either the Son of God, a madman, or something worse, Collicutt draws 
attention to the “unquestioned assumption that ‘madness’ and the divine are mutually 
exclusive” (2020, p.59). She summarises the contemporary cultural resistance to the idea that 
Jesus could be mad as resting in a further assumption. This assumption is that, what was 
previously described as madness is a type of illness, and therefore incompatible with God, who 
is healthy. Collicutt goes on to develop what she describes as “the scandalous idea of a mad 
God incarnate” (2020, p.59), arguing that in a number of ways the Gospels present Jesus as 
mad (in the sense of behaving in ways that are judged to be deeply and disturbingly strange, 
rather than irrational or unwell), and that there appears to have been a debate as to whether 
this was simple or divine madness.  
 
Collicutt’s work captures an important dimension which has so far largely been missing from 
mental health theology. Mad theology is much less developed than other contextual 
theologies, and it is rare to read that “ministry by, to, and with mad people only begins to 
make sense if Jesus is understood to be simply mad” (Collicutt, 2020, p.76 citing; Lawrence, 
2020) in a theological work on mental health. However, people who might identify as mad are 
a relatively small subset of those who experience mental health challenges. The examples that 
Collicutt offers are drawn from what medically might be described as psychosis (or hearing 
voices), rather than the range of mental health conditions. Based on the reflections offered by 
participants in this study, I suggest that another, potentially more fruitful, direction for mad 
theology is to look to the cross and the solidarity of God revealed there, rather than finding 
solidarity in the (mad) life and ministry of Jesus or through imaging Jesus as mad. This avoids a 
potential downfall to Collicutt’s approach, which could be seen to divinise suffering (given that 
the psychosis involved in ‘madness’ is necessarily characterised by distress in order to be 
classified as psychopathological). I turn therefore to the theology of the cross.156  
 
156 A turn that Weaver has described as seeking a “response to pain in the enduring symbol of 
the cross” (2013, p.18). 




8.3 Theology of the cross 
 
Recalling the conclusions drawn by Brock and Parker (2002) and Jones (2019) from their 
explorations of the trauma and violence of the cross – that Love or Presence persists – the 
image of Jesus suffering on the cross is, from the perspective of Christian theology, a symbol 
that God is present in the suffering of the world. It is an image of divine love – although as the 
trauma theologians reminded us, there are many theories as to how the cross accomplishes 
this. For some – though not all – of the research participants, the suffering and crucifixion of 
Jesus was the most significant aspect of the Christian narrative and the most significant aspect 
of Christology (rather than, for example, the birth or resurrection of Jesus). The cross 
symbolised the idea that Jesus understands human vulnerability and suffering ‘from the 
inside’, and spoke to them of Jesus’ solidarity in their suffering.  
 
The contemporary theologian Douglas John Hall describes the theology of the cross as 
inherently contextual theology (Hall, 2003, pp.35–52). This type of theology is “geared for the 
hardcore reality of suffering" (Fast, 2016, p.121), and arises in response to the suffering in the 
world:  
 
The metaphor of crucifixion is not as inaccessible to us as it was to our 
Enlightenment forbears. There is a “cross of reality” visible in every honest 
news broadcast. It is in fact this everyday human cross that makes it both 
possible and necessary… to develop a contextually sensitive theology of the 
cross (Hall, 2003, p.71). 
  
The phrase ‘theology of the cross’ originates with Luther, who traced his ideas firstly back to 
the biblical writings attributed to St Paul, and then to Augustine. And yet it has also been 
described as “subversive” (Tomlin, 1997, p.70), “never much loved” (Moltmann, 2015, xix), and 
as a “red thread” running through the Christian theological tradition (Fast, 2011, p.416); always 
present and discernible but rarely taking centre stage.  
 
At this point it is necessary to pause and offer some caveats. The introduction of Luther into a 
thesis dealing with disability and mental distress is not without controversy. He is commonly 
perceived to have been strongly ableist, based on reported comments about a severely 
disabled child. Luther is reported to have described the child as a changeling (i.e. not human), 
and, on that basis, recommended throwing the child into the river. This incident was used by 
National Socialists during the Third Reich as justification for their programme of euthanasia of 




disabled people (Heuser, 2012). Notwithstanding scholarship on the wider body of Luther’s 
work, which raises the possibility that he had a more nuanced approach to disability (Miles, 
2001), this is clearly a repugnant and highly problematic aspect of Luther’s work and legacy. At 
the very least, "Luther remains for us a highly ambiguous figure when it comes to the issue of 
disability” (Heuser, 2012, p.199). We would probably also want to add anti-Semitism and 
support for violent oppression of ‘peasants’ to the list of troubling ambiguities.  And yet his 
theology has been, and remains, influential far beyond those who would call themselves 
Lutherans.  
 
In the introduction to Disability in the Christian Tradition Brock and Swinton suggest what may 
be a way to cope with this ambiguity by appealing to the concept of the communion of saints. 
Their argument is that Christians throughout the ages are, theologically and spiritually, part of 
one ‘family’, bound together not just by a shared commitment to Christ, but as intimately 
connected members of the same body. This does not, in itself, answer the question of the 
most appropriate orientation towards historical or well-known figures when new, problematic, 
information emerges. It does, however, suggest that theologians do not necessarily need to 
conclude that past contexts were simply so alien that there can be no reasonable connection 
between the thinking of the past and contemporary thought: 
 
The historian must often terminate her investigation with the admission that 
the thinking of those in the past was so different from ours that we can't 
make any reasonable sense of it. We must simply admit that we are alienated 
from them and find it very difficult to learn from them. But it is precisely here 
that Christian theology is forced to take another route. Its study of those in 
the past takes place as a study of people under a shared Lord. Because 
Christians throughout the ages have read a single set of scriptures within a 
shared confession of the role of the person and work of Jesus Christ, they are 
provided with a theologically inflected understanding of the very concepts of 
tradition and history (Brock and Swinton, 2012, p.17).  
 
An appeal to the communion of saints does not erase the very problematic views of the past 
(and indeed the present – eugenics is not confined to the past).  It does, however, provide a 
rationale for continuing to engage with those who have gone before, while acknowledging the 
vast differences between Christians, both past and present.  
 
Any discussion that sets Luther’s comments on changelings into context runs the risk of 
appearing to endorse his description of a severely disabled child as a ‘devil’s child’. That said, it 
seems relevant to note that he was not apparently drawing a distinction between disabled and 




non-disabled people generally. Elsewhere in his writings he takes it for granted that disability, 
along with other kinds of hardships, are simply part of human experience (Luther cited in 
Guðmundsdóttir, 2015, p.236).  
 
One further caveat is necessary. Discussions of the theological meaning of suffering frequently 
risk appearing to glorify or romanticise violence and suffering. This is especially the case when 
speaking about the cross, and is emphatically not my intention in what follows. The kind of 
suffering encountered at the cross, and that involved in altered moods, is not good in itself. 
Luther himself, while arguing that the glory of God is revealed in the suffering of the cross, 
specifically warns against choosing suffering. A descriptive emphasis on suffering, as found in 
Luther’s theology of the cross, is not the same as prescribing suffering (Guðmundsdóttir, 
2015). 
 
With those caveats in place, I turn now to introducing Luther’s theology of the cross. 
 
In 1518, Martin Luther, presiding at the Heidelberg Disputation, presented 28 theological and 
12 philosophical theses, describing them as theological paradoxes deduced from the biblical 
texts attributed to St Paul and the work of Augustine. Luther draws from the Bible (specifically, 
Romans 1; 1 Corinthians 1; John 10 & 14; Philippians 3) a number of interwoven contrasts in 
these theses: wisdom and folly, visible and invisible, manifest and hidden, glory and humility, 
evil and good. In this disputation he introduced the concept of the theologian or theology of 
the cross (theologia crucis), contrasting it with the theologian or theology of glory (theologia 
gloriae). In the standard English translation the central theses that describe the theologian of 
the cross are:  
 
19. That person does not deserve to be called a theologian who looks upon 
the invisible things of God as though they were clearly perceptible in those 
things which have actually happened [Romans 1.20].  
20. He deserves to be called a theologian, however, who comprehends the 
visible and manifest things of God seen through suffering and the cross.  
21. A theologian of glory calls evil good and good evil. A theologian of the 
cross calls the thing what it actually is (Luther, 1957).157 
 
157 In the proof attached to theses 19-21, it is evident that Luther is concerned with the 
question of justification by faith, and with countering the concept of natural revelation. As far 
as Luther is concerned, a theologian of the cross is someone who trusts that they are justified 
through faith, rather than seeking justification through works. Luther would argue that God is 
 





McGrath provides a more nuanced translation of two of these theses as: 
 
19. Anyone who observes the invisible things of God, understood through 
those things that are created, does not deserve to be called a theologian.  
20. But anyone who understands the visible rearwards parts of God as 
observed in suffering and the cross does deserve to be called a theologian. 
(McGrath, 2011, pp.202–3) 
 
What it means to be a theologian of the cross is further outlined through describing what it is 
not – a theology of glory. Luther says that a theologian of glory has not recognised God hidden 
in suffering, leading them to call the cross evil rather than good.158 A theologian of glory starts 
from the wrong place; rather than beginning with the cross and viewing the world through a 
cruciform lens they begin with the things of the world (including, for example, conceptions of 
God and the nature of God’s self-disclosure) and view the cross through those. In Luther’s 
terms, a theologian of the cross views the world through the lens of Christ’s suffering and 
cross.  
 
This suggests a particular one-way relationship between experience (things of the world) and 
theology, rather than the dialogue model that I am pursuing in this chapter. However, Hall 
suggests that theology of glory could be translated as ‘triumphalism’ or ‘ideology’. He defines 
this as: 
 
[T]he tendency in all strongly held world-views, whether religious or secular, 
to present themselves as full and complete accounts of reality… Such a 
tendency is triumphalistic in the sense that it triumphs – at least in its own 
self-estimate – over all ignorance, uncertainty, doubt, and incompleteness, as 
well, of course, as over every other point of view (Hall, 2003, p.17). 
 
In the context of the 21st disputation, Hall suggests that this means that the theology of glory 
“presents divine revelation in a straightforward, undialectical, and authoritarian manner that 
silences argument, silences doubt – silences, therefore, real humanity” (2003, p.20). Such a 
description could have been written about some spiritualised accounts of altered moods; it is 
 
revealed only in Christ, while theologians of glory mistakenly identify the things of God 
elsewhere. Thus, theologians of the cross “call the thing what it is”. 
158 McGrath defines the difference between the two theologians as “…a theologian of glory 
“observes what is understood”. A theologian of the cross, however, “understands what is 
seen”” (McGrath, 2011, p.204). 




certainly reflective of the outcome of those theologies. The real experiences and doubts of 
participants are silenced by inflexible or binary theologies which claim to be a full and 
uncomplicated account of reality. It does not feel like a stretch of the imagination to think that 
participants might have identified these as ‘theologies of glory’ if they had been aware of the 
term. However, while it is tempting to name some specific spiritual approaches and Christian 
‘solutions’ to altered moods as theologies of glory, to do so would take me beyond the scope 
of this study.159 Nevertheless, in the course of their interviews, a number of participants 
shared both helpful and harmful responses by their church community, as well as the 
participants’ views on those responses. Some participants identify and criticise the response of 
their church community, largely on the basis that it is not true to their experience – it is not 
calling the thing what it is 
 
Articulating concepts associated with theology of the cross is not easy, relying as it does on the 
paradoxical language of hidden revelation and addressing, as it does, the sufferings of life. As 
Hall suggests, "The theology of the cross can never be a brilliant statement about the 
brokenness of life; it has to be a broken statement about life's brokenness, because it 
participates in what it seeks to describe” (Hegedus, 1989, p.23). This difficulty in articulating 
concepts is shared with trauma theology and with the mad theology outlined in the next 
section; in each case it is necessary to draw on theological imagination and metaphor, and the 
shape of the theology reflects the brokenness or suffering that is part of the subject matter. 
 
Works that explicitly self-identify as theology of the cross (and which therefore trace their 
roots back to Luther) typically emphasise the profound otherness of God, and the problems 
with the world. For example, McCarroll says:  
 
The pervasive reality of suffering in the world undercuts all prideful 
pretensions that desire to ignore, repress, or gloss over the wretchedness of 
life in this realm. It is only through an engagement with the darkness of life in 
its suffering, brokenness, and tragedy that the truth of things in this realm can 
be apprehended and spoken, including intimations of beauty and goodness. 
 
159 The intention of this research was never to gather data about churches’ responses to 
mental distress, and as such these are not covered by the research questions. The intention is 
also not to critique churches without giving them the opportunity to share their own 
perspective – instead the intention is to amplify and centre those voices and ordinary 
theologies which may not otherwise be heard. It is making space for the testimony of those 
who experience altered moods, based on the belief that while mental distress is not a gift, 
those who experience it can be a gift to the church. The aim here is not to uncover theologies 
of glory that might be active in the context of Christians experiencing altered moods.  




The theologian who employs a hermeneutic of the cross cannot honestly 
apprehend beauty without the tragic dimensions of life interpenetrating and 
deepening her apprehension (McCarroll, 2014, p.92). 
 
Such an emphasis is consistent with the ways in which Lutheran reformed theology has 
conceptualised revelation and grace - typically resisting the possibility of natural revelation, 
making a sharp distinction between reason and revelation, and, in relation to “grace alone”, 
strongly emphasising a total human inability to earn or merit salvation other than through 
faith. This may not, in fact, be any different to the official doctrine of other traditions,160 but 
the emphasis on the ‘pervasive reality of suffering’ and the light of God as entirely ‘other’ and 
discontinuous with the darkness of the world, can nonetheless be jarring to those of us from 
other traditions. To put it bluntly, these theologies of the cross seem to have a low opinion of 
humanity and the world (see e.g. Hall, 2003; Fast, 2011; McCarroll, 2014), which contrasts with 
the more positive attitude to wider society that is typical of the central Anglican tradition (see 
section 1.2). However, at least in the case of Hall and McCarroll, this is an intended function of 
the purpose of their theology. Both argue for the need for theology to be contextual – in their 
case arising from the context of contemporary North America. Their explicit aim is to:  
 
deconstruct the edifices of the theology of glory in all its guises in the world. 
This is the critical and negating task wherein the theologian engages the 
realities of his time and place in a negative apologetic. In uncovering the 
theology of glory, the theologian of the cross moves negatively (or critically), 
naming and unpacking what is wrong in the world (McCarroll, 2014, p.94). 
 
These contemporary theologies contend that theologians of the cross perceive that “God is 
not hidden at the cross, but is revealed there most plainly” (Thomas, 2012, p.139). God may be 
said to ‘hide’ by both concealing and revealing Godself in the events of the cross; violent and 
traumatic events which, naturally speaking, would appear to be the exact opposite of Almighty 
God. “Faith, however, sees behind and beyond the brutality and ugliness of the crucifixion as 
such; it sees the glory (doxa) “hidden beneath its opposite”” (Hall, 2003, p.93). The theological 
paradox is that God is both revealed and hidden in the apparent weakness of the cross. God is 
revealed hidden in the suffering of Christ and the cross. The crucifixion, a scene of apparent 
weakness and real trauma, is in fact the central image of the hidden presence of God in the 
 
160 See Lutheran World Federation (2019) for an ecumenical statement about the doctrine of 
justification which articulates “a common understanding of our justification by God’s grace 
through faith in Christ” (p.9). 




world (Louw, 2003, p.393). It is not immediately self-evident that the suffering of Jesus – a 
man dying on a cross – is an expression of divine love.161 There is little that is obviously 
glorious about that image. As with Moses, who was permitted to see only the posterior, 
rearwards, vision of God passing by (Exodus 33), this self-revelation by God is not of the full 
magnificent glory of God’s face. It is, rather, concealed, partial, glimpsed in passing. This is the 
foolishness or scandal of the cross (1 Corinthians 1:18-25).  
 
This scandal is not just an intellectual challenge. Considering the cross as the ultimate image of 
divine love may be emotionally and psychologically challenging, by highlighting the finitude 
and limitedness of humanity. However, McCarroll suggests that reactions to theology of the 
cross may vary (between “terror or relief” (2014, p.69)), depending on the context of those 
encountering the theology: 
 
The gospel is heard and experienced differently in different contexts. In 
contexts of power, it comes disruptively, breaking through the false 
presumptions upon which our empires are built…[But] in the experience of 
authentic human vulnerability there is the possibility for greater humility and 
openness to receive that for which the soul longs… Thus, in contexts of 
vulnerability and authentic humility and in the face of suffering, the 
discontinuity of the gospel can be experienced in a way that is life-affirming. 
(McCarroll, 2014, p.70). 
 
The experience of altered moods is often accompanied by such an awareness of limits and 
vulnerability. It is certainly often accompanied by suffering. It is perhaps no surprise then that 
an awareness of Jesus’ suffering on the cross was experienced by some participants as life-
affirming, despite the trauma and horror of that scene. I want to suggest, therefore, some 
potential points of connection between the theology of the cross, the insights offered by 
trauma theory, and the experience of altered moods. These draw on the empirical analysis in 
each of the previous chapters to offer some of the contours that might be expected in a 
contextual theology of altered moods; those ways in which the experience of altered moods 
shapes theology. They are, however, offered as tentative and potential points of connection or 
direction towards a mad theology, rather than as a grand theory of altered moods or mad 
theology. This is reflective of the nature of suffering and trauma itself, and is in line with both 
Hall’s approach to theology of the cross and Jones’ conclusions about Christology. Each point 
 
161 Although it should be noted that the expression of divine love may be more evident at the 
cross when considered in the context of Jesus’ whole life and ministry.  




of connection arises from the analysis in one of the previous chapters. These points of 
connection are: Wounds that remain (from the chapter ‘Narrative shape’), realism about 
experience (from ‘Interpreting altered moods’), solidarity in suffering (from ‘Christology’), and 
the persistence of love (from ‘Imaging God’).  
 
8.4 Towards a mad theology 
 
8.4.1 Wounds that remain 
 
In Chapter 3 I demonstrated that participants’ altered moods narratives demonstrate a range 
of identity-talk. They do not, however, present their mood experiences as challenging or 
transforming their identity or sense of self, as might have been expected from the sociological 
literature on chronic illness and acquired disability (Bury, 1982; Williams, 2000; Williams, 2000; 
Lafrance and Stoppard, 2006; Locock et al., 2009). As discussed above, however, trauma 
emerged as a more useful lens or framing concept than biographical disruption and recovery. 
Participants’ narratives of their altered moods did not explicitly acknowledge a sense of their 
identity being challenged and reformed after a disruptive experience. This may be related to 
the particular concepts of identity present in that literature, but perhaps is also partially 
because of the ongoing and fluctuating nature of altered moods – even those participants who 
considered themselves recovered did not offer a smooth and linear biography of disruption 
and recovery. Trauma, on the other hand: 
 
leaves holes in the stories we tell about our lives. There are places in those 
stories where endings are abrupt and ragged, other places where stories are 
unfinished; in this way, violence creates open-ended narrative spaces filled 
with fear, silence, and uncertainty (Jones, 2019, p.101).  
 
The theological parallel to biographical disruption and recovery would seem to be the 
traditional linear narrative of cross followed by resurrection, where life triumphs over death. 
This narrative has been criticised by trauma theologians as insufficient to account for the 
ongoing nature of trauma and its afterlife, where life and death (in the guise of the wounds of 
trauma) are felt to be “coterminous rather than sequential, entangled rather than clearly 
delineated” (Rambo, 2017, Introduction, Section 3, para. 6). This description of the afterlife of 
trauma fits the context of altered moods much more closely than the linear narrative. There is 
life after and alongside altered moods, but it is not a narrative of victory, triumph and glory. It 




is much more fragile and tentative than that; God is encountered in the experience, but the 
wounds remain. 
 
In Spirit and Trauma (2010; 2015) and Resurrecting Wounds (2017) Rambo uses a trauma 
hermeneutic to explore Christian concepts of healing and redemption, cross and resurrection, 
and the interpretation of suffering. She draws particularly on two descriptions of trauma – 
trauma as an encounter with death162 and as an ongoing wound: “the storm is gone, but ‘after 
the storm’ is always here” (Rambo, 2015, p.7). She challenges the linear theological narrative 
that moves from cross to resurrection - that life follows, or is victorious over, death. She 
suggests that this “runs the risk of glossing over a more mixed experience of death and life” 
(Rambo, 2015, p.12), such as life after trauma – an experience of ongoing suffering (or ‘death’) 
that remains in life. To speak to the experience of trauma, theology needs to attend to the 
‘middle’ – the area between cross and resurrection, between death and new life. Rambo 
challenges theology to attend to life after the cross without moving immediately to 
resurrection, and to recognise the ways in which trauma, including that of the cross, remains 
after the event. In relation to the chronology of the Gospels, this space is exemplified by Holy 
Saturday and the post-resurrection appearances of Jesus. Rambo notes that these post-
resurrection appearances are both extraordinary and ordinary – the very presence of Jesus is 
extraordinary, and yet he does ordinary things like cook and eat. Suggesting that these 
appearances are “testimonies to life beyond trauma”, Rambo uses the post-resurrection 
wounds of Jesus as a symbol of the afterlife of trauma. The presence of these wounds is 
significant because they are a mark of death appearing within life. The victory of life 
incorporates the woundedness rather than erasing it. She therefore develops the idea of Jesus’ 
resurrection wounds (Luke 24:39-40; John 20:20, 25-27) in a slightly different direction to 
contextual disability theologians. Rather than interpreting the wounds as evidence of post-
resurrection physical impairment (leading to the image of the disabled God), they are instead 
seen as a symbol of life “marked by wounds and yet recreated through them” (Rambo, 2017, 
Introduction, Section 3, para. 5). Perhaps the significant difference is that trauma is not being 
envisaged in terms of identity or as mere difference. Jesus’ wounds function as a marker of his 
identity – the crucified and resurrected one – rather than conferring group membership. The 
wounds of trauma may be a significant part of self-identity without implying a group identity.   
 
162 Potentially literally, in the traumatic event, but also as a metaphorical way of describing the 
ongoing impact of traumatic events – the death of former certainties and ways of being in the 
world.  





Trauma theologians are careful not to imply that trauma itself is a good; they are not offering 
positive narratives of trauma even though survivors and the literature attest to the possibility 
of post-traumatic remaking or growth. In these respects the mad theology that I am outlining 
is much closer to trauma theology than contextual disability theology. Altered moods are not 
widely discussed in terms of identity, nor as mere difference. Certainly there are valued 
outcomes that may arise from altered moods, and some people interpret them as potentially 
transformative, but these are more similar to post-traumatic growth than either the recovery 
identity posited by sociologists of illness or contextual disability Christologies. The biographical 
and theological arc of altered moods tracks that of trauma; wounds that remain (on Jesus or 
people who have experienced altered moods) become a site of disjunction between mad 
theology and disability theology.163 This mad theology is a theology of experience, not a 
theology of identity. As Rambo suggests: 
 
there is something of those wounds still persisting in life… there is no pure 
space to stand apart from them, and… we need to think creatively and 
constructively in the midst of these realities (Rambo, 2017, Conclusion, 
Section 1, para. 1). 
 
The mad theology arising from this project is one attempt to think creatively and 
constructively in the midst of the realities of altered moods. It is to these realities that I turn 
next. 
 
8.4.2 Realism about experience - calling the thing what it is  
 
The cross is a very human scene and belongs to the story of humanity: that humans inflict 
violence on each other is well within our sphere of knowledge, even if we have not ourselves 
experienced traumatic violence. Theology of the cross is realistic about the world and takes 
lived experience seriously.164 This is not to say that theological claims are only valid to the 
extent that they can be verified by experience, but the theology of the cross says that doctrine 
 
163 They also demand that the social in biopsychosocial remains in view – Jesus’ wounds are 
evidence of the humiliation and marginalisation associated with crucifixion. 
164 Hall describes this as honesty about experience and Christian realism  (Hall, 1987, p.13), 
quoting “La theorie c’est bon, mais ҫa n’empeche pas d’exister”: Theory is good, but it doesn’t 
prevent things from existing (Jean-Marie Charcot cited in Hall, 1987, p.41). 




is not a purely abstract and theoretical undertaking - it has to be submitted to the test of life. 
Solberg suggests that Luther’s theology gives a central place to lived experience:  
 
It also suggests his disdain for theology as speculation and for the pretence 
that anyone could do theology at a distance from everyday life, which is 
always lived coram mundo (before, or in the presence of, the world) and 
coram Deo (in the presence of God) (cited in Guðmundsdóttir, 2015, p.235).  
 
Theology of the cross therefore encourages realism about experience. 
 
In the chapter ‘Interpreting altered moods’ I presented the mood experiences of participants, 
and then examined the ways in which they interpreted those experiences. Interpretations fell 
into two major categories; those organised around acceptance/rejection of a biochemical 
account of altered moods, and spiritualised accounts. A minority of participants interpreted 
their altered moods as a time of spiritual growth, but otherwise they rejected spiritualised 
accounts in relation to their own mood experiences. Spiritualised interpretations were 
discussed because they were either a) thought to be possible in theory/in some cases, or b) 
were interpretations that others had given to the participants. Participants identified a gap 
between their experiences and the theology offered by others/their churches, for example, 
the belief that Bible reading and prayer ‘should’ resolve depression. Borrowing a phrase from 
Luther’s Heidelberg Disposition, I describe this orientation of mad theology as ‘calling the thing 
what it is’. Trauma theory too, suggests an important role for ‘calling it what it is’. Recovery 
from trauma involves remembering, re-narrating, and acknowledging the harm that has been 
done.165 
 
Realism about experience and ‘calling the thing what it is’ is precisely what Christians who 
experience altered moods are doing when they describe a gap between their experiences and 
the theology they have encountered, and when they reject spiritualised interpretations of 
their own experiences. Throughout the participants’ accounts it is apparent that people seek 
 
165 O’Donnell criticises use of the word recovery in relation to trauma, suggesting that ‘post-
traumatic remaking’ more accurately captures the experience of “putting oneself together in 
the aftermath of trauma… rather than a recovery of the self that was” (O’Donnell, 2021, 
p.269). This seems to be in line with what recovery usually means in mental health and 
sociology of chronic illness – ‘recovery’ in this case does not imply returning to either the self 
that came before, or to the absence of difficulties/symptoms, but to living well with and after 
mental health challenges. See Bonney and Stickley (2008) for a systematic review of recovery 
concepts.  




to be clear-sighted and realistic about both the depths of their own distress, and the 
difficulties they face in interpreting this suffering. When churches suggest that spiritual 
practices or faith should reduce mental distress and therefore blame people for continuing 
distress, participants ‘call it what it is’ and reject it as a theology of glory. The disconnect 
between experience and theology is one example of ‘realism about experience’, another might 
be the careful and clear accounts of their altered moods offered by participants.166    
 
These first two points of connection - the wounds that remain and calling the thing what it is - 
lead to the next point, encountering the solidarity of God. It is not unusual for contextual 
theologies to talk about solidarity. This emphasis has however, a distinctive shape within mad 
theology, formed by the suffering associated with altered moods. The cross and suffering of 
Jesus come to the fore, with Jesus understood to be in solidarity with human suffering and a 
companion for the journey. 
 
8.4.3 Encountering the solidarity of God through the suffering of Jesus 
 
In the chapter ‘Christology’, I argued that participants image Jesus as having an ‘insider’ view 
of human life. This idea that God, through the suffering of Jesus, understands human suffering 
‘from the inside’ is the central point of connection between trauma theory, theology of the 
cross, and the experience of altered moods. This is in line with Scrutton’s work on Christianity 
and depression, where she suggests that “Jesus' solidarity with those who suffer should be 
foremost in our minds when we think theologically about depression" (Scrutton, 2020, p.193). 
As Hall phrases this: 
 
The theology of the cross declares God is with you — Emmanuel. He is 
alongside you in your suffering. He is in the darkest place of your dark night. 
You do not have to look for him in the sky, beyond the stars, in infinite light, 
in glory unimaginable. He is incarnate. That means he has been crucified 
(cited in Hegedus, 1989, p.24).  
 
Questions such as whether God in Godself suffers and how this relates to concepts of Trinity 
do not come to the fore in these experiences. Instead, God who understands human suffering 
is also understood to be present in our suffering. God is revealed hidden in the suffering of 
 
166 The idea that depression, in particular, is a more, rather than less realistic view of the world 
is known as ‘depressive realism’ and has its roots in psychological research.  




Christ, and spiritual growth is (sometimes) paradoxically found through the experience of 
suffering. The crucifixion is not seen as an easy answer to suffering, nor is it described in terms 
of atonement, such as substitution for sin. Instead, the cross is described in terms of solidarity 
with the suffering Christ. The presence and solidarity of God are revealed through the cross: 
 
Hidden beneath the suffering of the cross is the presence of God. We wait 
upon such revealing. God, through the lens of the cross, is one who is 
particularly present in solidarity with those who suffer and are abandoned, 
humiliated, and betrayed by the power and coercion of the world (McCarroll, 
2014, p.199). 
 
This solidarity is deeper than the ‘misery loves company’ type of relationship described 
disparagingly by Forde (Forde, 1997, Preface, para. 2). Nor is it that Jesus is imagined to have 
suffered inexplicably at the hands of a shared unknown enemy, as Forde suggests. There is a 
recognition that much suffering has an identifiable cause (e.g. as a result of trauma inflicted by 
others), or an acceptance that suffering is associated with living in the kind of world we have. 
There is also a recognition that the cross is the place at which “the old being is crucified and 
the resurrection of the new is anticipated” (Fast, 2016, p.124), with Jesus, the Answerer, both 
accepting their suffering and offering hope of resurrection. 
 
There are at least two aspects to the idea of solidarity with Christ. There is the believer’s 
experience of Christ’s solidarity with them and then there is human-human solidarity, which, 
from the perspective of Christian theology, also flows from Christ. Muers, reflecting on the 
nature of Christian solidarity in a pandemic describes this two-fold nature in this way: “Christ is 
both the pattern of how this solidarity works, as he stands with the victims of structural 
injustice, and the one whose presence is recognized in the act of solidarity with the neighbour 
in need” (Muers, 2020, p.531).  
 
O’Donnell outlines some limitations of the theological idea of solidarity (between Jesus 
suffering on the cross and our human suffering) as a way of making meaning of the cross. As 
with Rambo (2010), she suggests that it moves too quickly to resurrection, that it is through 
the resurrection that Jesus’ suffering on the cross is given significance, and that this 
expectation that life will triumph over death is untrue to the experiences of trauma survivors. 
She also suggests that the idea that Jesus knows what it is like to suffer can offer only fleeting 
comfort if it is not paired with action – that empathy is a starting- not an end-point. She offers 




the concept of groundless solidarity (i.e. solidarity that is not rooted in shared experience or 
identity), coupled with the actions of witness, love, and survival: 
 
Entwined with witness, then, is love: a love that calls the trauma survivor out 
of death; a love that survives. Perhaps this is the hope a trauma survivor can 
see in the broken, tortured and abused body of Jesus on the cross - that love, 
or at least this love anyway, survives. And this love is strong enough to call 
the trauma survivor out of death…. (O’Donnell, 2021, p.269).  
 
The components of mad theology outlined in this chapter and rooted in the research 
participants’ narratives of their altered moods, are in line with O’Donnell’s conclusions about 
trauma survivors. Altered moods do not necessarily link so easily with death, although, for 
some people in some circumstances, death – or living death - may feel like an appropriate 
metaphor for the mental distress experienced. And of course the possibility of self-harm or 
suicide often accompanies mental health challenges, whether that is someone’s own 
experience, in DSM criteria, or in the narratives of participants keen to reassure the researcher 
that although their depression was serious, ‘they never seriously considered suicide’. 
Nevertheless, her conclusions are borne out by the participants’ narratives. Mad theology 
looks to the cross, but does not rush to resurrection. The resurrection of Jesus is not denied or 
minimised, but it is not the most salient factor. Similarly, Jesus is not said to have precisely 
shared the experience of altered moods – this solidarity is not grounded in a shared identity. 
What gives meaning to the solidarity expressed by Jesus on the cross, moving it beyond mere 
empathy from a fellow-sufferer, is the fact that this is seen not just as human love, but as the 
love of God. The suffering of Jesus is significant because it reveals the abiding nature of God’s 
love – a love that persists and endures even through madness.  
 
8.4.4 The abiding nature of God’s love 
 
The final point of connection is related to the chapter ‘Imaging God’. In that chapter I 
suggested that participants image God as present, personal, and pervasive, with the emphasis 
on characteristics summarised by Macquarrie as ‘the nearer side of God’. This characterisation 
is the love that is revealed at the cross and that persists through madness.  The conclusions 
offered by a number of authors in this chapter are strikingly similar to each other and to this 
image of God, despite their different starting points: 
 
For at bottom the theology of the cross means nothing more nor less than 
this: God’s own abiding commitment to this world (Hall, 1989, p.26). 





Jesus is put in the place of the marginalized, the outcast, the humiliated, the 
shamed, the broken, and tortured and killed . . . and love persists. That is it. 
There is no bigger theory that undergirds that (Jones, 2019, p.177). 
 
Presence burns fiercely… Through extremities of experience, God is with us… 
(Brock and Parker, 2002, pp.248–9). 
 
Love survives trauma and the divine love is strong enough to call trauma 
survivors out of death (O’Donnell, 2021, p.270). 
 
Perhaps the divine story is neither a tragic one nor a triumphant one but, in 
fact, a story of divine remaining, the story of love that survives (Rambo, 2010, 
p.172). 
 
All argue that Jesus was not a martyr seeking torture, the cross is not a justification for 
violence, and God was not the perpetrator of the violence of the cross. Jesus is tortured and 
killed, and in the face of that trauma, Love, or Presence, persists. Seeking to articulate the 
ways in which God’s love is encountered through the suffering associated with altered moods, 
Luther’s image of catching a glimpse of the rearwards or posterior view of God is a particularly 
evocative one, echoed by Brock and Parker: 
 
Let us say that life shows us the face of God only in fleeting glimpses, by the 
light of night fires, in dancing shadows, in departing ghosts, and in 
recollections of steady love. (Brock and Parker, 2002, p.252) 
 
These images capture something of the theology that arises from the experience of altered 
moods, and which has been explored throughout this chapter. It is, like the experiences 
themselves, shifting and perhaps more easily expressed in metaphor than direct statements. 
Trauma and suffering do not necessarily or immediately yield a glimpse of God. And yet 
research participants and authors offer testimonies that it is in fact possible to glimpse God in 
the messy tangle of lived experience. I finish this section, therefore, with an image offered by 
Matthias, which captures this same sense of glimpsing God: 
 
Matthias: So, there were times when I felt that it wasn't that God wasn't 
there, I was just not able to see it. I, like, had massive walls up, and if I could 
just maybe stand near enough to the wall, close enough, there might be a tiny 
hole in which I could see what was beyond this. And it- That made me think 
you've got to just keep- you've gotta stay there. Because there is that light 
there, and there might be gleams… And if you stay near the gleam you might 
get to chip away at the hole! And if enough of us are getting the gleams, and 
trying to let people know the gleams are there, that maybe there will be more 
light eventually. 






Mental health challenges are a common feature of contemporary life in the UK. Churches and 
Christian communities are no exception to this. While macro-level surveys suggest that 
religious involvement may be generally associated with improved mental wellbeing,167 this by 
no means exempts Christians from experiencing poor mental health. There are, however, good 
reasons for thinking that religious communities, and the individuals within them, may 
understand mental health challenges in distinctive ways, such as interpreting them from a 
spiritual or theological perspective (e.g. Scrutton, 2020).  
 
In this research I therefore set out to explore the contemporary, lived experience of altered 
moods and Christianity using a distinctive empirical theological methodology to develop a 
grounded practical theology. Through collecting and analysing new interview data from 21 
participants, I have shown that the lived experience of Christianity and altered moods inform 
and challenge each other in four main areas: identity, interpretations of altered moods, images 
of God, and Christology. I have also demonstrated three major overarching themes that frame 
these interactions between altered moods and Christianity: altered moods as a common 
experience not a group identity, the idea of a potential disconnect between theology and 
experience, and the concept of suffering. Through bringing these areas and themes into 
dialogue with wider Christian theology I conclude that it is possible to discern directions for a 
contextual theology of altered moods. This thesis therefore contributes to two areas of 
emerging and as yet underdeveloped literature: contextual theologies of experience, and the 
use of empirical methods within a theological methodology.  
 




• The underlying commitment to ground theology in experience (i.e. to centre the 
experiences of participants) is reflected in the choice of methodology, what I have 
 
167 (Spencer et al., 2016) discussed in section 1.1. 




described as grounded practical theology methodology. This is an innovative 
methodology which combines grounded theory methods with a dialogic mutual critical 
correlation practical theological methodology. In this approach, grounded theory is 




• Attention to the narrative shape of the interviews reveals firstly that altered moods 
are associated with a significant degree of suffering, and secondly that the lived 
experiences of altered moods and Christianity inform each other in ways which lead to 
particular kinds of identity-talk. This section draws on and complicates the sensitising 
concepts of core narrative and biographical disruption. These concepts are not present 
in the data in a straightforward way; altered moods are not seen as a shared identity, 
nor a challenge to self-identity. Concepts of spiritual disruption and a potential 
disconnect between theology and everyday experience are central to this identity-talk. 
Both these concepts recur in the ways in which people interpret and label their mood 
experiences. 
 
Research question 1: How do people with lived experience of Christianity interpret their 
experiences of altered moods? 
 
• The two major clusters of interpretations are those which centre on the idea of a 
‘chemical imbalance’ (with that particular perspective either accepted, partially 
accepted, or rejected), and those which interpret them in spiritualised terms. Attitudes 
towards the medical labelling of altered moods form a third cluster. These attitudes 
are associated with the idea of a chemical imbalance, i.e. those who strongly resisted 
the narrative of altered moods resulting from a chemical imbalance also tended to 
reject medical labelling as unhelpful or inaccurate. They also reflect further identity-
talk, in relation to potential stigma associated with diagnosis.  
 
• Spiritualised accounts interpret altered moods as evidence of evil spirits or poor 
spiritual health, as a form of testing, or, positively, as a potentially transformative time 
of spiritual growth. None of the participants endorsed the first three types of 
spiritualised account as accurate interpretations of their own altered moods, but some 
had encountered them in their churches (rather than having just heard of them in 




passing). Potential disconnects between experience/theology and 
experience/medicine are therefore identified in this analysis. Evil spirit and poor 
spiritual health interpretations are perceived as often, but not inherently, harmful to 
those experiencing altered moods. This harm is related to the blame that often 
accompanies those accounts, or to the type of deliverance ministry or simplistic 
solutions (such as reading the Bible more often) that may follow them.   
 
Research question 2: Does the experience of altered moods change people’s theology? 
Research question 3: How might the experience of altered moods inform or challenge Christian 
theology? 
 
• Turning the focus from the lived experience of altered moods to the lived experience 
of Christianity, altered moods can be seen to interact with wider Christian theology in 
two major areas: images or representations of God in Godself, and Christology. In 
some cases there is a perceived relationship between theology and experience, with 
experience leading to changed theology i.e. the experience of altered moods shapes 
theology in certain ways. This interaction emerges in relation to both images of God 
and Christology.  
 
• The images of God that arise from the intersection between the lived experiences of 
altered moods and Christianity typically characterise God as present, personal, and 
pervasive. God is imaged as accessible, but also ‘more-than’. Images of God are also 
formed in relation to images that are considered to be mainstream or traditional (such 
as God as father). 
 
• Christology is also a significant theological interpretive resource. Jesus is represented 
as understanding human vulnerability ‘from the inside’. These images of Jesus are 
almost exclusively of the adult, earthly, Jesus and tend towards images of his Passion 
and suffering. Divine solidarity is most frequently encountered through Jesus’ 
suffering, but also in Jesus’ wider life and ministry, in his solidarity with those who are 
powerless or oppressed.   
 
Research question 4: How congruent is wider Christian theology with the lived experience of 
altered moods? 
 




• The concept of suffering runs as a thread throughout the analysis. The interpretative 
accounts, images of God, and Christology are all oriented towards the question of 
theodicy in relation to suffering; these are different approaches to resolve the 
perceived tension between the existence of suffering and the Christian tradition of an 
omnipotent and omnibenevolent God. 
 
• The analysis of the empirical material is then placed in dialogue with disability 
theology. This process of dialogic mutual critical correlation identifies areas of 
commonality between the voice of experience and the voice of Christian tradition, but 
also a significant difference. Unlike in the disability theology literature, God is not 
imaged as experiencing altered moods. Instead, the traditional image of Jesus 
suffering on the cross is adopted and transformed to incorporate the suffering 
associated with altered moods. Jesus on the cross is the site of divine solidarity with 
human suffering, a companion for the journey. This approach appears to be distinctive 
to theological reflection on altered moods. 
 
• This insight leads to a further process of dialogue, in which the preceding analysis is 
brought into conversation with contextual Christologies, trauma theology, and 
theology of the cross. These areas of theology offer differing perspectives on Jesus’ 
suffering, and illuminate the points of disconnection between mental health 
theologies and disability theology, by attending to the reality of ongoing suffering and 
the emphasis on shared experience rather than shared identity. 
 
Research question 5: What theological themes might provide the contours of a contextual 
theology of mental health? 
 
• Finally, all the threads are gathered up and woven together into a new garment, one 
that outlines potential contours of a new theology of experience – a theology of 
altered moods, or mad theology. These contours are: wounds that remain, realism 
about experience, encountering the solidarity of God through the suffering of Jesus, 
and the abiding nature of God’s love. Through these contours this theology emerges as 
one that bears witness to the fact that God can be glimpsed and encountered even in 
the ‘messy tangle’ of altered moods and mental distress.  
 




The argument presented above offers a grounded practical theology of altered moods, based 
on a robust and innovative empirical methodology. This practical theology builds on and 
develops the existing literature by applying insights from contextual theologies, disability 
theology, and the newly emerging theologies of experience, in a different context – that of 
altered moods. As such, it is a practical theology ‘which is contextual’, rather than a full 
contextual theology.  
 
By grounding theology in experience, this thesis therefore makes a contribution to the existing 
literature in four areas:  
1) This project addresses a number of the gaps identified in the introductory literature 
review and acknowledged by authors in the field, in particular the relatively little 
attention paid specifically to the theology of mental health (when compared with the 
large and diverse field of disability theology), and the very small number of published 
accounts of using grounded theory as a theological methodology. The project also 
aligns with established authors’ calls for more research into the lived experience of 
mental health and Christianity. Specifically, Swinton’s (2020a) call for theological 
redescriptions of common mental health challenges, and Ryan’s call for “an authentic 
biblical and theological language of mental health” (2017, p.8). 
2) The new empirical material and analysis presented here extends our understanding of 
the lived experience of altered moods and Christianity and the ways in which they 
inform each other. In particular, it extends our understanding of the ordinary theology 
of Christians who experience a range of mental challenges, the theological resources 
that they draw on to interpret and live with those challenges, and points of connection 
between these ordinary theologies and wider Christian theology.  
3) The grounded practical theology contributes to and extends the emerging field of 
theologies of experience which previously have focused on dementia or trauma. It 
identifies the ways in which theology of altered moods is distinctive when compared 
to wider disability theology and suggests potential directions for a theology of altered 
moods. The empirical nature of the project is also distinctive in the area of mental 
health theology, where the majority of the  previous work is theoretical, 
autobiographical, or relies on previously published accounts.168  
 
168 Discussed in section 1.4. 




4) The methodology contributes to the field of empirical theology through the use of 
grounded theory as a theological methodology. I believe that this is the first time this 
kind of methodology has been used in relation to mental health. 
 
There were, of course, limitations to the project. One of the most significant areas of limitation 
relates to the methodology. Specifically, the pool of participants who provided the empirical 
material, decisions that were made about recruitment and inclusion criteria, and, relatedly, 
the collection of demographic data. Inclusion criteria were intentionally broad, in order to 
allow any participant who identified as having lived experience of Christianity and disruptive 
altered moods to be added to the pool. I also asked for very little information about potential 
participants, other than for them to confirm they met the inclusion criteria. Later in the 
recruitment process I also carried out purposive sampling, and asked potential participants if 
they considered themselves part of the specific groups I was seeking to interview (at different 
times this was identifying as LGBTQ+, male, or Catholic). These decisions were made with good 
intentions, as I was concerned not to exclude participants without a diagnosis or set up 
unnecessary barriers to participation, to provide a large enough pool for maximum variation 
sampling, and to meet ethical requirements when dealing with potentially sensitive topics. 
However, these decisions limited the kind of analysis that was possible, and the conclusions 
that could be drawn from it. For example, the wide range of mood experiences and Christian 
traditions meant that analysis had to focus on looking for commonalities across the narratives, 
while acknowledging differences and outliers. This diversity meant that it was not possible to 
drill down into some of the interesting concepts that emerged, or, in most cases, to correlate 
participant characteristics with analytic themes. The sample was not large enough, I did not 
have sufficient demographic information, and one interview did not provide the right kind of 
data to pursue interesting questions to do with differences in tradition or their relationship 
with participant characteristics (such as whether certain interpretations of altered moods were 
associated with age or background).  
 
The final group of participants were not representative of the UK population in significant 
ways, specifically with respect to ethnicity, nationality, education level, and perhaps sexuality 
and gender identity. This lack of diversity was most likely related to my recruitment strategy 
and possible self-selection bias, but also to the decision not to collect demographic 
information. This lack of information meant it was difficult to give any details about participant 
ethnicity, since I was relying on what participants may have disclosed in the course of the 
interview and to some extent my own perceptions (which may or may not be accurate). My 




estimate is that seven of the 21 participants had minoritised ethnic heritage, of whom two had 
US citizenship, and three had Irish heritage. While qualitative research does not rely on 
representative sampling, this lack of representation among the participants does still represent 
a limitation to this specific research, since all of these characteristics might affect the lived 
experience of both altered moods and Christianity. The final way in which the participant pool 
and selection was limited is that only one participant no longer identified as Christian. While it 
is understandable that someone might not wish to be interviewed about something they no 
longer identify with, this did place a further limit on the analysis. 
 
The second area of limitation relates to Christian tradition. While there was a broad range of 
Christian traditions represented among the participants, no participant was part of a black 
majority church or an Orthodox church. This represents a limitation for the same reasons 
described above. However, the range of Christian traditions was both a strength and a 
limitation in other ways. In terms of the grounded theory methodology, variation is considered 
a strength and is actively sought out. It is thought to enhance the robustness of the analysis 
and resulting theory, as it has to account for divergent cases. In terms of theology, it is much 
more usual to write from within one tradition. When it came to bringing the empirical analysis 
into conversation with wider theology it was therefore not at all clear which theological 
tradition to use. This was an unanticipated difficulty of using grounded theory as a tool in 
theological methodology, which I resolved to some extent by initially bringing the voice of 
experience into dialogue with disability theology which tends to be less explicitly confessional. 
Explicitly confessional material, specifically the Lutheran theology of the cross, I reserved for 
the final chapter, which intentionally went beyond the empirical data to introduce my own 
voice. This range of tradition does, however, mean that while it is possible to say, for example, 
that ‘Christians offer these interpretations of altered moods’, it is much more difficult to say 
‘Roman Catholics offer these interpretations’, or ‘Roman Catholics and Pentecostals differ in 
these ways.’ 
 
This consideration of the limitations of the research suggests one fruitful area for future 
research could be to address some of those limitations by carrying out similar research but 
with tighter inclusion criteria. For example, the experiences of people who no longer identify 
as Christian might offer a useful counterpoint to the analysis so far, as would an exploration of 
specific traditions. There are, however, other fruitful areas of research that arise more directly 
from the empirical material and analysis. One direction would be to develop the idea of 
theologies of experience by exploring other areas of lived experience that might be thought to 




shape theology. Autism would be one possibility, as would dyslexia (perhaps in relation to the 
text-focused nature of Christianity, and the idea of Jesus as the word/logos of God). The 
second area relates to pastoral theology and ministry to/with/by people who experience 
mental health challenges. This project was not intended to be primarily a work of pastoral 
theology, however, in the course of the interviews I incidentally collected a very large range of 
material about churches’ approaches to mental health challenges, both helpful and unhelpful. 
This material is not, in the main, presented in this thesis, but would be a fruitful area for future 
research and analysis. 
 
Even without the pastoral material being presented in this thesis, this research has some clear 
pastoral implications. One of those pastoral implications is in relation to evil spirit and spiritual 
symptom accounts. Such accounts are typically perceived as harmful by those people on the 
receiving end of them, not because of the content of the account, but because of its 
outcomes. These harmful outcomes are aggressive deliverance ministry or exorcism, 
exhortations to greater spiritual efforts, and blame (including linking altered moods with 
personal sin) directed at the person when mental health challenges develop or do not resolve. 
For those people who accept these accounts as a possible interpretation of altered moods, a 
more pastorally responsible approach would be to offer deliverance ministry in the form of 
prayer, and to consider carefully whether such ministry might be considered aggressive, 
coercive, or threatening to the person receiving it. Ministers and communities should also be 
wary of presenting a ‘one interpretation fits all’ approach to altered moods, and to implying 
through pastoral practice that one particular approach ‘should’ resolve mental health 
challenges. The reality is that mental health challenges are often long-term, even if 
intermittent and even if the person is a faithful Christian; theology is not free to disregard this 
reality. 
 
A second pastoral implication that flows from this thesis relates to the ways in which people 
who experience mental health challenges are enabled, or not, to take their place and 
contribute to the life of Christian communities. Altered moods are not a gift, but people who 
experience them are a gift to the church. This thesis has demonstrated that people who 
experience altered moods reflect deeply and theologically about them, and that their insights 
can illuminate both wider Christian theology and the everyday experiences of Christians 
(whether or not they themselves experience altered moods). Acknowledging the wounds that 
remain for many people, realism about experience, divine solidarity and suffering, and the 
abiding nature of God’s love – these are all theological insights that arise in the experience of 




altered moods but have relevance beyond that experience for people living through suffering. I 
hope, therefore, that this research will prove useful, in the first place, for Christians who 
experience altered moods. However, I hope it will also be useful for pastoral ministers looking 
to value the experiences and insights of those who experience altered moods, and finally, 
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Appendix A: Final interview schedule 
Area 1: Altered mood 
• Can you tell me a bit about your mood experiences - being unusually low/high? 
o At the time, how did you explain what was happening? 
o Thoughts about diagnosis and labelling? 
• What does the word depression/bipolar/mood mean to you now? 
 
Area 2 – Christian experience 
• Can you tell me a bit about your experience of Christianity? Did you grow up as a 
Christian? 
• How would you describe your spiritual identity now? 
• What words or pictures would you use to describe God/Higher Power/Jesus? 
 
Area 3 - Interactions 
• Do you recall ever hearing/reading anything about Christianity and mental health? 
o How would your church/Christians you knew react if someone had altered mood? 
o In your opinion, does the Bible say anything about mental health? 
• How would your church/Christians explain altered moods? E.g. what causes them, what 
should the treatment be? 
o Would you describe your mood differently if you were talking to someone from 
church than to a doctor? 
• Is there any connection for you between your spiritual life/faith and your experience of 
altered mood? 
o Would you say your spiritual life has been changed as a result of your personal 
experience of altered mood? 
o Have your altered moods been changed as a result of your experience of 
Christianity? 
• Have you got a view on the role of suffering in life? 
 
Closing 
• Anything you thought we’d talk about that we haven’t? 
• Anything else you think I need to know? 
• Anything you want to ask? 
